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April 15, 2019: Canada sanctions 45 more under Venezuela program

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Canada imposes additional sanctions on the Maduro regime in Venezuela

April 15, 2019 – Ottawa, Ontario – Global Affairs Canada

In response to the Maduro regime’s attempts to strengthen its authoritarian rule over Venezuela, Canada today announces its fourth round of sanctions against key figures in the regime, adding to the 70 that have already been sanctioned.

Under the Special Economic Measures Act, the Honourable Chrystia Freeland, Minister of Foreign Affairs, is today announcing targeted sanctions against 43 individuals responsible for the deteriorating situation in Venezuela. They are high ranking officials of the Maduro regime, regional governors and/or directly implicated in activities undermining democratic institutions.

These measures are being taken in response to the Maduro regime’s anti-democratic actions, particularly relating to the repression and persecution of the members of the interim government, censorship, and excessive use of force against civil society, undermining the independence of the judiciary and other democratic institutions.

Quotes

“During the Lima Group meeting held in Ottawa on February 4, 2019, we called on the international community to take action against the Maduro regime. Today, Canada is taking that action by holding 43 more people accountable for their roles in worsening the situation in Venezuela.”

– Hon. Chrystia Freeland, P.C., M.P., Minister of Foreign Affairs

From the official posting of the amending regulation, here are those being added to the sanctions:

  1. Manuel Gregorio BERNAL MARTÍNEZ

  2. Iván Rafael HERNÁNDEZ DALA

  3. Manuel Ricardo Cristopher FIGUERA

  4. Hildemaro José RODRÍGUEZ MÚCURA

  5. Rafael Enrique BASTARDO MENDOZA

  6. José Miguel DOMÍNGUEZ RAMÍREZ

  7. Cristian Abelardo MORALES ZAMBRANO

  8. Franklin GARCÍA DUQUE

  9. Richard Jesús LÓPEZ VARGAS

  10. José Miguel MONTOYA RODRÍGUEZ

  11. Giuseppe Alessandro Martín Alessandrello CIMADEVILLA

  12. José Adelino ORNELAS FERREIRA

  13. Carlos Augusto Leal TELLERÍA

  14. Jorge Alberto ARREAZA MONTSERRAT

  15. Katherine Nayarith HARRINGTON PADRÓN

  16. Reinaldo Enrique MUÑOZ PEDROZA

  17. Alfredo RUIZ ANGULO

  18. Larry Devoe MÁRQUEZ

  19. Nelson Reinaldo LEPAJE SALAZAR

  20. Carlos Erik MALPICA FLORES

  21. Manuel Ángel FERNÁNDEZ MELÉNDEZ

  22. Franco SILVA AVILA

  23. Jorge Elieser MÁRQUEZ MONSALVE

  24. José RIVAS

  25. Luis Eduardo ORTEGA MORALES

  26. Simón Alejandro ZERPA DELGADO

  27. Manuel Salvador QUEVEDO FERNÁNDEZ

  28. Víctor Hugo CANO PACHECO

  29. Adrián Antonio PERDOMO MATA

  30. Justo José NOGUERA PIETRI

  31. Gladys REQUENA

  32. Eduardo PIÑATE

  33. Earle HERRERA

  34. María Alejandra DÍAZ

  35. Marco Antonio MEDINA

  36. Bárbara Gabriela CÉSAR SIERO

  37. Inocencio FIGUEROA

  38. María Carolina AMELIACH VILLARROEL

  39. Eulalia GUERRERO RIVERO

  40. Omar José PRIETO FERNÁNDEZ

  41. Ramón Alonso CARRIZALEZ RENGIFO

  42. Jorge Luis GARCÍA CARNEIRO

  43. Rafael Alejandro LACAVA EVANGELISTA

Links:

Canada Venezuela Sanctions page

Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Venezuela) Regulations (unofficial version)

OSFI Notice


HKMA Alert: Fraudulent Shanghai Commercial Bank website

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Press Releases

Fraudulent website related to Shanghai Commercial Bank Limited

The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) wishes to alert members of the public to a press release issued by Shanghai Commercial Bank Limited on fraudulent website, which has been reported to the HKMA.  Hyperlink to the press release is available on the HKMA website for ease of reference by members of the public.

