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HKMA Alert: HSBC Phishing Emails

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Press Releases

Phishing emails related to The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited

The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) wishes to alert members of the public to a press release issued by The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited on phishing e-mails, which has been reported to the HKMA. Hyperlink to the press release is available on the HKMA website for ease of reference by members of the public.

Anyone who has provided his or her personal information to the e-mails concerned or has conducted any financial transactions through the e-mails should contact the bank concerned using the contact information provided in the press release, and report to the Police or contact the Cyber Security and Technology Crime Bureau of the Hong Kong Police Force at 2860 5012.

 

Hong Kong Monetary Authority
11 March 2019

Link:

HKMA Notice


April 1, 2019: UN, OSFI update 6 on counter terror list

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On Monday, Canadian officials amended the following 6 individual listings modified by the United Nations ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee last Friday:

QDi.001 Name: 1: SAYF-AL ADLMohammed 2: n.a.Salahaldin3: n.a.Abd El Halim 4: n.a. Zidane 
Name (original script): سيف العدل محمد صلاح الدين عبدالحليم زيدان
Title: na Designation: na DOB: (a) 11 Apr. 1963 (b) 11 Apr. 1960POB: Monufia Governate, Egypt Good quality a.k.a.: a) Mohammed Salahaldin Abd El Halim ZidanSayf-Al Adl (DOB: 11 Apr. 1963. POB: Monufia Governorate, Egypt. Nationality: Egypt. In Arabic: محمد صلاح الدين عبدالحليم زيدان سيف العدل b) Muhamad Ibrahim Makkawi (DOB: a) 11 Apr. 1960 b) 11 Apr. 1963. POB: Egypt. Nationality: Egypt) Low quality a.k.a.: a) Ibrahim al-Madani b) Saif Al-‘Adil c) Seif al Adel Nationality: Egypt Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 25 Jan. 2001 (amended on 16 Dec. 2010, 24 Jul. 2013, 15 Feb. 2017, 29 Mar. 2019Other information: Responsible for Usama bin Laden’s (deceased) security. Hair: Dark. Eyes: Dark. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 15 Jun. 2010. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb. 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link:  https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4681065.

QDi.123 Name: 1: YASSIN 2: SYAWAL 3: na 4: na
Title: na Designation: na DOB: Approximately 19723 Sept. 1962POB: naMakassar, Indonesia Good quality a.k.a.: a) Salim Yasin b) Yasin Mahmud Mochtar c) Abdul Hadi Yasin d) Muhamad Mubarok e) Muhammad Syawal f) Yassin Sywal (formerly listed as) Low quality a.k.a.: a) Abu Seta b) Mahmud c) Abu Muamar d) Mubarok Nationality: Indonesia Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 9 Sep. 2003 (amended on 12 Dec. 2014, 29 Mar. 2019Other information: At large as at Dec. 2003. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 25 May 2010. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb. 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link:   https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1424789.

QDi.144 Name: 1: MOHAMMAD 2: TAHIR 3: HAMMID 4: HUSSEIN
Name (original script: حسين محمد طاهر حامد
Title: Imam Designation: na DOB: 1 Nov. 1975 POB: Poshok, Iraq Good quality a.k.a.: Abdelhamid Al Kurdi Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Iraq Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: Sulaymaniya, Iraq Listed on: 12 Nov. 2003 (amended on 9 Sep. 2005, 21 Dec. 2007, 16 May 2011, 10 Dec. 2015, 29 Mar. 2019Other information: Mother’s name: Attia Mohiuddin Taha. A deportation order was issued by the Italian authorities on 18 Oct. 2004. Considered a fugitive from justice by the Italian authorities as of Sep. 2007. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jun. 2010. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb. 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link:  https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1424109.

QDi.250 Name: 1: AMOR 2: MOHAMED 3: GHEDEIR 4: na
Name (original script): عمر محمد قدير
Title: na Designation: na DOB: Approximately 1958 POB: Deb-Deb, Amenas, Wilaya (province) of Illizi, Algeria Good quality a.k.a.: a) Abdelhamid Abou Zeid b) Youcef Adel c) Abou Abdellah d) Abid Hammadou born 12 Dec. 1965 in Touggourt, Wilaya (province) of Ouargla, Algeria (previously listed as) Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Algeria Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 3 Jul. 2008 (amended on 10 May 2012, 15 Nov. 2012, 29 Mar. 2019Other information: Associated with the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014). Located in Northern Mali as of Jun. 2008. Mother’s name is Benarouba Bachira. Father’s name is Mabrouk. He usurped the identity of Abid Hammadou, who allegedly died in Chad in 2004. Reportedly deceased as of 24 February 2013. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb. 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1529259.

QDi.319 Name: 1: MOHAMED 2: LAHBOUS 3: na 4: na
Name (original script): محمد لحبوس
Title: na Designation: na DOB: 1978 POB: Mali Good quality a.k.a.: a) Mohamed Ennouini b) Hassan c) Hocine Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Mali Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: Mali Listed on: 24 Oct. 2013 (amended on 29 Mar. 2019) Other information: Member of the Mouvement pour l’Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) (QDe.134). Reportedly deceased as of 14 February 2018. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb. 2019 INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link:  https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5720103.

QDi.374 Name: 1: NUSRET 2: IMAMOVIC 3: na 4: na
Title: na Designation: na DOB: a) 26 Sep. 1971 b) 26 Sep. 1977 POB: naMiljanovci, Kalesija Municipality, Bosnia Good quality a.k.a.: Nusret Sulejman Imamovic Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Bosnia and Herzegovina Passport no: a) Bosnia and Herzegovina number 349054 b) Bosnia and Herzegovina number 3490054 National identification no: na Address: Syrian Arab Republic (location as at Sep. 2015) Listed on: 29 Feb. 2016 (amended on 29 Mar. 2019) Other information: Believed to be fighting with Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137) in Syrian Arab Republic and reported to be a leader in the group as of Apr. 2015. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb. 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link:  https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5930702.

Links:

OSFI Notice

UN Notice

April 1, 2019: UN, DFAT modify 6 counter terror listings

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On Monday, Australian regulators amended:

QDi.001 Name: 1: SAYF-AL ADLMohammed 2: n.a.Salahaldin3: n.a.Abd El Halim 4: n.a. Zidane 
Name (original script): سيف العدل محمد صلاح الدين عبدالحليم زيدان
Title: na Designation: na DOB: (a) 11 Apr. 1963 (b) 11 Apr. 1960 POB: Monufia Governate, Egypt Good quality a.k.a.: a) Mohammed Salahaldin Abd El Halim ZidanSayf-Al Adl (DOB: 11 Apr. 1963. POB: Monufia Governorate, Egypt. Nationality: Egypt. In Arabic: محمد صلاح الدين عبدالحليم زيدان سيف العدل b) Muhamad Ibrahim Makkawi (DOB: a) 11 Apr. 1960 b) 11 Apr. 1963. POB: Egypt. Nationality: Egypt) Low quality a.k.a.: a) Ibrahim al-Madani b) Saif Al-‘Adil c) Seif al Adel Nationality: Egypt Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 25 Jan. 2001 (amended on 16 Dec. 2010, 24 Jul. 2013, 15 Feb. 2017, 29 Mar. 2019Other information: Responsible for Usama bin Laden’s (deceased) security. Hair: Dark. Eyes: Dark. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 15 Jun. 2010. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb. 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link:  https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4681065.

QDi.123 Name: 1: YASSIN 2: SYAWAL 3: na 4: na
Title: na Designation: na DOB: Approximately 19723 Sept. 1962 POB: naMakassar, Indonesia Good quality a.k.a.: a) Salim Yasin b) Yasin Mahmud Mochtar c) Abdul Hadi Yasin d) Muhamad Mubarok e) Muhammad Syawal f) Yassin Sywal (formerly listed as) Low quality a.k.a.: a) Abu Seta b) Mahmud c) Abu Muamar d) Mubarok Nationality: Indonesia Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 9 Sep. 2003 (amended on 12 Dec. 2014, 29 Mar. 2019Other information: At large as at Dec. 2003. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 25 May 2010. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb. 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link:   https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1424789.

QDi.144 Name: 1: MOHAMMAD 2: TAHIR 3: HAMMID 4: HUSSEIN
Name (original script: حسين محمد طاهر حامد
Title: Imam Designation: na DOB: 1 Nov. 1975 POB: Poshok, Iraq Good quality a.k.a.: Abdelhamid Al Kurdi Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Iraq Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: Sulaymaniya, Iraq Listed on: 12 Nov. 2003 (amended on 9 Sep. 2005, 21 Dec. 2007, 16 May 2011, 10 Dec. 2015, 29 Mar. 2019Other information: Mother’s name: Attia Mohiuddin Taha. A deportation order was issued by the Italian authorities on 18 Oct. 2004. Considered a fugitive from justice by the Italian authorities as of Sep. 2007. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jun. 2010. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb. 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link:  https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1424109.

QDi.250 Name: 1: AMOR 2: MOHAMED 3: GHEDEIR 4: na
Name (original script): عمر محمد قدير
Title: na Designation: na DOB: Approximately 1958 POB: Deb-Deb, Amenas, Wilaya (province) of Illizi, Algeria Good quality a.k.a.: a) Abdelhamid Abou Zeid b) Youcef Adel c) Abou Abdellah d) Abid Hammadou born 12 Dec. 1965 in Touggourt, Wilaya (province) of Ouargla, Algeria (previously listed as) Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Algeria Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 3 Jul. 2008 (amended on 10 May 2012, 15 Nov. 2012, 29 Mar. 2019Other information: Associated with the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014). Located in Northern Mali as of Jun. 2008. Mother’s name is Benarouba Bachira. Father’s name is Mabrouk. He usurped the identity of Abid Hammadou, who allegedly died in Chad in 2004. Reportedly deceased as of 24 February 2013. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb. 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1529259.

QDi.319 Name: 1: MOHAMED 2: LAHBOUS 3: na 4: na
Name (original script): محمد لحبوس
Title: na Designation: na DOB: 1978 POB: Mali Good quality a.k.a.: a) Mohamed Ennouini b) Hassan c) Hocine Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Mali Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: Mali Listed on: 24 Oct. 2013 (amended on 29 Mar. 2019) Other information: Member of the Mouvement pour l’Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) (QDe.134). Reportedly deceased as of 14 February 2018. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb. 2019 INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link:  https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5720103.

QDi.374 Name: 1: NUSRET 2: IMAMOVIC 3: na 4: na
Title: na Designation: na DOB: a) 26 Sep. 1971 b) 26 Sep. 1977 POB: naMiljanovci, Kalesija Municipality, Bosnia Good quality a.k.a.: Nusret Sulejman Imamovic Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Bosnia and Herzegovina Passport no: a) Bosnia and Herzegovina number 349054 b) Bosnia and Herzegovina number 3490054 National identification no: na Address: Syrian Arab Republic (location as at Sep. 2015) Listed on: 29 Feb. 2016 (amended on 29 Mar. 2019) Other information: Believed to be fighting with Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137) in Syrian Arab Republic and reported to be a leader in the group as of Apr. 2015. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb. 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link:  https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5930702.

in line with changes made by the United Nations ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee.

Link:

UN Notice

March 14, 2019: HK SFC AML/CTF Circular – UN Sanctions Early Alert

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Circular to Licensed Corporations and Associated Entities 

Anti-Money Laundering / Counter-Financing of Terrorism

Early Alert on United Nations Sanctions 

The sanctions committee of the United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) which administers the sanctions regime for ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida amended the detail of one individual on its sanctions list Note 1, 2 on 13 March 2019 (New York time).  Please refer to the relevant press release issued by the UNSC in Attachment 1.

Licensed corporations (“LCs”) and associated entities (“AEs”) should update their screening databases with the above change made by the UNSC sanctions committee for sanctions screening of customers and payments.  LCs and AEs are reminded to refer to our circular on United Nations Sanctions issued on 7 February 2018 Note 3 which sets out our expectations on actions that LCs and AEs should take regarding sanctions imposed by the UNSC.

