919. How do sanctions related to U.S. bank loans imposed on Russia pursuant to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Act of 1991 (CBW Act), as announced by the State Department on August 20, 2021, affect existing prohibitions?Answer

The prohibitions announced by the State Department on August 20, 2021 related to U.S. bank loans have the same scope as those imposed by OFAC in August 2019 under the CBW Act Directive.  Please see FAQs 675–678 for additional information.

Note that additional prohibitions on dealings in Russian sovereign debt are in effect under Directive 1 of Executive Order 14024. See FAQs 888–891.

920. How are the sanctions related to import restrictions imposed on Russia pursuant to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Act of 1991 (CBW Act), as announced by the State Department on August 20, 2021, being implemented?Answer

The announced import restrictions related to the permanent importation of firearms and ammunition that are the growth, product, or manufacture of the Russian Federation will be implemented by the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF).  OFAC has concurred with the Deputy Secretary of State’s determination pursuant to the CBW Act regarding the imposition of import restrictions, and with ATF’s implementation of the restrictions according to State Department guidance.  

For information about the sanctions announced by the State Department pursuant to the CBW Act on August 20, 2021, please see the relevant State Department press statement and Federal Register Notice. For additional guidance regarding the import restrictions, please review the related Fact Sheet published by the State Department.

921. What is the purpose of Executive Order (E.O.) of August 20, 2021, “Blocking Property with Respect to Certain Russian Energy Export Pipelines”?Answer

The Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act of 2019, 22 U.S.C. 9526 note, as amended (PEESA), requires the imposition of sanctions with respect to the provision of vessels engaged in specified activities for the construction of certain Russian energy export pipelines, including the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, the TurkStream pipeline project, or any project that is a successor to either such project.  E.O. of August 20, 2021, issued under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State to further implement those sanctions and directs agencies of the United States government to take all appropriate measures within their authority to ensure the full implementation of those sanctions.

Among other things, E.O. of August 20, 2021 enables Treasury to promulgate regulations and provides for blocking of PEESA-designated persons without the exception relating to the importation of goods in Section 7503(e) of PEESA. All property and interests in property of persons designated pursuant to E.O. of August 20, 2021 that are or come within the United States or the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with them. Additionally, entities owned 50 percent or more, individually or in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.

894. What does Russia-related General License (GL) 1A authorize?Answer

Russia-related GL 1A authorizes U.S. persons to engage in certain transactions and activities otherwise prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) of August 20, 2021, “Blocking Property with Respect to Certain Russian Energy Export Pipelines,” or the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act of 2019, 22 U.S.C. 9526 note, as amended (PEESA). A prior version of Russia-related GL 1A was issued on May 21, 2021 (GL 1). On August 20, 2021, GL 1 was amended and reissued as Russia-related GL 1Ato ensure that the scope of activities authorized with respect to the Federal State Budgetary Institution Marine Rescue Service (MRS) includes E.O. of August 20, 2021. Russia-related GL 1A replaces and supersedes GL 1 effective August 20, 2021. Specifically, GL 1A authorizes U.S. persons to engage in transactions and activities involving MRS, or any entity in which MRS owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are not related to the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, the TurkStream pipeline project, or any project that is a successor to either such project. GL 1A does not, however, authorize any transactions or activities with any vessels identified on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List) as blocked property of MRS, including vessels identified as blocked property of any entity in which MRS owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest.

U.S. Imposes Additional Costs on Russia for Aleksey Navalny Poisoning

PRESS STATEMENT

NED PRICE, DEPARTMENT SPOKESPERSON

AUGUST 20, 2021Share

The United States, in concert with the United Kingdom, is imposing additional costs on the Russian Federation on the one-year anniversary of the poisoning of Russian opposition figure Aleksey Navalny with a Novichok nerve agent.

As the United Kingdom and the United States reaffirmed [https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-anniversary-of-mr-alexey-navalnys-poisoning/], we condemn the August 2020 assassination attempt on Mr. Navalny and subsequent actions intended to stop his efforts to criticize the Russian government, including his imprisonment in January 2021.