Anyone who has provided his or her personal information to the website concerned or has conducted any financial transactions through the website should contact the bank concerned using the contact information provided in the press release, and report to the Police or contact the Cyber Security and Technology Crime Bureau of the Hong Kong Police Force at 2860 5012.

 

Hong Kong Monetary Authority
3 April 2019

Link:

HKMA Notice

April 17, 2019: UN, DFAT update one ISIL (Da’esh)/Al-Qaida individual listing

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Last Wednesday, Australian regulators updated the following counter terror designation:

QDi.187 Name: 1: ZULKARNAENARIS 2: naSUMARSONO 3: na 4: na
Title: na Designation: na DOB: 1963 POB: Gebang village, Masaran, Sragen, Central Java, Indonesia Good quality a.k.a.: a) Zulkarnan b) Zulkarnain c) Zulkarnin d) Arif Sunarso e) Aris SumarsonoZulkarnaen f) Aris Sunarso g) Ustad Daud Zulkarnaen h) Murshid Low quality a.k.a.: naMurshid Nationality: Indonesia Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 16 May 2005 (amended on 17 Apr. 2019) Other information: Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jun. 2010.  Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 7 Jun. 2018.  INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4681385

after it was modified by the United Nations ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee.

Link:

UN Notice

April 16, 2019: OFAC Technical Notice

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Important technical notice for users of OFAC’s Sanctions List Data Files

Update: Corrected versions of the updated Data Specification for OFAC’s list-related flat files have been released.  Given this change, OFAC will be adding 30 additional days onto its implementation schedule for this change.  The change to the Program field will now be implemented on or about June 17th Additionally, sample files have been added below.     

On or about June 17th, OFAC will be expanding the “Program” field found in OFAC’s legacy data files (DEL, PIP, FF, and CSV) from 50 to 200 characters.  Users of OFAC’s XML files should not be affected by this update.  A full list of affected files is provided below.     
  
SDN.DEL
SDN.PIP
SDN.FF
SDN.CSV
CONS_PRIM.DEL
CONS_PRIM.PIP
CONS_PRIM.FF
CONS_PRIM.CSV

Here are updated Data Specification files for both the SDN and Consolidated Lists that OFAC will publish on June 17th as part of this update.    

SDN List Data Specification File
Consolidated List Data Specification File 

For sample files with the Program field containing the 200 character maximum limit, please see below.  Please note, these files are for testing purposes only and do not contain any SDN or non-SDN data.  

sample_file_prim.ff
sample_file_prim.pip

Users with questions about this update are welcome to contact OFAC at O_F_A_C@treasury.gov or contact OFAC’s technical support hotline at 1-800-540-6322 – Menu Option 8 for assistance.  

Link:

OFAC Notice

Canada does not like US Cuba changes

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Government of Canada will defend interests of Canadians doing business in Cuba

April 17, 2019 – Ottawa, Ontario – Global Affairs Canada

The Honourable Chrystia Freeland, Minister of Foreign Affairs, today issued the following statement regarding Canadian businesses operating in Cuba and the decision by the United States not to suspend Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, commonly known as the Helms-Burton Act:

“Canada is deeply disappointed with today’s announcement. We will be reviewing all options in response to this U.S. decision.

“Since the U.S. announced in January it would review Title III, the Government of Canada has been regularly engaged with the U.S. government to raise our concerns about the possible negative consequences for Canadians—concerns that are long-standing and well known to our U.S. partners.

“I have met with U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to register those concerns. Canadian and U.S. officials have had detailed discussions on the Helms-Burton Act and Canada’s Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act. I have also discussed this issue with the EU.

“I have been in contact with Canadian businesses to reaffirm we will fully defend the interests of Canadians conducting legitimate trade and investment with Cuba.”

Quick facts

  • The Helms-Burton Act came into force in the United States in 1996. The act aims to prevent foreign countries from engaging in international trade with Cuba by subjecting foreign nationals to travel restrictions and financial liabilities in the United States. Since then, successive U.S. administrations have continuously suspended application of Title III (financial liabilities) in the maximum six-month increments.