Should you have any queries regarding the contents of this circular, please contact Ms Kiki Wong at 2231 1569 who will assist to refer your queries to the relevant officer.

Intermediaries Supervision Department
Intermediaries Division
Securities and Futures Commission

Enclosure

End

SFO/IS/008/2019

Note 1 An updated list specifying “individuals, groups, undertakings and entities”, reflecting the amendment by the sanctions committee of the UNSC, was published under section 25 of the United Nations Sanctions (ISIL and Al-Qaida) Regulation (Cap. 537CB) on the website of the Commerce and Economic Development Bureau on 14 March 2019. The list obtained from the website of the Commerce and Economic Development Bureau is attached in Attachment 2.
Note 2
 Licensed corporations and associated entities will also be alerted when the updated sanctions list, reflecting the amendment by the sanctions committee of the UNSC, is published under the United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Ordinance (Cap. 575) in the Gazette. The website of the Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”) will also be updated to provide a weblink to the gazette notice thereof for easy reference.
Note 3
 The circular on United Nations Sanctions can be accessed on the SFC’s website (http://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/circular/aml/aml-regulations/doc?refNo=18EC9)

Links:

HK SFC Notice

HK SFC Circular

UN Press Release (Attachment 1)

Updated Commerce and Economic Development Bureau List (Attachment 2)

April 2, 2019: SECO amends 6 counter terrorism listings

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On Tuesday, Swiss officials updated the following listings under their Al-Qaida/bin Laden/Taliban counter terrorism sanctions:

SSID: 10-15641 Foreign identifier: QI.H.250.08. Name: Amor Mohamed Ghedeir

DOB: 1958 (approximately) POB: Deb-Deb, Amenas, Wilaya (province) of Illizi, Algeria Good quality a.k.a.: a) Abdelhamid Abou Zeid b) Youcef Adel c) Abou Abdellah Nationality: Algeria

Other identity: Abid Hammadou

DOB: 12 Dec 1965 POB: Touggourt, Wilaya (province) of Ouargla, Algeria

Relation: Associated with The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QE.T.14.01., SSID 10-17785) Other information: Associated with the Organization of Al- Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QE.T.14.01.). Located in Northern Mali as of Jun 2008. Mother’s name is Benarouba Bachira. Father’s name is Mabrouk. He usurped the identity of Abid Hammadou, who allegedly died in Chad in 20042004. Reportedly deceased as of 24 February 2013. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link available. Modifications: Amended on 14 Dec 2012, 29 Mar 2019

SSID: 10-15687 Foreign identifier: QI.H.144.03. Name: Mohammad Tahir Hammid Hussein

Title: Imam DOB: 1 Nov 1975 POB: Poshok, Iraq Good quality a.k.a.: Abdelhamid Al Kurdi Address: Sulaymaniya, Iraq Nationality: Iraq

Other information: Mother’s name: Attia Mohiuddin Taha. A deportation order was issued by the Italian authorities on 18 Oct 2004. Considered a fugitive from justice by the Italian authorities as of Sep 2007. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jun 20102010. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link available. Modifications: Amended on 17 Dec 2015, 29 Mar 2019

SSID: 10-16771 Foreign identifier: QI.S.1.01. Name: Sayf-Al AdlMohammed Salahaldin Abd El Halim Zidane

DOB: a) 11 Apr 1963 b) 11 Apr 1960 POB: Monufia Governorate, Egypt Low quality a.k.a.: a) Saif Al-‘AdilIbrahim al-Madani b) Seif al AdelSaif Al-‘Adil c) Ibrahim al-MadaniSeif al Adel Nationality: Egypt

Other identity: Mohammed Salahaldin Abd El Halim ZidanSayf-Al Adl

DOB: 11 Apr 1963 POB: Monufia Governorate, Egypt Nationality: Egypt

Other identity: Muhamad Ibrahim Makkawi

DOB: a) 11 Apr 1960 b) 11 Apr 1963 POB: Egypt Nationality: Egypt

Other information: Responsible for Usama bin Laden’sLaden’s (deceased) security. Hair: Dark. Eyes: Dark. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 15 Jun 20102010. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link available. Modifications: Amended on 9 Mar 2013, 14 Aug 2013, 15 Feb 2017, 29 Mar 2019

SSID: 10-16872 Foreign identifier: QI.S.123.03. Name: Yassin Syawal

DOB: 1972 (approximately)3 Sep 1962 POB: Makassar, Indonesia Good quality a.k.a.: a) Salim Yasin b) Yasin Mahmud Mochtar c) Abdul Hadi Yasin d) Muhamad Mubarok e) Muhammad Syawal Low quality a.k.a.: a) Abu Seta b) Mahmud c) Abu Muamar d) Mubarok F.k.a.: Yassin Sywal Nationality: Indonesia

Other information: At large as at Dec 2003. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 25 May 20102010. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link available. Modifications: Amended on 21 Jan 2015, 29 Mar 2019

SSID: 10-26311 Foreign identifier: QI.L.319.13. Name: Mohamed Lahbous

DOB: 1978 POB: Mali Good quality a.k.a.: a) Mohamed Ennouini b) Hassan c) Hocine Address: Mali Nationality: Mali

Relation: Member of the Mouvement pour l’Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) (QE.M.134.12., SSID 10-23649) Other information: Member of the Mouvement pour l’Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) (QE.M.134.12).QE.M.134.12). Reportedly deceased as of 14 February 2018. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link available. Modifications: Listed on 15 Nov 2013, amended on 29 Mar 2019

SSID: 10-33635 Foreign identifier: QDi.374 Name: Nusret Imamovic

DOB: a) 26 Sep 1971 b) 26 Sep 1977 POB: Miljanovci, Kalesija Municipality, Bosnia and Herzegovina Good quality a.k.a.: Nusret Sulejman Imamovic Address: Syrian Arab Republic (location as at Sep 2015) Nationality: Bosnia and Herzegovina Identification document: a) Passport No. 349054, Bosnia and Herzegovina b) Passport No. 3490054, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Relation: Fighting with Al-Nusrah Front For The People Of The Levant (QE.A.137.14., SSID 10-27843) Other information: Believed to be fighting with Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137) in Syrian Arab Republic and reported to be a leader in the group as of Apr 20152015. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link available. Modifications: Listed on 3 Mar 2016, amended on 29 Mar 2019

Links:

FINMA Notice

Data files of updates – PDF, XML

April 2, 2019: SECO adds some, changes some, removes 1 from Ukraine sanctions

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On Tuesday, Swiss authorities added:

SSID: 175-40217 Name: Stankevich Sergey Nikolayevich Spelling variant: СТАНКЕВИЧ Сергей Николаевич (Russian)

Sex: M DOB: 27 Jan 1963

Justification: a) Head of Border Directorate of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation for “Republic of Crimea and City of Sevastopol”, Rear Admiral. In this capacity, he was responsible for actions of the coast guard naval fleet of the Russian Federation against Ukraine on 25 Nov 2018 which prevented access by Ukrainian vessels to their coast on the Sea of Azov, thereby undermining the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and undermining the security of Ukraine through the disruption of the movements and operability of Ukrainian naval vessels. b) Those actions also supported the consolidation of the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula into the Russian Federation. Modifications: Listed on 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-40223 Name: Shein Andrey Borisovich Spelling variant: ШЕИН Андрей Борисович (Russian)

Sex: M DOB: 10 Jun 1971

Justification: a) Deputy Head of Border Directorate — Head of Coast Guard Unit of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation for “Republic of Crimea and City of Sevastopol”. In this capacity, he participated in operations against Ukrainian ships and their crew during the actions of the Russian Federation against Ukraine on 25 Nov 2018 which prevented access by Ukrainian vessels to their coast on the Sea of Azov, thereby undermining the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and undermining the security of Ukraine through the disruption of the movements and operability of Ukrainian naval vessels. b) Those actions also supported the consolidation of the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula into the Russian Federation. Modifications: Listed on 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-40229 Name: Salyaev Aleksey Mikhailovich Spelling variant: a) Salyayev Aleksey Mikhailovich (Russian) b) Saliaiev Oleksii Mykhailovych (Russian) c) САЛЯЕВ Алексей Михайлович (Russian) d) САЛЯЄВ Олексій Михайлович (Ukrainian)

Sex: M DOB: 22 Aug 1978

Justification: a) Commanding officer of the border patrol boat “Don” (side markings 353) of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. He was in command of the vessel that actively participated in actions of the Russian Federation against Ukrainian vessels and their crew on 25 Nov 2018, and conducted ramming of the estuary tug, “Yany Kapu”, of the Ukrainian Navy. Those actions prevented access by Ukrainian vessels to their coast on the Sea of Azov, thereby undermining the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and undermining the security of Ukraine through the disruption of the movements and operability of Ukrainian naval vessels. b) Those actions also supported the consolidation of the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula into the Russian Federation. Modifications: Listed on 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-40235 Name: Shipitsin Andrei Spelling variant: a) Shypitsin Andrei (Russian) b) ШИПИЦИН Андрей (Russian) c) ШИПІЦИН Андрей (Russian)

Sex: M DOB: 25 Dec 1969

Justification: a) Commanding officer of the border patrol boat “Izumrud” of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. He was in command of the vessel that actively participated in actions of the Russian Federation against Ukrainian vessels and their crew on 25 Nov 2018 which prevented access by Ukrainian vessels to their coast on the Sea of Azov, thereby undermining the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and undermining the security of Ukraine through the disruption of the movements and operability of Ukrainian naval vessels. b) Those actions also supported the consolidation of the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula into the Russian Federation. Modifications: Listed on 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-40241 Name: Shatokhin Aleksey Vladimirovich Spelling variant: a) Shatokhin Oleksii Volodymyrovich (Russian) b) ШАТОХИН Алексей Владимирович (Russian) c) ШАТОХІН Олексій Володимирович (Ukrainian)

Sex: M DOB: 26 Jan 1971

Justification: a) Head of the Service of the Kerch Control Point for the “Republic of Crimea and City of Sevastopol” of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. He participatedmin operations against Ukrainian vessels during the actions of the Russian Federation against Ukrainian vessels and their crews on 25 Nov 2018 which prevented access by Ukrainian vessels to their coast on the Sea of Azov, thereby undermining the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and undermining the security of Ukraine through the disruption of the movements and operability of Ukrainian naval vessels. b) Those actions also supported the consolidation of the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula into the Russian Federation. Modifications: Listed on 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-40247 Name: Romashkin Ruslan Alexandrovich Spelling variant: РОМАШКИН Руслан Александрович (Russian)

Sex: M DOB: 15 Jun 1976

Justification: a) Head of the Service of the Control Point in the “Republic of Crimea and City of Sevastopol” of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. In this role, he was responsible for coordinating the actions of Russian Federation forces against Ukrainian vessels and their crews on 25 Nov 2018 which prevented access by Ukrainian vessels to their coast on the Sea of Azov, thereby undermining the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and undermining the security of Ukraine through the disruption of the movements and operability of Ukrainian naval vessels. b) Those actions also supported the consolidation of the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula into the Russian Federation. Modifications: Listed on 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-40253 Name: Shcherbakov Sergey Alekseevich Spelling variant: a) ЩЕРБАКОВ Сергей Алексеевич (Russian) b) ЩЕРБАКОВ Сергій Олексійович (Ukrainian)

Sex: M DOB: 2 Nov 1986

Justification: a) Commanding officer of the anti-submarine ship “Suzdalets” of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation. He commanded the ship which participated in the actions of the Russian Federation against Ukrainian ships and their crews on 25 Nov 2018, and actively participated in the blockade of tugboat “Yani Kapu” and seizure of the armed gunboat “Nikopol”. Those actions prevented access by Ukrainian vessels to their coast on the Sea of Azov, thereby undermining the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and undermining the security of Ukraine through the disruption of the movements and operability of Ukrainian naval vessels. b) Those actions also supported the consolidation of the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula into the Russian Federation. Modifications: Listed on 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-40259 Name: Dvornikov Aleksandr Vladimirovich Spelling variant: ДВОРНИКОВ Александр Владимирович (Russian)