Our actions today – exercised by the U.S. Departments of State, the Treasury, Justice and Commerce – send a clear signal that there will be no impunity for the use of chemical weapons, including for the individuals and organizations involved. Any use of chemical weapons is unacceptable and contravenes international norms.  The United States calls upon Russia to comply with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

As part of today’s actions, the Department of State is imposing a second round of sanctions on Russia under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act (CBW Act). These include a restriction on the permanent importation of firearms or ammunition manufactured or located in Russia pursuant to new or pending permit applications as well as further restrictions on nuclear and missile-related technology exports to Russia.

The Departments of State and the Treasury will also designate nine Russian individuals and four entities, including operatives involved in poisoning Mr. Navalny and entities that have developed Russia’s chemical weapons capabilities.

For more information on today’s action, please see the Department of State’s fact sheet and the Department of the Treasury press release on today’s action.

PRESS RELEASES

Treasury Sanctions Russian Operatives and Entities Linked to the Poisoning of Aleksey Navalny, Chemical Weapons Program

August 20, 2021

WASHINGTON – Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the U.S. Department of State joined the United Kingdom in imposing additional sanctions on Russia in response to the state-sponsored poisoning of Russian opposition leader Aleksey Navalny that took place one year ago today. Specifically, OFAC is designating nine Russian individuals and two Russian entities involved in Navalny’s poisoning or Russia’s chemical weapons program. This is the third use of Treasury’s discretionary authorities to respond to Russia’s use of Novichok against its own citizens. Additionally, the U.S. Department of State is designating two Russian Ministry of Defense scientific laboratories that have engaged in activities to develop Russia’s chemical weapons capabilities. These actions build upon those announced by the United States in March and are consistent with the spirit of the U.S. Chemical and Biological Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act).

“Today, on the one year anniversary of Aleksey Navalny’s poisoning by Russian government agents, we stand with our ally, the United Kingdom, to again condemn the Kremlin’s use of a chemical weapon to target one of Russia’s most prominent opposition leaders,” said Office of Foreign Assets Control Director Andrea Gacki. “Navalny’s poisoning was a shocking violation of international norms against the use of chemical weapons and was part of an ongoing campaign to silence voices of dissent in Russia.”

NAVALNY’S POISONING BY THE FSB

Navalny has been the target of FSB surveillance for many years, including through wiretapping and covert video surveillance. The U.S. government assesses that Russia’s FSB officers used the nerve agent Novichok to poison Navalny, causing him to fall gravely ill on August 20, 2020, while he was traveling back to Moscow after campaigning in Tomsk and Novosibirsk. Navalny fell ill about 30 minutes into the flight, prompting an emergency landing in Omsk, where Navalny was treated by local hospital staff. Russian officials continue to deny the existence of any toxin in Navalny’s blood, despite analysis from numerous European laboratories and an official report from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which definitively concluded that Navalny was poisoned with a nerve agent from a group of agents, Novichoks, that only Russia has developed and used as chemical weapons.

The Russian operation against Navalny reportedly involved multiple individuals who were on the ground in both Tomsk and Omsk, as well as operatives coordinating the situation from afar. Eight of the individuals targeted today participated in Russia’s operation to assassinate Navalny. These individuals collaborated to surveil Navalny ahead of the attack, break into his hotel room and apply the chemical weapon to his personal belongings, and they attempted to erase any evidence of their operation following the attack. The ninth individual, Aleksei Sedov, is Chief of the FSB’s Service for the Protection of the Constitutional System and the Fight against Terrorism (also referred to as the FSB’s 2nd Service).

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ACTIONS

On March 2, 2021, the Treasury Department sanctioned seven Russian government officials for their involvement in the poisoning of Navalny. Separately, in December 2018, OFAC also responded to Moscow’s March 2018 attempted assassination of former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei Skripal in Salisbury, United Kingdom, in an attack that similarly leveraged the use of a Novichok nerve agent. OFAC sanctioned several Russian persons associated with the Skripal attack, under multiple authorities, and also implemented prohibitions pursuant to the CBW Act.

Through today’s action, the United States is targeting additional Russian officials who commanded the operation or bear responsibility by nature of their positions, and further expands our action to include rank-and-file security service operatives who were directly involved in the attack. Furthermore, several persons designated today were identified for their contributions to Russia’s continued proliferation of chemical weapons, in violation of international standards and agreements.