  • On January 16, 2019, the U.S. Secretary of State notified Congress that he would be suspending Title III for 45 days, instead of the typical six months, in order to conduct a careful review of the right to bring action under the Title. 

  • In 1996, the Government of Canada amended its Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act to mitigate the extraterritorial effects of the Helms-Burton Act and to offer explicit legal protections for Canadian businesses.

Link:

Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act

Saying it twice does not make it more effective, State Department…

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And, no, I did not cut and paste this just to make them look foolish…

Advancing the U.S. Maximum Pressure Campaign On Iran

Fact Sheet

Office of the Spokesperson

Washington, DC

April 22, 2019


The United States is not granting any Significant Reduction Exceptions to existing importers of Iranian oil. Maximum pressure means maximum pressure. 

  • Secretary Pompeo announced his decision not to grant any Significant Reduction Exceptions to existing importers of Iranian oil.

  • As the Secretary has said, maximum pressure means maximum pressure. We are fulfilling our promise to get Iran’s oil exports to zero and deny the regime the revenue it needs to fund terrorism and violent wars abroad.

  • Targeting Iran’s oil exports is critical because they have historically been the regime’s single largest source of revenue, which it uses to support terrorist proxies, fuel its missile development, and engage in other destabilizing behavior.

  • Entities that engage in sanctionable activity involving Iran risk severe consequences. These consequences could include losing access to the U.S. financial system and the ability to do business with the United States or U.S. companies.

  • The United States will continue to apply maximum pressure on the Iranian regime until its leaders change their destructive behavior, respect the rights of its people, and return to the negotiating table.

The Trump Administration has imposed the toughest sanctions ever on the Iranian regime. Our pressure is working. 

  • The announcement today builds on our already historic success.

  • Iran’s oil exports have plummeted due to our pressure. Since President Trump announced that we would cease participation in the nuclear deal in May 2018, over 1.5 million barrels of Iranian oil have been taken off the market, reducing the regime’s revenue by billions of dollars.

  • Overall, we estimate that our sanctions have denied the regime direct access to more than $10 billion in oil revenue since May. That is a loss of at least $30 million a day, and this is only with respect to the oil.

  • In March, Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah publicly appealed for donations for the first time ever. He has been forced to undertake unprecedented austerity measures because the money from Iran is not flowing in as it once did thanks to our unprecedented pressure.

  • Iranian proxies in Syria and elsewhere are experiencing a lack of funding from Tehran. Fighters are going unpaid, and the services they once relied upon are drying up.

Oil markets are currently well supplied. 

  • Oil markets are well supplied and oil inventory levels are seasonally strong.

  • We have commitments from oil producing countries, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, to increase oil production to offset reductions in Iranian oil exports.

  • Rising Non-OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil production and sufficient storage levels show that the adjustment to replace Iranian oil exports has been successful.

  • The United States and other non-OPEC oil producers have already increased production and replaced Iranian exports, while other major producers have signaled to markets a willingness and ability to increase production to compensate for additional Iranian reductions.

  • Non-OPEC output, led by the United States, is forecast to expand by 2.2 million barrels per day in 2019 and 2020, according to the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA).

  • OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), including
    U.S. industry-held, oil stocks remain above 5-year averages, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).

The United States is increasing oil production and exports. 

  • EIA reported that United States petroleum and other liquids production average over 17 million barrels a day during the first quarter of 2019, making the United States the largest producer of oil and natural gas liquids, supplying more than 19 percent of global production.

  • U.S. crude oil production is estimated to have reached 12 million barrels per day in March, up 1.6 million barrels per day compared to a year ago.

  • EIA forecasts U.S. crude production will increase by 1.4 million barrels per day within the next year.

  • U.S. crude oil exports in January 2019 reached 2.575 million barrels per day, an increase of over 1.2 million barrels per day or 90 percent from the prior year, according to the EIA. U.S. exports help markets to function efficiently.