Sex: M DOB: 22 Aug 1961 POB: Ussuriysk, Primorskiy Krai, Russian Federation Justification: a) Commander of the Southern Military District of the Russian Armed Forces, Colonel General and responsible for military forces in the region, including illegally annexed Crimea and Sevastopol. In this role he was responsible for the actions of the Black Sea Fleet and other military forces of the Russian Federation against Ukraine on 25 Nov 2018 which prevented access by Ukrainian vessels to their coast on the Sea of Azov, thereby undermining the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and undermining the security of Ukraine through the disruption of the movements and operability of Ukrainian naval vessels. b) Those actions also supported the consolidation of the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula into the Russian Federation. Modifications: Listed on 2 Apr 2019

changed:

SSID: 175-27400 Name: Vitko Aleksandr Viktorovich Spelling variant: Витко Александр Викторович (Russian)

DOB: 13 Sep 1961 POB: Vitebsk, Belarus

Justification: a) Former Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, AdmiralAdmiral. Deputy Commander in Chief of the Russian Navy. b) Responsible for commanding Russian forces that have occupied Ukrainian sovereign territory. Modifications: Listed on 2 Apr 2014, amended on 6 Oct 2015, 23 Mar 2016, 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-27418 Name: Rogozin Dmitry Olegovich Spelling variant: Рогозин Дмитрий Олегович (Russian)

DOB: 21 Dec 1963 POB: Moscow, Russian Federation Justification: a) Former Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. Publicly called for the annexation of Crimea. b) Since 2018 holds the position of General Director in a State corporation. Modifications: Listed on 2 Apr 2014, amended on 6 Oct 2015, 11 Oct 2016, 27 Sep 2018, 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-27480 Name: Medvedev Valery Kirillovich Spelling variant: a) Медведев Валерий Кириллович (Russian) b) Medvediev Valeriy Kyrylovych (Russian) c) Медведєв Валерій Кирилович (Ukrainian)

DOB: 21 Aug 1946 POB: Shmakovka, Primorsky region

Justification: a) Former Chair of Sevastopol Electoral Commission (until 26 May 2017). Responsible for administering the Crimean referendum. Responsible under the Russian system for signing referendum results. b) Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies. Modifications: Listed on 2 Apr 2014, amended on 6 Oct 2015, 24 Mar 2017, 15 Aug 2017, 21 Mar 2018, 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-27531 Name: Belaventsev Oleg Yevgenyvich Spelling variant: Белавенцев Олег Евгеньевич (Russian)

DOB: 15 Sep 1949 POB: Moscow

Justification: a) Former Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation into the so-called “Crimean“Crimean Federal District”, Non-permanent member of the Russian Security Council. ResponsibleDistrict”, responsible for the implementation of the constitutional prerogatives of the Russian Head of State on the territory of the annexed Autonomous Republic of CrimeaCrimea. Former non-permanent member of the Russian Security Council. b) CurrentlyFormer Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation into the North Caucasus Federal District.District (until Jun 2018). c) Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies. Modifications: Listed on 2 May 2014, amended on 6 Oct 2015, 24 Mar 2017, 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-27538 Name: Savelyev Oleg Genrikhovich Spelling variant: Савельев Олег Генрихович (Russian)

DOB: 27 Oct 1965 POB: Leningrad

Justification: a) Former Minister for Crimean Affairs. Responsible for the integration of the annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation. b) CurrentlyFormer Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Government, responsible for the organisation of the work of the Governmental Commission on the socio-economicsocioeconomic development of the so-called “Republic“Republic of Crimea”.Crimea”. c) Chief of Staff of the Audit Chamber of the Russian Federation. Modifications: Listed on 2 May 2014, amended on 6 Oct 2015, 23 Mar 2016, 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-27597 Name: Pushylin Denys Volodymyrovych Spelling variant: a) Пушилін Денис Володимирович (Russian) b) Pushilin Denis Vladimirovich (Russian) c) Пушилин Денис Владимирович (Russian)

DOB: a) 9 May 1981 b) 9 May 1982 POB: Makiivka, Donetsk Oblast

Justification: One of the leaders of the “Donetsk“Donetsk People’s Republic”.Republic”. Participated in the seizure and occupation of the regional administration. Active spokesperson for the separatistsadministration in Donetsk in 2014. Until 4 Sep 2015 so- called “Deputy Chairman” of the “People’s Council““People’s Council” of the so-called “Donetsk“Donetsk People’s Republic”.Republic”. Since 4 Sep 2015 “Chairman““Chairman” of the “People’s“People’s Council of the Donetsk People’s Republic”.Republic”. So-called “acting Head of the Donetsk People’s Republic” after 7 Sep 2018. So-called “Head of the Donetsk People’s Republic” following the so-called elections of 11 Nov 2018. Modifications: Listed on 2 May 2014, amended on 2 Apr 2015, 6 Oct 2015, 23 Mar 2016, 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-27721 Name: Bezler Igor Nikolaevich Spelling variant: a) Безлер Игорь Николаевич (Russian) b) Bezler Ihor Mykolayovych (Russian) c) Безлер Iгор Миколайович (Ukrainian)

DOB: 30 Dec 1965 POB: Simferopol, Crimea Good quality a.k.a.: Bes (devil) Justification: a) One of the former leaders of the self-proclaimed militia of Horlivka. He took control of the Security Service of Ukraine’s Office in Donetsk region building and afterwards seized the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ district station in the town of Horlivka. He has links to IhorIgor Strelkov/Girkin under whose command he was involved in the murder of the Peoples’ Deputy of the Horlivka’s Municipal Council Volodymyr Rybak. b) Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies. Modifications: Listed on 20 May 2014, amended on 6 Oct 2015, 11 Oct 2016, 24 Mar 2017, 15 Aug 2017, 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-28249 Name: Gubareva Ekaterina Yurievna Spelling variant: a) Губарева Екатерина Юрьевна (Russian) b) Gubarieva Kateryna Yuriyivna (Russian) c) Hubarieva Kateryna Yuriyivna (Russian) d) Губарева Катерина Юріївна (Ukrainian)

DOB: a) 5 Jul 1983 b) 10 Mar 1983 POB: Kakhovka, Kherson Oblast

Justification: a) In her capacity of former so-called “Minister of Foreign Affairs” she was responsible for defending the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic”, thus undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. In taking on and acting in this capacity she has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Remains active in supporting separatist actions and policies. b) Former Member of the so-called “People’s Council”“People’s Council” of the “Donetsk“Donetsk People’s Republic”.Republic” (until Nov 2018). Modifications: Listed on 5 Aug 2014, amended on 2 Apr 2015, 6 Oct 2015, 23 Mar 2016, 11 Oct 2016, 24 Mar 2017, 15 Aug 2017, 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-28527 Name: Tchigrina Oksana – Spelling variant: a) Чигрина Оксана Александровна (Russian) b) Chigrina Oksana Aleksandrovna (Russian) c) Chyhryna Oksana Aleksandrovna (Russian)

DOB: 23 Jul 1981 (approximately)

Justification: a) Former spokesperson of the so-called “government” of the so-called “Lugansk People’s Republic” who made declarations justifying, inter alia, the shooting down of a Ukrainian military airplane, the taking of hostages, fighting activities by the illegal armed groups, which have as a consequence undermined the territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of Ukraine. b) Former spokesperson of the Press Service of LNR. c) Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies. Modifications: Listed on 27 Aug 2014, amended on 2 Apr 2015, 11 Oct 2016, 24 Mar 2017, 27 Sep 2018, 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-28539 Name: Abisov Sergey Vadimovich Spelling variant: a) Абисов Сергей Вадимович (Russian) b) Abisov Sergiy Vadymovych (Russian) c) Abisov Serhiy Vadymovych (Russian) d) Абiсов Сергій Вадимович (Ukrainian)

DOB: 2127 Nov 1967 POB: Simferopol, Crimea

Justification: a) By accepting his appointment as so-called “Minister of Interior of the Republic of Crimea” by the President of Russia (decree No. 301) on 5 May 2014 and by his actions as so-called “Minister of Interior” he has undermined the territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of Ukraine. b) Dismissed as so-called “Minister of Interior of the Republic of Crimea” in Jun 2018. Modifications: Listed on 27 Aug 2014, amended on 6 Oct 2015, 24 Mar 2017, 15 Aug 2017, 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-29281 Name: Kononov Vladimir Petrovich Spelling variant: a) Кононов Владимир Петровнч (Russian) b) Kononov Volodymyr Petrovych (Russian) c) Кононов Володимир Петрович (Russian)

DOB: 14 Oct 1974 POB: Gorsky, Lugansk Oblast Good quality a.k.a.: Tsar

Justification: a) As of 14 Aug 2014, he replaced Igor Strelkov/Girkin, as the so-called “Defence minister”“Defence minister” of the “Donetsk“Donetsk People’s Republic”.Republic”. He has reportedly commanded a division of separatist fighters in Donetsk since AprilApr 2014 and has promised to solve the strategic task of repelling Ukraine’s military aggression. Kononov has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. b) Dismissed as so-called “Defence minister” in Sep 2018. Modifications: Listed on 12 Nov 2014, amended on 6 Oct 2015, 11 Oct 2016, 24 Mar 2017, 21 Mar 2018, 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-29309 Name: Rodkin Andrei Nikolaevich Spelling variant: Родкин Андрей Николаевич (Russian)

DOB: 23 Sep 1976 POB: Moscow

Justification: a) Former Moscow Representative of the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic”. In his statements he has, inter alia, talked about the militias’ readiness to conduct a guerrilla war and their seizure of weapon systems from the Ukrainian armed forces. He has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. b) One of the former leaders of the “Union of Donbas Volunteers”. c) Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies. Modifications: Listed on 12 Nov 2014, amended on 2 Apr 2015, 6 Oct 2015, 23 Mar 2016, 27 Sep 2018, 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-29313 Name: Karaman Aleksandr Akimovich Spelling variant: a) Караман Александр Акимович (Russian) b) Caraman Alexandru – (Russian)

DOB: 26 Jul 1956 POB: Cioburciu, Slobozia district, Moldova

Justification: a) Former so-called “Deputy“Deputy Prime Minister for Social Issues”Issues” of the “Donetsk“Donetsk People’s Republic”.Republic”. Associated with Vladimir Antyufeyev, who was responsible for the separatist “governmental”“governmental” activities of the so- called “Government“Government of the Donetsk People’s Republic”.Republic”. He has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Protégé of Russia’s former Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin. Former Head of the Administration of the Council of Ministers of the “Donetsk“Donetsk People’s Republic”.Republic”. b) Until MarchMar 2017, so-called “Plenipotentiary representative of the President” of the so-called “Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic” to the Russian Federation. c) Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies. Relation: a) Associated with Antyufeyev Vladimir (SSID 175-28279) b) Protégé of Rogozin Dmitry Olegovich (SSID 175-27418) Modifications: Listed on 12 Nov 2014, amended on 2 Apr 2015, 6 Oct 2015, 11 Oct 2016, 24 Mar 2017, 21 Mar 2018, 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-29700 Name: Kozyakov Sergey Yurievich Spelling variant: a) Козьяков Сергей Юрьевич (Russian) b) Kozyakov Serhiy Yuriyovych (Russian) c) Козьяков Сергій Юрійович (Ukrainian) DOB: a) 29 Sep 1982 b) 23 Sep 1982