The individuals and entities listed below are being designated for acting for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the FSB pursuant to E.O. 13382, a counter-proliferation authority. The FSB was previously designated by Treasury pursuant to E.O. 13694 on December 20, 2016; Section 224 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) on March 15, 2018; and most recently by the Department of State on March 2, 2021, pursuant to E.O. 13382.

The FSB Criminalistics Institute is a sub-unit of the FSB originally founded under the KGB as a specialized laboratory. It has been reported that a majority of the individuals implicated in the attack against Navalny worked within or collaborated with members of this FSB unit.

Vladimir Bogdanov is Chief of the FSB’s Special Technology Center, an entity which oversees the activities of the FSB Criminalistics Institute. Bogdanov was reportedly in contact with individuals implicated in Navalny’s poisoning in the lead up to and directly following the attack.

Stanislav Makshakov is reportedly an FSB official and toxicologist who was in frequent communication and coordination with FSB leadership and individuals involved in Navalny’s poisoning around the time of the attack.

Konstantin Kudryavtsev is an FSB Criminalistics Institute operative who is reported to have been a part of the core FSB group that was involved in Navalny’s poisoning. Kudryavtsev admitted to his involvement in the cleanup operation following Navalny’s poisoning, as well as his involvement in at least one other operation against Navalny in 2017.

Alexey Alexandrov and Ivan Osipov are FSB Criminalistics Institute operatives who have been reported as two of the main perpetrators of the attack on Navalny.

Vladimir Panyaev is an FSB operative who was reported to have tailed Navalny on several occasions prior to the poisoning.

Aleksei Sedov is the Chief of the FSB’s Service for the Protection of the Constitutional System and the Fight against Terrorism (also referred to as the FSB’s 2nd Service), an organization responsible for managing internal political threats on behalf of the Kremlin. Operatives of the 2nd Service have been reported to have coordinated with the members of the FSB unit involved in the Navalny poisoning.

The following individuals and entity are being designated pursuant to E.O. 14024, a Russia-related authority:

The State Institute for Experimental Military Medicine (GNII VM) is a scientific research organization specializing in security and defense that operates under the ultimate authority of the Russian Ministry of Defense. GNII VM has collaborated with the 27th Scientific Center and the 33rd Scientific Research and Testing Institute — entities previously identified and designated by the U.S. government for engaging in activities to develop Russia’s chemical weapons capabilities — GNII VM is being designated for operating in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation.

Artur Zhirov is the former director of the 27th Scientific Center and a chemical weapons expert. Zhirov is being designated for having been an official of the Russian Federation.

Kirill Vasiliev is the Director of the FSB Criminalistics Institute. Vasiliev was in communication with FSB Criminalistics Institute Deputy Director Makshakov in the months preceding Navalny’s poisoning, specifically during an incident believed to have been a previous poisoning attempt against Navalny. Vasiliev is being designated for being an official of the Government of the Russian Federation.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE ACTIONS

Today, the Department of State is designating Russia’s 27th Scientific Center and the 33rd Scientific Research and Testing Institute pursuant to Russia-related authority, E.O. 14024, for operating in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation. Both the 27th Scientific Center and the 33rd Scientific Research and Testing Institute were previously sanctioned by the Department of State on March 2, 2021 pursuant to counterproliferation-related authority, E.O. 13382, for having engaged, or attempted to engage, in activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery (including missiles capable of delivering such weapons), including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use such items, by Russia.

View the Department of State’s fact sheet and statement on today’s actions.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of Treasury’s actions, all property and interests in property of the persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or dealings within the United States (including transactions transiting the United States) that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.

Fact Sheet: United States Imposes Additional Costs on Russia for the Poisoning of Aleksey Navalny

FACT SHEET

OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON

AUGUST 20, 2021Share

CBW ACT SANCTIONS

Description of Sanctions: Pursuant to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (the CBW Act), the United States will impose a second round of sanctions on the Russian Federation over its use of a “Novichok” nerve agent in the August 2020 poisoning of Russian opposition figure Aleksey Navalny.

New sanctions imposed today under the CBW Act include:

1. Restrictions on the permanent imports of certain Russian firearms. New and pending permit applications for the permanent importation of firearms and ammunition manufactured or located in Russia will be subject to a policy of denial.
2. Additional Department of Commerce export restrictions on nuclear and missile-related goods and technology pursuant to the Export Control Reform Act of 2018.