  • The IEA projects U.S. exports will rise sharply through 2021, and the United States will become the second largest oil and petroleum products exporter at around 9 million barrels per day, ahead of Russia and nearly equal to Saudi Arabia.

  • The U.S. remains in close and productive consultations with major oil producers, as well as major oil consuming organizations such as the International Energy Agency, which works to assure the global oil market is well supplied.

The United States is Rapidly Increasing Oil Production

The United States is not granting any Significant Reduction Exceptions to existing importers of Iranian oil. Maximum pressure means maximum pressure. 

  • Secretary Pompeo announced his decision not to grant any Significant Reduction Exceptions to existing importers of Iranian oil.

  • As the Secretary has said, maximum pressure means maximum pressure. We are fulfilling our promise to get Iran’s oil exports to zero and deny the regime the revenue it needs to fund terrorism and violent wars abroad.

  • Targeting Iran’s oil exports is critical because they have historically been the regime’s single largest source of revenue, which it uses to support terrorist proxies, fuel its missile development, and engage in other destabilizing behavior.

  • Entities that engage in sanctionable activity involving Iran risk severe consequences. These consequences could include losing access to the U.S. financial system and the ability to do business with the United States or U.S. companies.

  • The United States will continue to apply maximum pressure on the Iranian regime until its leaders change their destructive behavior, respect the rights of its people, and return to the negotiating table.

The Trump Administration has imposed the toughest sanctions ever on the Iranian regime. Our pressure is working. 

  • The announcement today builds on our already historic success.

  • Iran’s oil exports have plummeted due to our pressure. Since President Trump announced that we would cease participation in the nuclear deal in May 2018, over 1.5 million barrels of Iranian oil have been taken off the market, reducing the regime’s revenue by billions of dollars.

  • Overall, we estimate that our sanctions have denied the regime direct access to more than $10 billion in oil revenue since May. That is a loss of at least $30 million a day, and this is only with respect to the oil.

  • In March, Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah publicly appealed for donations for the first time ever. He has been forced to undertake unprecedented austerity measures because the money from Iran is not flowing in as it once did thanks to our unprecedented pressure.

  • Iranian proxies in Syria and elsewhere are experiencing a lack of funding from Tehran. Fighters are going unpaid, and the services they once relied upon are drying up.

Oil markets are currently well supplied. 

  • Oil markets are well supplied and oil inventory levels are seasonally strong.

  • We have commitments from oil producing countries, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, to increase oil production to offset reductions in Iranian oil exports.

  • Rising Non-OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil production and sufficient storage levels show that the adjustment to replace Iranian oil exports has been successful.

  • The United States and other non-OPEC oil producers have already increased production and replaced Iranian exports, while other major producers have signaled to markets a willingness and ability to increase production to compensate for additional Iranian reductions.

  • Non-OPEC output, led by the United States, is forecast to expand by 2.2 million barrels per day in 2019 and 2020, according to the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA).

  • OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), including
    U.S. industry-held, oil stocks remain above 5-year averages, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).

The United States is increasing oil production and exports. 

  • EIA reported that United States petroleum and other liquids production average over 17 million barrels a day during the first quarter of 2019, making the United States the largest producer of oil and natural gas liquids, supplying more than 19 percent of global production.

  • U.S. crude oil production is estimated to have reached 12 million barrels per day in March, up 1.6 million barrels per day compared to a year ago.

  • EIA forecasts U.S. crude production will increase by 1.4 million barrels per day within the next year.

  • U.S. crude oil exports in January 2019 reached 2.575 million barrels per day, an increase of over 1.2 million barrels per day or 90 percent from the prior year, according to the EIA. U.S. exports help markets to function efficiently.

  • The IEA projects U.S. exports will rise sharply through 2021, and the United States will become the second largest oil and petroleum products exporter at around 9 million barrels per day, ahead of Russia and nearly equal to Saudi Arabia.

  • The U.S. remains in close and productive consultations with major oil producers, as well as major oil consuming organizations such as the International Energy Agency, which works to assure the global oil market is well supplied.

The United States is Rapidly Increasing Oil Production

U.S. Crude Oil Production to increase by nearly 4 million barrels from 2017 to 2020.