Justification: a) In his former capacity as so-called “Head of the Luhansk Central Election Commission” he was responsible for organising the so-called “elections” of 2 NovemberNov 2014 in the “Luhansk People’s Republic”. These “elections” were in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. Between OctoberOct 2015 and DecemberDec 2017 so-called “Minister of Justice” of the “Luhansk People’s Republic”. b) In taking on and acting in these capacities, and in organising the illegal “elections”, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. c) Continues to support and legitimise separatist policies in cooperation with separatist, authorities. Modifications: Listed on 16 Dec 2014, amended on 6 Oct 2015, 23 Mar 2016, 11 Oct 2016, 24 Mar 2017, 15 Aug 2017, 27 Sep 2018, 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-29709 Name: Airapetyan Larisa Leonidovna Spelling variant: a) Айрапетян Лариса Леонидовна (Russian) b) Ayrapetyan Larysa – (Russian) c) Airapetyan Larisa – (Russian) d) Airapetyan Larysa – (Russian) e) Айрапетян Лариса Леонідівна (Ukrainian) DOB: 21 Feb 1970

Justification: a) Former so-called “Health Minister” of the so-called “Lugansk People’s Republic”. Stood as a candidate in the so-called “elections” of 2 Nov 2014 to the post of the “Head” of the so-called “Lugansk People’s Republic”. b) These “elections” are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. c) In taking on and acting in this capacity, and in participating formally as a candidate in the illegal “elections”, she has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. d) Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies. Modifications: Listed on 16 Dec 2014, amended on 2 Apr 2015, 6 Oct 2015, 24 Mar 2017, 15 Aug 2017, 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-29737 Name: Mikhaylov Yevgeniy Eduardovich Spelling variant: a) Михайлов Евгений Эдуардович (Russian) b) Mychaylov Yevhen Eduardovych (Russian) c) Михайлов Євген Едуардович (Ukrainian)

DOB: 17 Mar 1963 POB: Arkhangelsk

Justification: a) Former so-called “Minister of the Council of Ministers” (head of the administration for governmental affairs) of the “Donetsk People’s Republic”. b) In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. c) Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies. Modifications: Listed on 16 Dec 2014, amended on 6 Oct 2015, 11 Oct 2016, 24 Mar 2017, 15 Aug 2017, 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-29752 Name: Deynego Vladyslav Mykolayovych Spelling variant: a) Дейнего Владислав Миколайович (Russian) b) Deynego Vladislav Nikolayevich (Russian) c) Дейнего Владислав Николаевич (Russian)

DOB: 12 Mar 1964 POB: Romny (Ромны), Sumy Oblast (Сумская область) Justification: a) “Deputy Head”Former “Deputy Head” of the “People’s Council”“People’s Council” of the so-called “Lugansk“Lugansk People’s Republic”.Republic”. b) In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. c) Currently so-called “acting Minister of Foreign Affairs” of the so-called “Lugansk People’s Republic”. Modifications: Listed on 16 Dec 2014, amended on 2 Apr 2015, 6 Oct 2015, 24 Mar 2017, 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-30416 Name: Shubin Alexandr Vasilievich Spelling variant: Шубин Александр Васильевич (Russian)

DOB: a) 20 May 1972 b) 30 May 1972 POB: Lugansk

Justification: a) Former so-called “Minister of Justice”, of the illegal so-called “Luhansk People’s Republic”. ChairmanFormer chairman of the “Central Election Commission” of the so-calledso- called “Luhansk People’s Republic” since October 2015Republic”. b) In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. c) Dismissed as chairman of the “Central Election Commission” of the so-called “Luhansk People’s Republic” in Jun 2018. Modifications: Listed on 6 Mar 2015, amended on 6 Oct 2015, 23 Mar 2016, 24 Mar 2017, 27 Sep 2018, 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-30435 Name: Timofeev Aleksandr Yurievich Spelling variant: a) Тимофеев Александр Юрьевич (Russian) b) Tymofeyev Oleksandr Yuriyovych (Russian) c) Тимофеєв Олександр Юрійович (Ukrainian)

DOB: 15 May 1971 POB: Nevinnomyssk (Невинномысск), Stavropol Krai (Ставропольский край)

Justification: a) So-called “MinisterFormer so-called “Minister of RevenueFinance and Taxes“Taxes” of the “Donetsk“Donetsk People’s Republic”.Republic”. b) In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised the country. c) Dismissed as so-called “Minister of Finance and Taxes” in Sep 2018. Modifications: Listed on 6 Mar 2015, amended on 6 Oct 2015, 11 Oct 2016, 24 Mar 2017, 15 Aug 2017, 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-30476 Name: Kartapolov Andrei Valeryevich Spelling variant: Картaполов Андрей Валерьевич (Russian)

DOB: 9 Nov 1963 POB: Germany, Democratic Republic (GDR)

Justification: a) Former Commander of the Western Military District since 10 Nov 2015District. Former Director of the Main Operations Department and deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Actively involved in shaping and implementing the military campaign of the Russian forces in Ukraine. b) According to the stated activities of the general staff, by exercising operational control over the armed forces, he iswas actively involved in shaping and implementing the Russian government policy threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. c) Deputy Minister of Defence since Jul 2018. Modifications: Listed on 6 Mar 2015, amended on 6 Oct 2015, 23 Mar 2016, 2 Apr 2019

and removed:

SSID: 175-29275 Name: Zakharchenko Alexander Vladimirovich Spelling variant: a) Захарченко Александр Владимирович (Russian) b) Zakharchenko Oleksandr Volodymyrovych (Russian) c) Захарченко Олександр Володимирович (Russian) DOB: 26 Jun 1976 POB: Donetsk

Justification: As of 7 Aug 2014, he replaced Alexander Borodai as the so-called “Prime minister” of the “Donetsk People’s Republic”. Currently so-called “Head” of the “Donetsk People’s Republic”. In taking on and acting in this capacity, Zakharchenko has supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Modifications: Listed on 12 Nov 2014, amended on 2 Apr 2015, 6 Oct 2015, 11 Oct 2016, 24 Mar 2017, de-listed on 2 Apr 2019

persons from its Ukraine sanctions program. And the following entity listings were also updated:

SSID: 175-28300 Name: So-called “Donetsk People’s Republic” Spelling variant: a) “Донецкая народная республика” (Russian) b) “Donétskaya naródnaya respúblika” (Russian)

Justification: a) The so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic” was declared on 7 AprilApr 2014. b) Responsible for organizing the illegal referendum on 11 May 2014. Declaration of independence on 12 May 2014. c) On 24 May 2014, the so-called “People’s Republics” of Donetsk and Lugansk signed an agreement on the creation of the so-called “Federal State of Novorossiya”. d) This is in breach of Ukrainian constitutional law, and, as a consequence, of international law, thus undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. e) It is also involved in the recruitment to illegal armed separatist groups, thus threatening the stability or security of Ukraine. Other information: Official information: https://dnr-online.ru/; http://av-zakharchenko.su/; http://smdnr.ru/; https://dnrsovet.suhttps://dnrsovet.su/; https://denis-pushilin.ru/ Modifications: Listed on 5 Aug 2014, amended on 21 Mar 2018, 27 Sep 2018, 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-28310 Name: So-called “Federal State of Novorossiya” Spelling variant: a) “Федеративное государство Новороссия” (Russian) b) “Federativnoye Gosudarstvo Novorossiya” (Russian)

Justification: a) On 24 May 2014, the so-called “People’s Republics” of Donetsk and Lugansk signed an agreement on the creation of the unrecognized so-called “Federal State of Novorossiya”. b) This is in breach of Ukrainian constitutional law, and, as a consequence, of international law, thus threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Other information: Official press releases: http://novorossia.su/official; http://novopressa.ru; http://novorossia-tv.ru; http://novorossia.today; http://novorossiia.ru; https://www. novorosinform.orghttp://novopressa.ru/; http://novorossia-tv.ru/; http://novorossia.today/; http://novorossiia.ru/; https://www.novorosinform.org/ Modifications: Listed on 5 Aug 2014, amended on 26 Sep 2017, 21 Mar 2018, 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-29756 Name: Donetsk Republic (Public organisation) Spelling variant: Донецкая республика (Russian)

Justification: a) Public “organisation” that presented candidates in the so calledso-called “elections” of the so calledso-called “Donetsk People’s Republic” on 2 November 2014Nov 2014 and 11 Nov 2018. These “elections” are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. b) In participating formally in the illegal “elections” it has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine. HeadedFounded by Alexander ZakharchenkoAndriy Purgin and foundedwas headed by Andriy PurginAlexander Zakharchenko. Nominated in 2018 Denis Pushylin to be “Head” of the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic”. Relation: a) Headed by Zakharchenko Alexander Vladimirovich (SSID 175-29275) b) Founded by Purhin Andriy Yevhenovych (SSID 175-27593) c) Nominated to be “Head” of the so- called “Donetsk People’s Republic” Pushylin Denys Volodymyrovych (SSID 175-27597) Other information: Official information: http://oddr.info/ Modifications: Listed on 16 Dec 2014, amended on 27 Sep 2018, 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-29762 Name: Peace to Luhansk Region Spelling variant: a) Мир Луганщине (Russian) b) Mir Luganschine (Russian)

Justification: a) Public “organisation” that presented candidates in the so-called “elections” of the so-called “Luhansk People’s Republic” on 2 November 2014Nov 2014 and 11 Nov 2018. These “elections” are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. b) In participating formally in the illegal “elections” it has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine. Other information: https://mir-lug.info/ Modifications: Listed on 16 Dec 2014, amended on 26 Sep 2017, 27 Sep 2018, 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-29767 Name: Free Donbass Spelling variant: a) “Свободный Донбасс” (Russian) b) “Svobodny Donbass” (Russian) c) Free Donbas (English)

Justification: a) Public “organisation”“organisation” that presented candidates in the so- called “elections”“elections” of the so-called “Donetsk“Donetsk People’s Republic”Republic” 2 Nov 20142014 and 11 Nov 2018. These elections are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. b) In participating formally in the illegal “elections”“elections” it has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine. Other information: http://www.odsd.ru/ Modifications: Listed on 16 Dec 2014, amended on 26 Sep 2017, 2 Apr 2019

SSID: 175-29776 Name: Luhansk Economic Union Spelling variant: a) Луганский экономический Союз (Russian) b) Luganskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz (Russian) Justification: a) “Social organisation” that presented candidates in the illegal so-called “elections” of the so-called “Luhansk People’s Republic” on 2 November 2014Nov 2014 and 11 Nov 2018. Nominated a candidate, Oleg Akimov, to be “Head” of the so-called “Luhansk People’s Republic”Republic” in 2014 and member of the so-called “People’s Council of the Luhansk People’s Republic” in 2018. These “elections” are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. b) In participating formally in the illegal “elections” it has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine. Relation: Nominated as candidate to be “Head” of the so-called “Luhansk People’s Republic” Akimov Oleg Konstantinovich (SSID 175-29705) Other information: Official information: https://nslnr. su/about/obshchestvennye- organizatsii/337/https://nslnr.su/about/obshchestvennye- organizatsii/337/; https://vk.com/public97306393 Modifications: Listed on 16 Dec 2014, amended on 21 Mar 2018, 27 Sep 2018, 2 Apr 2019

Links:

FINMA Notice

Data files of updates – PDF, XML

HKMA Alert: Suspicious Bank of Singapore mobile app

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Press Releases

Suspicious mobile application (App) related to Bank of Singapore Limited

The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) wishes to alert members of the public to a press release issued by Bank of Singapore Limited on suspicious App, which has been reported to the HKMA.  Hyperlink to the press release is available on the HKMA website for ease of reference by members of the public.

Anyone who has provided his or her personal information to the App concerned or has conducted any financial transactions through the App should contact the bank concerned using the contact information provided in the press release, and report to the Police or contact the Cyber Security and Technology Crime Bureau of the Hong Kong Police Force at 2860 5012.