These sanctions also include a continuation of measures imposed on March 2, 2021, as well as in 2018 and 2019 in response to the poisoning of Sergey Skripal and his daughter, along with the waivers associated with these sanctions.  For information about the waivers, please see 86 FR 14804 and 84 FR 44671.

Duration and Conditions for Removal

These latest sanctions on Russia pursuant to the CBW Act will take effect upon the publication of a Federal Register notice expected on September 7, 2021, and they will remain in place for a minimum of 12 months. The sanctions can only be lifted after a 12-month period if the Executive Branch determines and certifies to Congress that Russia has met several conditions described in the CBW Act, 22 U.S.C. 5605(c), including (1) providing reliable assurances that it will not use chemical weapons in violation of international law, (2) it is not making preparations to use chemical weapons in the future, (3) it is willing to allow international inspectors to verify those assurances, and (4) it is making restitution to Mr. Navalny.

ACTIONS UNDER E.O.s 13382 AND 14024

Today, the Departments of State and the Treasury also designated numerous individuals and entities, including operatives involved in poisoning Mr. Navalny and entities that have developed Russia’s chemical weapons capabilities.  Together with the measures imposed under the CBW Act, these actions send a clear message that there will be accountability for the use of chemical weapons.

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE’S ACTIONS UNDER E.O. 14024 

Pursuant to the authorities in E.O. 14024 of April 15, 2021 (Blocking Property With Respect To Specified Harmful Foreign Activities of the Government of the Russian Federation), today the Department of State designated two Russian Ministry of Defense scientific institutes:  the 27th Scientific Center and the 33rd Scientific Research and Testing Institute.  Both entities are being re-designated pursuant to Section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024 because they have been determined to operate or have operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy.  The Department of State previously designated both of these entities under E.O. 13382 of June 28, 2005 (Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters).

The 27th Scientific Center and the 33rd Scientific Research and Testing Institute have engaged in activities to develop Russia’s chemical weapons capabilities, including technologies for delivering such weapons.  The 33rd Scientific Research and Testing Institute stewards Russia’s Shikhany Chemical Proving Ground, where Russia conducts chemical weapons-related testing.  The 27th Scientific Center has been involved with Russian chemical weapons research and testing activities.

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY’S ACTIONS UNDER E.O. 13382 AND E.O. 14024

On March 2, 2021, the Department of State designated Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) pursuant to E.O. 13382 for its role in the Navalny poisoning and for possessing a Novichok chemical weapon.  Today, pursuant to E.O. 13382, Treasury designated the FSB Criminalistics Institute; Vladimir Bogdanov, who is Chief of the FSB’s Special Technology Center; Stanislav Makshakov, who is reportedly an FSB official who was in frequent communication and coordination with FSB leadership and individuals involved in Navalny’s poisoning around the time of the attack; Konstantin Kudryavtsev, who is an FSB Criminalistics Institute operative who is reported to have been a part of the core FSB group that was involved in Navalny’s poisoning; Alexey Alexandrov and Ivan Osipov, who are FSB Criminalistics Institute operatives that have been reported as two of the main perpetrators of the attack on Navalny; Vladimir Panyaev, who is an FSB operative who was reported to have tailed Navalny on several occasions prior to the poisoning; and Aleksey Sedov, Chief of the FSB’s Service for the Protection of the Constitutional System and the Fight against Terrorism, whose operatives have been reported to have coordinated with the members of the FSB unit involved in the Navalny poisoning.

Under E.O. 14024, Treasury also designated Kirill Vasiliev, who is the Director of the FSB Criminalistics Institute.  Vasiliev was in communication with FSB Criminalistics Institute Deputy Director Stanislav Makshakov in the months preceding Navalny’s poisoning, specifically during an incident believed to have been a previous poisoning attempt against Navalny.  Additionally, Treasury also designated Artur Zhirov and the State Institute for Experimental Military Medicine (GNII VM), which is a scientific research organization specializing in security and defense that operates under the ultimate authority of the Russian Ministry of Defense, and which has collaborated with the 27th Scientific Center and the 33rd Scientific Research and Testing Institute.  Zhirov is the former director of the 27th Scientific Center and a chemical weapons expert.

The individuals targeted today either participated in Russia’s operation to assassinate or surveil Navalny. Additional information on Treasury’s action is available at: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0328.