Date: 04/22/2019 Description: U.S. Crude Oil Production - State Dept Image

So, let’s assume all this works… the Iranians throw up the hands, blow up all their missiles, get rid of all their nuclear program materials, and stop supporting terrorist groups. The world lets them sell oil again, and… the countries that ramped up production happily scale it back? Or, flush with all the extra money in their trade balance (especially when there are private firms involved), they feed a global supply glut until the price of oil collapses (and still have to live with the drop in their revenues)?

Mr. Watchlist will, of course, point out that, just because oil production is increasing, doesn’t mean that demand will not rise to meet it.

Oh, and in what century would the US and Iran ever establish regular diplomatic ties, without serious resentments? Not in Mr. Watchlist’s lifetime, I assure you….

To quote A Few Good Men: Thank you for playing “should or should we not, follow the advice of the galactically stupid?”

Link:

State Department Press Release

HKMA Alert: Fraudulent Bank of East Asia website

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Press Releases

Fraudulent website related to The Bank of East Asia, Limited

The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) wishes to alert members of the public to a press release issued by The Bank of East Asia, Limited on fraudulent website, which has been reported to the HKMA. Hyperlink to the press release is available on the HKMA website for ease of reference by members of the public.

Anyone who has provided his or her personal information to the website concerned or has conducted any financial transactions through the website should contact the bank concerned using the contact information provided in the press release, and report to the Police or contact the Cyber Security and Technology Crime Bureau of the Hong Kong Police Force at 2860 5012.

 

Hong Kong Monetary Authority
9 April 2019

Link:

HKMA Notice

OFAC Venezuela General License 19

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GENERAL LICENSE NO. 19

Authorizing Certain Activities Necessary to the Wind Down of Operations or Existing Contracts Involving Banco Central de Venezuela

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this general license, all transactions and activities prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 13850, as amended by E.O. 13857 of January 25, 2019 (“Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect to Venezuela”), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of operations, contracts, or other agreements involving Banco Central de Venezuela that were in effect prior to April 17, 2019, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, May 17, 2019.

(b) This general license does not authorize:

(1) Any debit to an account of Banco Central de Venezuela on the books of a U.S. financial institution; or

(2) Any transactions or dealings otherwise prohibited by E.O. 13850, E.O. 13835 of May 21, 2018, E.O. 13827 of March 19, 2018, E.O. 13808 of August 24, 2017, E.O. 13692 of

March 8, 2015, each as amended by E.O. 13857, or any part of 31 C.F.R. chapter V, or any transactions or dealings with any blocked person other than Banco Central de Venezuela.


OFAC Venezuela General License 20

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GENERAL LICENSE NO. 20

Authorizing Official Activities of Certain International Organizations Involving Banco Central de Venezuela

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this general license, all transactions and activities prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 13850, as amended by E.O. 13857 of January 25, 2019 (“Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect to Venezuela”)

(E.O. 13850), that are for the official business of the following entities are authorized:

• CAF Development Bank of Latin America

• Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas

• Inter-American Development Bank

• International Committee of the Red Cross

• International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

• International Monetary Fund

• Organization of American States

• United Nations and its specialized agencies, programs, funds, and related

organizations

• WorldBank

(b) This authorization automatically renews on the first day of each month, and is valid for a period of 18 months from the effective date of General License No. 20 or the date of any subsequent renewal of General License No. 20, whichever is later.

(c) This general license does not authorize:

(1) The unblocking of any property blocked pursuant to E.O. 13850, or any part of 31 C.F.R. chapter V, except as authorized by paragraph (a); or

(2) Any transactions or dealings otherwise prohibited by E.O. 13850, E.O. 13835 of May 21, 2018, E.O. 13827 of March 19, 2018, E.O. 13808 of August 24, 2017, E.O. 13692 of March 8, 2015, each as amended by E.O. 13857, or any part of 31 C.F.R. chapter V, or any transactions or dealings with any blocked person other than Banco Central de Venezuela.