 

Hong Kong Monetary Authority
14 March 2019

Link:

HKMA Notice

UN, DFAT remove another tranche of Iraqi entities

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Earlier today, Australian officials removed the following Iraq sanctions listings:

IQe.044 Name: GENERAL ESTABLISHMENT FOR THARTHAR PROJECT A.k.a.: na F.k.a.: na Address: P.O. Box 21, Fallouja, Iraq

Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information:

IQe.054 Name: IRAQI BROADCASTING AND TELEVISION ESTABLISHMENT A.k.a.: na F.k.a.: na Address: Broadcasting & TV Building, Salihiya, Karkh, Baghdad, Iraq Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information:

IQe.060 Name: IRAQI NEWS AGENCY A.k.a.: na F.k.a.: na Address:28 Nissan Complex, Al Salihiya, Baghdad, Iraq Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information:

IQe.073 Name: MINISTRY OF YOUTH, DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF PLANNING AND FOLLOW UP, IMPORT SECTION A.k.a.: na F.k.a.: na Address: P.O. Box 19055, Palestine Street, near Al-Shaab

Stadium, Baghdad, Iraq Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information:

IQe.132 Name: STATE ENTERPRISE FOR IRRIGATION PROJECTS A.k.a.: na F.k.a.: na Address: Karantina, near Sarafiya Bridge, Baghdad, Iraq Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information:

IQe.156 Name: STATE ESTABLISHMENT OF HADITHA DAM A.k.a.: na F.k.a.: na Address: Haklanya, Haditha, Iraq Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information

IQe.157 Name: STATE ESTABLISHMENT OF HEMREEN DAM A.k.a.: na F.k.a.: na Address: 6 Mukdadiya, Mukdadiya, Iraq Listed on:26 Apr. 2004 Other information:

IQe.161 Name: STATE ESTABLISHMENT OF MOSUL DAM A.k.a.:na F.k.a.: na Address: Ninewa Governorate, Mosul, Iraq Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information:

IQe.162 Name: STATE ESTABLISHMENT OF SMALL DAMS AND REGULATORS A.k.a.: na F.k.a.: na Address: Sinak, Baghdad, Iraq Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information:

after their delisting by the United Nations.

Link:

UN Notice


SECO removes 9 entities from Iraq sanctions

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Earlier today, Swiss authorities delisted the following entities from the Iraq sanctions program:

SSID: 70-2163 Name: General Establishment For Tharthar Project Address: P.O.Box 21, Fallouja, Iraq

Modifications: De-listed on 4 Apr 2019

SSID: 70-2209 Name: Iraqi Broadcasting And Television Establishment Address: Broadcasting & TV Building, Salihiya, Karkh, Baghdad, Iraq Modifications: De-listed on 4 Apr 2019

SSID: 70-2236 Name: Iraqi News Agency

Address: 28 Nissan Complex, Al Salihiya, Baghdad, Iraq Modifications: De-listed on 4 Apr 2019

SSID: 70-2300 Name: Ministry Of Youth, Directorate General Of Planning And Follow Up, Import Section

Address: Palestine Street, near Al-Shaab Stadium, P.O.Box 19055, Baghdad, Iraq Modifications: De-listed on 4 Apr 2019

SSID: 70-2615 Name: State Enterprise For Irrigation Projects Address: Karantina, near Sarafiya Bridge, Baghdad, Iraq Modifications: De-listed on 4 Apr 2019

SSID: 70-2725 Name: State Establishment Of Haditha Dam Address: Haklanya, Haditha, Iraq

Modifications: De-listed on 4 Apr 2019

SSID: 70-2730 Name: State Establishment Of Hemreen Dam Address: 6 Mukdadiya, Mukdadiya, Iraq

Modifications: De-listed on 4 Apr 2019

SSID: 70-2747 Name: State Establishment Of Mosul Dam Address: Ninewa Governorate, Mosul, Iraq Modifications: De-listed on 4 Apr 2019

SSID: 70-2751 Name: State Establishment Of Small Dams And Regulators Address: Sinak, Baghdad, Iraq

Modifications: De-listed on 4 Apr 2019

Links:

FINMA Notice

Data files of updates – PDF, XML

EU extends Iran human rights sanctions for 1 more year

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Link:

EU Notice

Sanctions ahoy! OFAC designates a raft of Venezuelan cargo vessels (and more)

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On Friday, OFAC designated the following 2 entities:

BALLITO BAY SHIPPING INCORPORATED (a.k.a. BALLITO BAY SHIPPING INC), 80 Broad Street, Monrovia, Liberia; Identification Number IMO 5804961 [VENEZUELA-EO13850]. 

 

PROPER IN MANAGEMENT INCORPORATED (a.k.a. PROPER IN MANAGEMENT INC), 2, Gounari Street, Piraeus, Athens 185 31, Greece; 2 D Gounari Street, Piraeus, Greece; Identification Number IMO 5766343 [VENEZUELA-EO13850].

and all these cargo vessels:


AMAPOLA 1 Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9717357 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

AMUAY Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9432658 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

BICENTENARIO I Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9584762 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

BICENTENARIO II Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9513323 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

BICENTENARIO III Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9585819 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

BICENTENARIO IV Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9556947 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

BICENTENARIO IX Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9557915 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

BICENTENARIO V Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9542518 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

BICENTENARIO VI Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9557549 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

BICENTENARIO VII Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9588990 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

BICENTENARIO VIII Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9564695 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

BICENTENARIO X Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9564126 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

BICENTENARIO XI Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9513311 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

BICENTENARIO XII Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9513282 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

BICENTENARIO XIII Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9513294 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

BICENTENARIO XIV Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9513270 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

BICENTENARIO XV Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9513268 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

BICENTENARIO XVI Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9513309 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

CARIBE Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9540895 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

CAYAURIMA Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9688805 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

CUMANAGOTO Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9540883 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

DESPINA ANDRIANNA Crude Oil Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9182667 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: BALLITO BAY SHIPPING INCORPORATED). 

 

GARDENIA Tug Panama flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9739898 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

GP-21 Drilling Ship Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8767953 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

GP-23 Drilling Ship Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8767977 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

JAZMIN Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9662643 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

L-409 Drilling Ship Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8772049 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

MANAURE Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9670987 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

MARA Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9670999 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

MARGARITA 1 Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9671668 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

PDVSA CARDON Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9432660 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

SABANETA Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9667813 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

TRIBILIN Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9693240 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

URDANETA Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 7912111 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.). 

 

YORACO Tug Venezuela flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9688790 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.).

under its Venezuela sanctions program.

And the State Department:

The United States Sanctions Companies Enabling Shipment of Venezuelan Oil to Cuba

Media Note

Office of the Spokesperson

Washington, DC

April 5, 2019


Today, the United States sanctioned two companies, Ballito Bay Shipping Inc. and ProPer in Management Inc., operating in Venezuela’s oil sector and the vessel Despina Andrianna used to transport oil to Cuba. Additional vessels, in which Venezuela’s state-owned oil company PDVSA has interests, are being identified as blocked property, pursuant to Executive Order 13850. These actions target entities and vessels that have been enabling the former Maduro regime to continue undermine the prosperity and democracy that Venezuelans deserve.

The former Maduro regime continues to line its pockets with the profits from natural resources that properly belong to the people of Venezuela. Meanwhile, Cuba is propping up the former regime and facilitating its repression of the Venezuelan people, through its military and intelligence support to Maduro.

The United States is taking action to curtail this and other ongoing corrupt activities of Nicolas Maduro and malign actors. We encourage companies, banks, and other institutions to refrain from providing services that support his repressive practices. We also urge countries to take appropriate legal measures to deprive Maduro and his cronies of assets held overseas and to prevent travel to their countries.

We will continue to use the full weight of U.S. economic and diplomatic power to complete the peaceful transition to a once-again free, prosperous and stable Venezuela.

and the Treasury Department:

Treasury Sanctions Companies Operating in the Oil Sector of the Venezuelan Economy and Transporting Oil to Cuba

Washington – Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated two companies operating in the oil sector of the Venezuelan economy, pursuant to E.O. 13850, as amended.  Additionally, OFAC identified one vessel, which transported oil from Venezuela to Cuba, as blocked property that is owned by one of these companies.  Separately, OFAC is also identifying 34 vessels as blocked property of Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), which was designated on January 28, 2019, for operating in the oil sector of the Venezuelan economy.  The United States continues to take strong action against the illegitimate regime of former President Nicolas Maduro, not only to isolate corrupt Venezuelan enterprises, but also to target Maduro’s supporters in Havana who continue to enable the oppression of the people of Venezuela.

“Cuba has been an underlying force fueling Venezuela’s descent into crisis.  Treasury is taking action against vessels and entities transporting oil, providing a lifeline to keep the illegitimate Maduro regime afloat,” said Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin.  “Cuba continues to profit from, and prop up, the illegitimate Maduro regime through oil-for-repression schemes as they attempt to keep Maduro in power.  The United States remains committed to a transition to democracy in Venezuela and to holding the Cuban regime accountable for its direct involvement in Venezuela’s demise.”

The relationship between Cuba and Venezuela hinges on a two-decade long political, security, and economic alliance, particularly given Cuba’s reliance on a barter system for Venezuelan oil imports.  Cuba is a major importer of crude oil from Venezuela, and in return, sends assistance to Venezuela in the form of political advisors, intelligence and military officials, and medical professionals, all of whom are used to ensure Maduro’s hold on power and complete social control over the people of Venezuela.  Cuba’s influence has contributed to Venezuela’s failure.  Maduro continues to send aid to Cuba as Venezuelans suffer from a deepening humanitarian crisis while denying entry to food, medicine, and other supplies provided by the United States and our allies and partners.

Today’s action sheds light on the lifeline that Venezuela’s oil industry provides to the illegitimate regime of former President Maduro, targeting two companies that operate in the oil sector of the Venezuelan economy, delivering oil to Cuba on the vessel, Despina Andrianna:

  • Despina Andrianna is a crude oil tanker (IMO: 9182667) that delivered crude oil from Venezuela to Cuba during February and March of 2019.
  • Ballito Bay Shipping Incorporated is based in Monrovia, Liberia, and is the registered owner of the vessel, Despina Andrianna.
  • ProPer In Management Incorporated is based in the port city of Piraeus, Athens, Greece, and is the operator of the vessel, Despina Andrianna.

Additionally, OFAC identified the following 34 vessels as blocked property as PdVSA has an interest in such vessels:

  • AMAPOLA 1
  • AMUAY
  • BICENTENARIO I
  • BICENTENARIO II
  • BICENTENARIO III
  • BICENTENARIO IV
  • BICENTENARIO V
  • BICENTENARIO VI
  • BICENTENARIO VII
  • BICENTENARIO VIII
  • BICENTENARIO IX
  • BICENTENARIO X
  • BICENTENARIO XI
  • BICENTENARIO XII
  • BICENTENARIO XIII
  • BICENTENARIO XIV
  • BICENTENARIO XV
  • BICENTENARIO XVI
  • CARIBE
  • CAYAURIMA
  • CUMANAGOTO
  • GARDENIA
  • GP-21
  • GP-23
  • JAZMIN
  • L-409
  • MANAURE
  • MARA
  • MARGARITA 1
  • PDVSA CARDON
  • SABANETA
  • TRIBILIN
  • URDANETA
  • YORACO

For information about the methods that Venezuelan senior political figures, their associates, and front persons use to move and hide corrupt proceeds, including how they try to exploit the U.S. financial system and real estate market, please refer to Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) advisories FIN-2017-A006, “Advisory on Widespread Public Corruption in Venezuela,” and FIN-2017-A003, “Advisory to Financial Institutions and Real Estate Firms and Professionals.”

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of these entities, and of any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by the designated entities, that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.  OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons.

U.S. sanctions need not be permanent; sanctions are intended to bring about a positive change of behavior.  The United States has made clear that the removal of sanctions is available for persons designated under E.O. 13692 or E.O. 13850, both as amended, who take concrete and meaningful actions to restore democratic order, refuse to take part in human rights abuses, speak out against abuses committed by the Maduro regime, and combat corruption in Venezuela.

issued press releases.

Links:

OFAC Notice

Press Releases: State Department, Treasury Department

Hong Kong stock exchange sanctions risks guidance

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The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong issued a 6-page sanctions risks guidance document. Skipping over definition of terms, the purpose of the document is:

1. Purpose

1.1 Certain overseas jurisdictions may from time to time impose trade or economic sanctions on specific countries, governments, entities or persons by restricting their nationals from making assets or services available, directly or indirectly, to them, dealing with their assets or otherwise conducting commercial transactions with them. Some sanctions may even have (i) extra-jurisdictional effect, i.e. are imposed on persons who are not nationals of the relevant jurisdiction or entities which are not incorporated or located in the relevant jurisdiction, and do not otherwise have any nexus with that jurisdiction; and/or (ii) implications on activities or investments which may be regarded as financing, facilitating or contributing to the enhancement of the ability of a sanctioned country, government, entity or person to develop certain specific products or industries.

1.2 This letter provides guidance on actions required to be taken by a listing applicant if its activities expose the Relevant Persons (as defined below) to any risk as a result of sanctions under any law or regulation of any Relevant Jurisdiction (as defined below) and how such risk may affect its suitability for listing and should be dealt with.

And the scenarios given are:

Three scenarios

3.2 This Guidance Letter considers three different scenarios:

(a) a listing applicant has engaged in Primary Sanctioned Activity;

(B) a listing applicant has engaged in Secondary Sanctionable Activity; and

(C) a listing applicant is a Sanctioned Target, is located, incorporated, organised or resident in a Sanctioned Country, or is a Sanctioned Trader.

It also sets out certain circumstances under which the Exchange may find an applicant not suitable for listing.

Primary Sanctioned Activity

3.3 The listing applicant must obtain a reasoned analysis from its legal adviser on whether each Primary Sanctioned Activity conducted by the listing applicant (i) violates any applicable law or regulation in the Relevant Jurisdiction(s); and/or (ii) results in any material sanctions risk1 to the Relevant Persons. The listing applicant must also assess the impact of any cessation of Primary Sanctioned Activity on its financial position and business operations. The listing applicant must cease all Primary Sanctioned Activities prior to listing if its legal adviser has confirmed that such activities violate applicable law or regulation.

Depending on the facts and circumstances, the listing applicant should adopt appropriate measures to deal with any material sanctions risk identified (see paragraphs 3.6 and 3.7 below).

Secondary Sanctionable Activity

3.4 The listing applicant must obtain a reasoned analysis from its legal adviser on whether each Secondary Sanctionable Activity conducted by the listing applicant would likely result in the imposition of any sanctions against the Relevant Persons (including designation as a Sanctioned Target and/or the penalties which might be imposed).

Depending on the facts and circumstances, the listing applicant should adopt appropriate measures to deal with any material sanctions risk identified (see paragraphs 3.6 and 3.7 below).

Applicant is a Sanctioned Target, is located, incorporated, organised or resident in a Sanctioned Country or is a Sanctions Trader

3.5 Depending on the facts and circumstances, the Exchange may determine that such a listing applicant is not suitable for listing due to reputational risk or impose other restrictions (e.g. the listing applicant might be required to ensure that its shares are not offered to nationals of the Relevant Jurisdictions).

And the handling of these cases:

Measures to be adopted

Listing applicant subject to material sanctions risk

3.6 The listing applicant which is subject to material sanctions risk should implement effective and adequate internal control measures before listing to control and monitor its and other Relevant Persons’ exposure to sanctions risks. Depending on the specific nature of the sanctions risk involved and the materiality of the Sanctioned Activity to the listing applicant’s business, these measures might include an undertaking from the listing applicant and/or its shareholders to the Exchange:

(a) not to directly or indirectly apply the IPO proceeds and any other funds raised through the Exchange to (i) finance or facilitate any Sanctioned Activity; or (ii) pay any damages for terminating or transferring the relevant contracts that constitute Sanctioned Activity;

(b) to terminate before listing all obligations under the relevant contracts that constitute the Sanctioned Activity and have measures in place to ensure compliance with the Undertakings; and/ or

(c) to disclose in its annual, interim and quarterly reports (if any) (i) details of any new and/ or existing Sanctioned Activity; (ii) its efforts in monitoring its business exposure to sanctions risks; and (iii) the current status of, and the anticipated plans for, any new and/ or existing Sanctioned Activity.

Any breach of such undertaking may lead to a possible delisting of the listing applicant’s securities from the Exchange.

3.7 Depending on the specific nature of the sanctions risk involved and the materiality of the Sanctioned Activity to the listing applicant’s business, the listing applicant may be required to prominently disclose the following in the “Summary”, “Risk Factors” and “Business” sections of its listing document:

(a) details of the Sanctioned Activities, including but not limited to (i) the nature and size of the listing applicant’s projects/ businesses involved in the Sanctioned Activities; (ii) whether the listing applicant and/ or its counterparties were or have reasons to believe they will be deemed to be Sanctioned Targets; and (iii) background of the counterparties, the revenue recognized from Sanctioned Activities during the track record period and the current status of such activities;

(b) the legal adviser’s reasoned analyses under paragraphs 3.3 and 3.4 above;

(c) a description of any known material contingent liabilities in relation to the Sanctioned Activities in accordance with the applicable accounting and legal standards;

(d) if it has engaged in Primary Sanctioned Activities that violate any applicable law or regulation, (i) when such activities ceased; (ii) details of the financial and operational impact; (iii) any disclosure made to the relevant governments and responses to, and the status of, any such disclosure; and (iv) the legal consequences (including maximum penalties (if any)) on the Relevant Persons as a result of such cessation;

(e) if it intends to undertake any new Sanctioned Activity after listing, details of such intention and the parameters or criteria that the listing applicant will consider when determining whether to undertake such venture; and

(f) (i) the internal control measures and the views of its sponsor(s) and directors on the adequacy and effectiveness of the internal control measures to protect the interests of the Relevant Persons; (ii) the Undertakings; and (iii) a risk factor on the possible delisting of the listing applicant’s securities if any undertaking to the Exchange as described in paragraph 3.6 is breached.

Circumstances which may render an applicant not suitable for listing

3.8 The Exchange is unlikely to approve the listing if (a) any sanctions risks to or sanctions imposed on the applicant materially undermine its ability to continue its operations; (b) an applicant states that the funds are raised to finance Sanctioned Activities; or (c) its listing would cause a significant risk to the Relevant Persons or reputational risk to the Exchange (see also paragraph 3.5 above). Whether a listing would cause a significant risk to the Relevant Persons depends on the specific facts and circumstances.

No current Sanctioned Activity or no material sanctions risk

3.9 If there is no apparent or material sanctions risk, no specific risk mitigating measures need to be adopted and no disclosure on sanctions is required.

Suitability for continued listing

3.10 Please refer to paragraphs 25-28 of GL96-18 regarding the Exchange’s guidance on listed issuer’s suitability for continued listing due to trade or economic sanctions.

And it ends by reminding everyone that laws and refs change, and that one should consult counsel to be make sure they are up to date on the latest requirements.

Link:

HKEX Guidance Letter

Breaking: Standard Chartered Bank settles yet another set of sanctions violations

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OFAC Notice:

Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Standard Chartered Bank

The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) today announced a $639,023,750 settlement with Standard Chartered Bank (“SCB” or the “Bank”), a financial institution headquartered in the United Kingdom.  The bank has agreed to settle its potential civil liability for apparent violations of the now-repealed Burmese Sanctions Regulations (BSR); the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 515 (CACR); the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 560 (ITSR); the now-repealed Sudanese Sanctions Regulations; and the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 542 (SySR), or Executive Order 13582 of August 17, 2011, “Blocking Property of the Government of Syria and Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Syria” (E.O. 13582). 

From June 2009 until June 2014, SCB processed 9,335 transactions totaling $437,553,380 that were processed to or through the United States. All of these transactions involved persons or countries subject to comprehensive sanctions programs administered by OFAC. The majority of the conduct concerns Iran-related accounts maintained by SCB’s Dubai, UAE branches (“SCB Dubai”), including accounts at SCB Dubai held for a number of general trading companies, and a petrochemical company. SCB Dubai processed USD transactions to or through SCB’s branch office in New York (“SCB NY”) or other U.S. financial institutions on behalf of customers that sent payment instructions to SCB Dubai while physically located or ordinarily resident in Iran. OFAC determined that the Bank did not voluntarily self-disclose the apparent violations, and the apparent violations constitute an egregious case.  

Separately, the bank has agreed to settle its potential civil liability for apparent violations of the Zimbabwe Sanctions Regulations (ZSR). The bank has agreed to remit $18,016,283.  All of the transactions giving rise to the Zimbabwe-Related Apparent Violations involved persons identified on OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (the “SDN List”) or parties that were owned 50 percent or more, directly or indirectly, by persons on the SDN List at the time the transactions occurred. The designated and/or blocked persons maintained account relationships with SCB’s affiliate in Zimbabwe (“SCBZ”), and engaged in funds transfer or debit/credit card transactions whose net settlement transfers were sent to, and processed by SCB NY or other U.S. financial institutions. SCB NY processed 1,795 transactions totaling $76,795,414, for or on behalf, or that otherwise contained a property interest, of those sanctioned entities.

OFAC determined that SCB voluntarily self-disclosed the Zimbabwe-Related Apparent Violations and that the Zimbabwe-Related Apparent Violations constitute a non-egregious case.

Treasury Press Release:

U.S. Treasury Department Announces Settlement with Standard Chartered Bank

Treasury Settlement Part of Combined $1.1 Billion Settlement for Bank’s Apparent Violations of Multiple Sanctions Programs

WASHINGTON – As part of a combined $1.1 billion settlement with federal, state, local, and United Kingdom government partners, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) today announced a $639 million agreement with Standard Chartered Bank (SCB) to settle its potential civil liability for apparent violations of U.S. economic sanctions.  Today’s settlement resolves OFAC’s investigation into apparent violations of a number of U.S sanctions programs, including those relating to Burma, Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria.  OFAC is also settling a separate case involving apparent violations by SCB of sanctions related to Zimbabwe.

From June 2009 until May 2014, SCB processed 9,335 transactions totaling $437,553,380 that were processed to or through the United States.  All of these transactions involved persons or countries subject to comprehensive sanctions programs administered by OFAC (including Burma, Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria).  The majority of the conduct concerns Iran-related accounts maintained by SCB’s Dubai, UAE branches (“SCB Dubai”), including accounts at SCB Dubai, held for a number of general trading companies and a petrochemical company.  SCB Dubai processed USD transactions to or through SCB’s branch office in New York or other U.S. financial institutions on behalf of customers that sent payment instructions to SCB Dubai while physically located or ordinarily resident in Iran.  SCB also processed online banking instructions for residents of comprehensively sanctioned countries.

These actions constitute apparent violations of the now-repealed Burmese Sanctions Regulations; the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 515; the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 560; the now-repealed Sudanese Sanctions Regulations; and the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 542, or Executive Order 13582 of August 17, 2011, “Blocking Property of the Government of Syria and Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Syria.”

Under the settlement agreement, SCB has agreed to sustain its commitment to implementing robust compliance procedures by ensuring that it has a management team in place that: (1) is committed to a culture of compliance; (2) conducts regular risk assessments; (3) ensures that its internal controls appropriately mitigate the entity’s sanctions-related risks; (4) conducts regularized audits; and (5) provides ongoing sanctions compliance training throughout SCB.

OFAC worked closely and collaboratively with its counterparts at other government agencies in the investigation of this matter. ​ Today’s settlement is simultaneous with SCB’s settlements with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia, the New York County District Attorney’s Office, the New York State Department of Financial Services, and the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority.  

SCB’s $639 million settlement with OFAC will be deemed satisfied by the bank’s payment of a forfeiture and fine to the Department of Justice and fine to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors for the same pattern of conduct.