HKMA Alert: HSBC Phishing Email

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Press Releases

Phishing email related to The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited

The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) wishes to alert members of the public to a press release issued by The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited on phishing email, which has been reported to the HKMA.  Hyperlink to the press release is available on the HKMA website for ease of reference by members of the public.

Anyone who has provided his or her personal information to the email concerned or has conducted any financial transactions through the email should contact the bank concerned using the contact information provided in the press release, and report to the Police or contact the Cyber Security and Technology Crime Bureau of the Hong Kong Police Force at 2860 5012.

 

Hong Kong Monetary Authority
12 April 2019

Link:

HKMA Notice

HKMA Alert: Fraudulent Bank of China website

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Press Releases

Fraudulent website related to Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited

The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) wishes to alert members of the public to a press release issued by Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited on fraudulent website, which has been reported to the HKMA.  Hyperlink to the press release is available on the HKMA website for ease of reference by members of the public.

Anyone who has provided his or her personal information to the website concerned or has conducted any financial transactions through the website should contact the bank concerned using the contact information provided in the press release, and report to the Police or contact the Cyber Security and Technology Crime Bureau of the Hong Kong Police Force at 2860 5012.

 

Hong Kong Monetary Authority
25 March 2019

Link:

HKMA Notice

April 23, 2019: UN, OSFI, DFAT remove one person from counter terrorism list

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On Tuesday, Canadian and Australian regulators removed:

QDi.160 Name: 1: FETHI 2: BEN HASSEN 3: BEN SALEM 4: AL-HADDAD
Name (original script): فتحي بن حسن بن سالم الحداد
Title: na Designation: na DOB: a) 28 Jun. 1963 b) 28 Mar. 1963 POB: Tataouene, Tunisia Good quality a.k.a.: a) Fethi ben Assen Haddadb) Fathy Hassan al Haddad Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: TunisiaPassport no: Tunisian number L183017, issued on 14 Feb. 1996 (expired on 13 Feb. 2001) National identification no: na Address: a) Number 184 Via Fulvio Testi – Cinisello Balsamo (MI), Italy b) Number 1 Via Porte Giove – Mortara (PV), Italy (Domicile) Listed on: 17 Mar. 2004 (amended on 26 Nov. 2004, 20 Dec. 2005, 21 Dec. 2007, 25 Jan. 2010, 16 May 2011) Other information: Italian Fiscal Code: HDDFTH63H28Z352V.  Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 30 Jul. 2009.  INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1417054.

from their counter terrorism program, in line with the removal made by the United Nations ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee.

Links:

OSFI Notice

UN Press Releases – HTML (OSFI), PDF (DFAT)

April 24, 2019: OFAC adds (and makes one update) to Hizballah sanctions list

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Yesterday, OFAC designated the following persons:

BAZZI, Wael (a.k.a. BAZZI, Wa’el; a.k.a. BAZZI, Wa’il Muhammad), Eglantierlaan 15, Antwerpen 2020, Belgium; DOB 01 Oct 1989 to 31 Oct 1989; alt. DOB 31 Oct 1989; POB Freetown, Sierra Leone; nationality Belgium; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations; Gender Male; Passport EN312261 (Belgium); National ID No. 89103150321 (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: BAZZI, Mohammad Ibrahim).

TABAJA, Hassan (a.k.a. TABAJA, Hasan; a.k.a. TABAJA, Hasan Husayn; a.k.a. TABAJA, Hassan Hussain), Lebanon; DOB 08 Oct 1971; POB Chiah, Lebanon; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations; Gender Male; Passport RL 0913767 (Lebanon); Identification Number 371923 (Lebanon); Residency Number 62270869 (United Arab Emirates) (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: TABAJA, Adham Husayn). 

and organizations:

BSQRD LIMITED, Mansion House Manchester Road, Altrincham Chesire WA14 4RW, United Kingdom; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations; D-U-N-S Number 22-369-0096; Company Number 11207847 (United Kingdom) [SDGT] (Linked To: BAZZI, Wael).