Separately, between May 2009 and July 2013, SCB Zimbabwe processed transactions to or through the United States involving Zimbabwe-related Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) or entities owned 50 percent or more, individually or in the aggregate, by one or more Zimbabwe-related SDNs.  These transactions constituted apparent violations of the Zimbabwe Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 541.  SCB will remit $18,016,283 to OFAC to settle civil liability relating to the apparent violations of the ZSR.

It’s important to note that the non-Zimbabwe part of this fine was for egregious conduct, which was not voluntarily self-disclosed. They were previously fined $132 million by OFAC in late 2012 (as part of a larger multi-agency settlement).

BTW, here is OFAC’s math, which reduced their penalty from the $2,715,100,479 base penalty amount (for the Global Settlement Apparent Violations):

OFAC found the following to be aggravating factors:

• At a minimum, SCB acted with reckless disregard and failed to exercise a minimal degree of caution or care with regard to the conduct that led to the Global Settlement Apparent Violations;

• SCB had actual knowledge and/or reason to know of the conduct at issue, and various supervisory and managerial personnel from multiple business lines, often including those with responsibility for financial crimes and sanctions compliance, were involved in discussions regarding specific customers or products and services that posed OFAC sanctions risks;

• The Global Settlement Apparent Violations resulted in significant harm to multiple economic sanctions programs, and provided dozens of companies subject to U.S. economic sanctions access to the U.S. financial system;

• SCB’s compliance program was inadequate to manage the bank’s risk and suffered from multiple systemic deficiencies, including failure to respond to warning signs in a timely and efficient manner; and

• SCB is a large, commercially sophisticated financial institution.

OFAC found the following to be mitigating factors:

• SCB provided OFAC with substantial cooperation throughout the course of its investigation, including by signing a tolling agreement and multiple extensions to the agreement, and submitting detailed, well-organized, and voluminous information and documents to OFAC throughout the course of the multi-year investigation;

• SCB has undertaken remedial efforts in order to curtail and inhibit similar apparent violations from occurring in the future;

• A small number of the Syria-related transactions occurred shortly after Executive Order 13582; and

• SCB had not received a penalty notice or Finding of Violation in the five years preceding the earliest date of the transactions giving rise to the Global Settlement Apparent Violations.

However, that last note is very deceiving – it says that SCB had not gotten in trouble from 2004 to 2009 – despite getting fined back in 2012, which was during the pattern of these violations.

It is interesting to note the much more severe accounting related to the Zimbabwean-related penalty:

OFAC found the following to be aggravating factors:

• Both SCB and SCBZ appear to have had actual knowledge regarding customer relationships that SCBZ maintained with persons identified on the SDN List over a period of several years;

• Components of SCB, including supervisory and managerial personnel in the Bank’s compliance unit, appear to have had actual knowledge of SCBZ’s exposure to OFAC- designated parties;

• The conduct resulted in significant harm to the sanctions program objectives embodied in the ZSR;

• SCB’s compliance program was inadequate to manage the Bank’s risk;

• SCB is a large, commercially sophisticated financial institution;

• SCBZ’s efforts to identify and “ring-fence” SDN customers were not sufficient to address the conduct leading to the Zimbabwe-Related Apparent Violations; and

• Multiple SCBZ personnel appear to have been unaware that the Bank’s customers (including those on the SDN List) could use their SCBZ-issued credit cards outside of Zimbabwe (including in the United States).

OFAC found the following to be a mitigating factor:

• SCB provided OFAC with cooperation including a statute of limitations tolling agreement.

Links:

OFAC Notice

Enforcement Information

Settlement Agreement

Treasury Press Release

EU, OFSI amend 5 on terror list

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Earlier today, UK regulators implemented Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/555 by amending the following counter terror listings:

1. ADL, Sayf-Al ZIDANE Mohammed Salahaldin Abd El Halim

DOB: (1) 11/04/1963. (2) 11/04/1960. POB: Monufia Governate, Egypt a.k.a: (1) AL ADEL, Seif (2) AL-‘ADIL, Saif (3) ALMADANI, Ibrahim (4) MAKKAWI, Muhammad Muhamad, Ibrahim (5) ZIDAN, Mohammed, Salahaldin, Abd, El Halim ADL, Sayf-Al Nationality: Egyptian Other Information: UN Ref QDi.001. Responsible for Usama bin Laden’s (deceased) security. Hair: Dark. Eyes: Dark. Listed on: 23/02/2001 Last Updated: 22/02/2017 09/04/2019 Group ID: 7424.

2. SYAWAL Yassin

DOB: –/–/1972 03/09/1962. POB: Makassar, Indonesia a.k.a: (1) ABU MUAMAR (2) ABU SETA (3) MOCHTAR, Yasin, Mahmud (4) MUAMAR, Abu (5) MUBAROK, Muhamad (6) SYAWAL, Muhammad (7) SYWAL, Yasin (8) YASIN, Abdul, Hadi Nationality: Indonesian Other Information: UN Ref QI.S.123.03. Also referred to as Mahmud and Mubarok. At large as at December 2003. Listed on: 05/09/2003 Last Updated: 20/01/2015 09/04/2019 Group ID: 7834.

3. GHEDEIR Amor Mohamed

DOB: (1) 12/12/1965. (2) –/–/1958. POB: (1) Deb-Deb, Amenas, Wilaya (province) of Illizi, (2) Touggourt, Wilaya (province) of Ouargla, (1) Algeria (2) Algeria a.k.a: (1) ABDELLAH, Abou (2) ADEL, Youcef (3) HAMMADOU, Abid (4) ZEID, Abdelhamid, Abou Nationality: Algerian Other Information: UN Ref QI.H.250.08. Associated with the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. Located in Northern Mali as of June 2008. Name of mother is Benarouba Bachira. Name of father is Mabrouk. He usurped the identity of Abid Hammadou who allegedly died in Chad in 2004. Reportedly deceased as of 24 February 2013. Listed on: 07/07/2008 Last Updated: 06/12/2012 09/04/2019 Group ID: 10691.

4. LAHBOUS Mohamed

DOB: –/–/1978. POB: Mali a.k.a: ENNOUINI, Mohamed Nationality: Malian Address: Mali.Other Information: UN Ref QI.L.319.13. Member of the Mouvement pour l’Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO). Also referred to as Hassan and Hocine. Reportedly deceased as of 14 February 2018. Listed on: 05/11/2013 Last Updated: 05/11/2013 09/04/2019 Group ID: 12886.

5. IMAMOVIC Nusret

DOB: (1) 26/09/1971. (2) 26/09/1977. POB: Miljanovci, Kalesija Municipality, Bosnia. a.k.a: IMAMOVIC, Nusret, Sulejman Nationality: Bosnia and Herzegovina Passport Details: Bosnia and Herzegovina passport number (1) 349054 (2) 3490054 Address: Syrian Arab Republic as of September2015.Listed on: 07/03/2016 Last Updated: 07/03/2016 09/04/2019 Group ID: 13314.

Link:

OFSI Notice

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/555

EU, OFSI amend 11 on Iran human rights violations list

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Earlier today, UK regulators implemented Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/560 by amending the following individual listings:

1. HEYDARIFAR Ali-Akbar

Position: Judge, Tehran Revolutionary Court Other Information: Former Judge, Tehran Revolutionary Court Listed on: 14/04/2011 Last Updated: 12/05/2011 09/04/2019 Group ID: 11794.

2. JAFARI-DOLATABADI Abbas

DOB: –/–/1953. POB: Yazd, Iran Position: Prosecutor General of Tehran since Aug 2009 Listed on: 14/04/2011 Last Updated: 12/05/2011 09/04/2019 Group ID: 11795.

3. MOGHISSEH Mohammad

a.k.a: NASSERIAN, Mohammad Position: Judge, Head of Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 28 Other Information: Also referred to as Nasserian. Listed on: 14/04/2011 Last Updated: 12/05/2011 09/04/2019 Group ID: 11796.

4. ESMAILI Gholam-Hossein

Position: Head of Iran’s Prisons Organisation Head of the Tehran Judiciary Other Information: Former Head of Iran’s Prisons Organisation Listed on: 14/04/2011 Last Updated: 12/05/2011 09/04/2019 Group ID: 11806.

5. BANESHI Jaber

Position: Prosecutor of Shiraz Other Information: Former Prosecutor of Shiraz Listed on: 12/10/2011 Last Updated: 12/10/2011 09/04/2019 Group ID: 12178.

6. GANJI Mostafa Barzegar

Position: Head of the Directorate General for prisons. Other Information: Former Prosecutor-General of Qom. Likely to be currently in a process of reassignment to another function. Listed on: 12/10/2011 Last Updated: 13/04/2017 09/04/2019 Group ID: 12180.

7. KAMALIAN Behrouz

DOB: –/–/1983. POB: Tehran Position: Head of the IRGC-linked ‘Ashiyaneh’ cyber group Other Information: Also referred to as ‘Hackers Brain’ and ‘Behrooz_Ice’. Listed on: 12/10/2011 Last Updated: 13/04/2017 09/04/2019 Group ID: 12187.

8. KHODAEI SOURI Hojatollah

DOB: –/–/1964. POB: Selseleh, Iran Position: Parliamentary deputy for Lorestan Province. Member of the Parliamentary Commission for Foreign and Security Policy. Other Information: Former Head of Evin prison Listed on: 12/10/2011 Last Updated: 14/04/2014 09/04/2019 Group ID: 12193.

9. HAJMOHAMMADI HAJMOHAM-MADI Aziz

Position: Judge at branch 71 of the Tehran Provincial Criminal Court Other Information: Former judge at the first chamber of the Evin Court. Listed on: 12/10/2011 Last Updated: 12/10/2011 09/04/2019 Group ID: 12198.

10. LARIJANI Sadeq

DOB: (1) –/–/1960. (2) –/08/1961. POB: Najaf, Iraq Position: Head of the Judiciary and Head of the Expediency Council Listed on: 29/03/2012 Last Updated: 29/03/2012 09/04/2019 Group ID: 12649.

11. RASHIDI AGHDAM Ali Ashraf

a.k.a: ROSTAMI AGHDAM Ali Ashraf Other Information: Former Head of Evin Prison, appointed in mid-2012. Listed on: 12/03/2013 Last Updated: 13/04/2017 09/04/2019 Group ID: 12849.

under the Iran (Human Rights) sanctions program.

Links:

OFSI Notice

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/560


UN, DFAT remove more Iraqi entities

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Earlier today, Australian authorities removed:

IQe.008 Name: AL HASSAKA SPINNING PROJECT A.k.a.: na F.k.a.: na Address: P.O. Box 46, Al Hassaka Al Azizeh, Iraq Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information:

IQe.196 Name: WOOLLEN TEXTILE STATE EST IN NASSIRIYAH A.k.a.: WOOLLEN TEXTILE STATE COMPANY IN NASIRYA F.k.a.: na Address: P.O. Box 108, Nassiriyah, Iraq Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information:

IQe.195 Name: WOOLLEN INDUSTRIES FACTORY OF ARBIL A.k.a.: WOOLLEN TEXTILE STATE COMPANY IN ARBIL F.k.a.: na Address: P.O. Box 101, Arbil, Iraq Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information:

IQe.030 Name: DIWANIYA STATE COTTON TEXTILE COMPANY A.k.a.: DIWANIYA COTTON STATE COMPANY F.k.a.: na Address: a) P.O. Box 79, Diwaniya, Qadisiya, Iraq b) P.O. Box 15, Diwaniyah, Diwaniyah, Iraq Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information:

IQe.183 Name: STATE SEWING COMPANY A.k.a.: na F.k.a.: na Address: P.O. Box 14007, Waziriya, Baghdad, Iraq Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information:

IQe.133 Name: STATE ENTERPRISE FOR LEATHER INDUSTRIES A.k.a.: STATE LEATHER INDUSTRIES COMPANY F.k.a.: na Address: Karrada Al Sharkiya, Hurriya Square, P.O. Box 3079, Baghdad, Iraq Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information:

IQe.089 Name: NATIONAL STATE COMPANY FOR TEXTILE A.k.a.: na F.k.a.: na Address: P.O. Box 5664, Kadhumia, Baghdad, Iraq Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information:

IQe.068 Name: KUT COTTON TEXTILE STATE COMPANY A.k.a.: a) TRAINING CENTRE FOR TEXTILE INDUSTRIES/KUT b) KUT INDUSTRIAL COMPANY F.k.a.: na Address: a) P.O. Box 25, Kut, Iraq b) Kut Opp, Al-Zahra TownAl-Zahra Town, Iraq c) P.O. Box 5613, South Gate, Kut, Iraq Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information:

IQe.065 Name: IRAQI TEXTILE STATE ESTABLISHMENT A.k.a.: IraqI STATE TEXTILE COMPANY F.k.a.: na Address: Al Nawab Street, Khadhumiya, P.O. Box 9106, Baghdad, Iraq Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information:

IQe.047 Name: GENERAL ESTABLISHMENT FOR WOOLLEN TEXTILE A.k.a.: WOOLLEN TEXTILE STATE COMPANY F.k.a.: na Address: P.O. Box 9114, Khadhumiya, Baghdad, Iraq Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information:

IQe.033 Name: FINE TEXTILE STATE COMPANY A.k.a.: na F.k.a.: na Address: P.O. Box 2, Hilla, Iraq Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information:

IQe.130 Name: STATE ENTERPRISE FOR HANDWOVEN CARPETS A.k.a.: HANDWOVEN CARPETS STATE COMPANY F.k.a.: na Address: Al Nasir Square, Arbil, Iraq Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information:

from Iraq sanctions, as per the corresponding United Nations Sanctions Committee.

Link:

UN Notice

HKMA Alert: Fraudulent DBS Bank Website

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Press Releases

Fraudulent website related to DBS Bank (Hong Kong) Limited

The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) wishes to alert members of the public to a press release issued by DBS Bank (Hong Kong) Limited on fraudulent website, which has been reported to the HKMA.  Hyperlink to the press release is available on the HKMA website for ease of reference by members of the public.

Anyone who has provided his or her personal information to the website concerned or has conducted any financial transactions through the website should contact the bank concerned using the contact information provided in the press release, and report to the Police or contact the Cyber Security and Technology Crime Bureau of the Hong Kong Police Force at 2860 5012.

 

Hong Kong Monetary Authority
18 March 2019

Link:

HKMA Notice

HKMA Alert: Fraudulent China CITIC Bank website

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Press Releases

Fraudulent website related to China CITIC Bank International Limited

The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) wishes to alert members of the public to a press release issued by China CITIC Bank International Limited on fraudulent website, which has been reported to the HKMA.  Hyperlink to the press release is available on the HKMA website for ease of reference by members of the public.

Anyone who has provided his or her personal information to the website concerned or has conducted any financial transactions through the website should contact the bank concerned using the contact information provided in the press release, and report to the Police or contact the Cyber Security and Technology Crime Bureau of the Hong Kong Police Force at 2860 5012.

 

Hong Kong Monetary Authority
19 March 2019

Link:

HKMA Notice

The fun starts on page 14…

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of the Standard Chartered settlement with OFAC – it’s a roadmap to what real remediation looks like, and the standards for a firm of size and commercial sophistication are:

Specifically, OFAC and Respondent understand that the following compliance commitments have been made:

a. Management Commitment:

i. Respondent commits that Senior Management has reviewed and approved Respondent’s sanctions compliance program.

ii. Respondent commits to ensuring that its senior management. including senior leadership, executives, and/or the board of directors, are committed to supporting Respondent’s sanctions compliance program.

iii. Respondent commits to ensuring that its compliance unit(s) are delegated sufficient authority and autonomy to deploy its policies and procedures in a manner that effectively controls Respondent’s OFAC risk.

iv. Respondent commits to ensuring that its compliance unit(s) receive adequate resources-tncluding in the form of human capital, expertise, information technology, and other resources, as appropriate- that are relative to Respondent’s breadth of operations, target and secondary markets, and other factors affecting its overall risk profile.

v. Respondent commits to ensuring that Senior Management promotes a “culture of compliance” throughout the organization.

vi. Respondent’s Senior Management demonstrates recognition of the seriousness of apparent violations of the laws and regulations administered by OFAC, and acknowledges its understanding of the apparent violations at issue, and commits to implementing necessary measures to reduce the risk of reoccurrence of similar conduct and apparent violations from occurring in the future.

b. Risk Assessment:

i. Respondent conducts an OF AC risk assessment in a manner, and with a frequency, that adequately accounts for potential risks. Such risks could be posed by its clients and customers, products, services, supply chain, intermediaries, counter-parties, transactions, and geographic locations, depending on the nature of the organization. The risk assessment will be updated to account for the root causes of any apparent violations or systemic deficiencies identified by Respondent during the routine course of business.

ii. Respondent has developed a methodology to identify,,analyze, and address the particular risks it identifies. The risk assessment will be updated to account for the conduct and root causes of any apparent violations or systemic deficiencies identified by Respondent during the routine course of business, for example, through a testing or audit function.

c. Internal Controls:

i. Respondent has designed and implemented written policies and procedures outlining its sanctions compliance program. These policies and procedures are relevant to the organization. capture Respondent’s day-to-day operations and procedures, are easy to follow, and prevent employees from engaging in misconduct.

ii. Respondent has implemented internal controls that adequately address the results of its OF AC risk assessment and profile. These internal controls should enable Respondent to clearly and effectively identify, interdict, escalate, and report to appropriate personnel within the organization transactions and activity that may be prohibited by OF AC. To the extent information technology solutions factor into Respondent•s internal controls, Respondent has selected and calibrated the solutions in a manner that is appropriate to address Respondent’s risk profile and compliance needs, and Respondent routinely tests the solutions to ensure effectiveness.

iii. Respondent commits to enforcing the policies and procedures it implements as part of its sanctions compliance internal controls through internal and/or external audits.

iv. Respondent commits to ensuring that its OF AC-related recordkeeping policies and procedures adequately account for its requirements pursuant to the sanctions programs administered by OF AC.

v. Respondent commits to ensuring that, upon learning of a weakness in its internal controls pertaining to sanctions compliance, it will take immediate and effective action, to the extent possible, to identify and implement compensating controls until the root cause of the weakness can be determined and remediated.

vi. Respondent has clearly communicated the sanctions compliance program’s policies and procedures to all relevant staff, including personnel within the sanctions compliance function, as well as relevant gatekeepers and business units operating in high-risk areas (e.g., customer acquisition, payments, sales, etc.) and to external parties performing sanctions compliance responsibilities on behalf of Respondent.

vii. Respondent has appointed personnel to integrate the sanctions compliance program’s policies and procedures into Respondent’s daily operations. This process includes consultations with relevant business units, and ensures that Respondent’s employees understand the policies and procedures.

d. Testing and Audit:

i. Respondent commits to ensuring that the testing or audit function is accountable to senior management, is independent of the audited activities and functions, and has sufficient authority, skills, expertise, and resources within the organization.

ii. Respondent commits to ensuring that it employs testing or audit procedures appropriate to the level and sophistication of its sanctions compliance program and that this function, whether deployed internally or by an external party, reflects a comprehensive and objective assessment of Respondent’s OFAC-related risks and internal controls.

iii. Respondent commits to ensuring that, upon learning of a confirmed negative testing or audit result pertaining to its sanctions compliance program, it will take immediate and effective action to identify and implement compensating controls until the root cause of the weakness can be detennined and remediated.

e. Training:

i. Respondent commits to ensuring that its OF AC-related training program provides adequate information and instruction to employees and, as appropriate, stakeholders (for example, clients, suppliers, business partners, and counterparties) in order to support Respondenes sanctions compliance efforts.

ii. Respondent commits to providing OF AC-related training with a scope that is appropriate for the products and services it offers; the customers, clients, and partner relationships it maintains; and the geographic regions in which it operates.

m. Respondent commits to providing OF AC-related training with a frequency that is appropriate based on its OFAC risk assessment and risk profile and, at a minimum, at least once a year to all relevant employees.

iv. Respondent commits to ensuring that, upon learning of a confirmed negative testing result or audit finding, or other deficiency pertaining to its sanctions compliance program, it will take immediate and effective action to provide training to relevant personnel.

v. Respondent’s training program includes easily accessible resources and materials that are available to all applicable personnel.

In addition, the agreed to annual certifications to OFAC for 5 years attesting to the implementation and maintenance of the compliance measures.

Mr. Watchlist is impressed.

Link:

OFAC Settlement with Standard Chartered Bank

April 10, 2019: SECO delists Iraqi entities

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On Wednesday, Swiss authorities removed:

SSID: 70-1973 Name: Al Hassaka Spinning Project Address: P.O.Box 46, Al Hassaka Al Azizeh, Iraq Modifications: De-listed on 8 Apr 2019

SSID: 70-2067 Name: Diwaniya State Cotton Textile Company

Good quality a.k.a.: Diwaniya Cotton State Company Address: a) P.O.Box 79, Diwaniya, Qadisiya, Iraq b) P.O.Box 15, Diwaniyah, Iraq

Modifications: De-listed on 8 Apr 2019

SSID: 70-2083 Name: Fine Textile State Company Address: P.O.Box 2, Hilla, Iraq

Modifications: De-listed on 8 Apr 2019

SSID: 70-2179 Name: General Establishment For Woollen Textile

Good quality a.k.a.: Woollen Textile State Company Address: Khadhumiya, P.O.Box 9114, Baghdad, Iraq

Modifications: De-listed on 8 Apr 2019

SSID: 70-2258 Name: Iraqi Textile State Establishment

Good quality a.k.a.: Iraqi State Textile Company Address: Al Nawab Street, Khadhumiya, P.O.Box 9106, Baghdad, Iraq

Modifications: De-listed on 8 Apr 2019

SSID: 70-2275 Name: Kut Cotton Textile State Company

Good quality a.k.a.: a) Training Centre For Textile Industries/Kut b) Kut Industrial Company Address: a) P.O.Box 25, Kut, Iraq b) Kut Opp, Al-Zahra Town, Iraq c) South Gate, P.O.Box 5613, Kut, Iraq

Modifications: De-listed on 8 Apr 2019

SSID: 70-2324 Name: Mosul State Company For Textile Address: P.O.Box 18, Mosul, Iraq

Modifications: De-listed on 8 Apr 2019

SSID: 70-2370 Name: National State Company For Textile Address: Kadhumia, P.O.Box 5664, Baghdad, Iraq Modifications: De-listed on 8 Apr 2019

SSID: 70-2605 Name: State Enterprise For Handwoven Carpets

Good quality a.k.a.: Handwoven Carpets State Company Address: Al Nasir Square, Arbil, Iraq

Modifications: De-listed on 8 Apr 2019

SSID: 70-2619 Name: State Enterprise For Leather Industries

Good quality a.k.a.: State Leather Industries Company Address: Karrada Al Sharkiya, Hurriya Square, P.O.Box 3079, Baghdad, Iraq

Modifications: De-listed on 8 Apr 2019

SSID: 70-2885 Name: State Sewing Company Address: Waziriya, P.O.Box 14007, Baghdad, Iraq Modifications: De-listed on 8 Apr 2019

SSID: 70-2942 Name: Woollen Industries Factory Of Arbil

Good quality a.k.a.: Woollen Textile State Company In Arbil Address: P.O.Box 101, Arbil, Iraq

Modifications: De-listed on 8 Apr 2019

SSID: 70-2947 Name: Woollen Textile State Est In Nassiriyah

Good quality a.k.a.: Woollen Textile State Company In Nasirya Address: P.O.Box 108, Nassiryah, Iraq

Modifications: De-listed on 8 Apr 2019

from their Iraq sanctions program.

Links:

FINMA Notice

Data files of updates – PDF, XML

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