OFFISCOOP NV, Frankrijklei 156, 5eVerd, Antwerpen 2000, Belgium; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations; D-U-N-S Number 37-163-1008; Branch Unit Number 2093373727 (Belgium); Enterprise Number 0473365047 (Belgium) [SDGT] (Linked To: BAZZI, Wael).

VOLTRA TRANSCOR ENERGY BVBA (a.k.a. VOLTRA TRANSCOR ENERGY; f.k.a. “SOFTLINE”), Frankrijklei 156 (5deV), Antwerpen 2000, Belgium; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations; D-U-N-S Number 37-339-4675; V.A.T. Number BE0443680473 (Belgium); Branch Unit Number 2052342727 (Belgium); Enterprise Number 0443680473 (Belgium) [SDGT] (Linked To: BAZZI, Wael). 

under the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations, part of its counter terrorism sanctions program which come with secondary sanctions attached.

In addition, OFAC updated an existing designation:

GLOBAL TRADING GROUP NV (a.k.a. GLOBAL TRADING GROUP), Frankrijklei 39, 2nd Floor, Antwerpen 2000, Belgium; 22 Liverpool Street, Freetown, Sierra Leone; Standard Chartered Bank Building, 2nd floor, Kairaba Ave, Banjul, The Gambia; Rue de Canal, G83 Zone 4G, 01BP1280, Abidjan, Cote d Ivoire; Quartier les Cocotiers, Avenue Pape Jean Paul II, Lot 4274, Cotonou, Benin; Website http://www.globaltradinggroup.com; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations; D-U-N-S Number 37-117-1419 [SDGT] (Linked To: BAZZI, Mohammad Ibrahim). -to- ENERGY ENGINEERS PROCUREMENT AND CONSTRUCTION (a.k.a. GLOBAL TRADING GROUP; a.k.a. GLOBAL TRADING GROUP NV; a.k.a. “EEPC”), Frankrijklei 39, 2nd Floor, Antwerpen 2000, Belgium; 22 Liverpool Street, Freetown, Sierra Leone; Standard Chartered Bank Building, 2nd floor, Kairaba Ave, Banjul, The Gambia; Rue de Canal, G83 Zone 4G, 01BP1280, Abidjan, Cote d Ivoire; Quartier les Cocotiers, Avenue Pape Jean Paul II, Lot 4274, Cotonou, Benin; Frankrijklei 156 (5th floor), Antwerpen 2000, Belgium; Website http://www.globaltradinggroup.com; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations; D-U-N-S Number 37-117-1419 [SDGT] (Linked To: BAZZI, Mohammad Ibrahim).

And Treasury issued the following press release:

Treasury Targets Sanctions Evasion Conduits for Major Hizballah Financiers

Washington – Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) further targeted the global business operations of Hizballah by designating two individuals and three entities acting as conduits for sanctions evasion schemes.  Specifically, OFAC designated Belgium-based Wael Bazzi for acting for or on behalf of his father and Hizballah financier, Mohammad Bazzi.  OFAC designated Belgium-based Voltra Transcor Energy BVBA, Belgium-based OFFISCOOP NV, and United Kingdom-based BSQRD Limited for being owned or controlled by Wael Bazzi.  OFAC is also adding Energy Engineers Procurement and Construction as an alias for Global Trading Group NV (GTG), one of Mohammad Bazzi’s companies, which was designated in May 2018.  Additionally, OFAC designated Lebanon-based Hassan Tabaja for acting for or on behalf of his brother and Hizballah member and financier, Adham Tabaja.  These individuals and entities were designated under Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, which targets terrorists and those providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism. 

“Treasury is relentlessly pursuing Hizballah’s financial facilitators by dismantling two of Hizballah’s most important financial networks.  As Hizballah continues to attempt to obscure its activities by using seemingly legitimate businesses, we will continue to take action against the front persons who hide the movement of money, including the relatives of designated terrorists,” said Sigal Mandelker, Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence.  “By targeting Hassan Tabaja and Wael Bazzi and their European-based companies, this Administration is continuing to disrupt all avenues of financial support relied upon by Hizballah.”

DESIGNATIONS BUILD ON REWARDS FOR JUSTICE PROGRAM

Today’s designation of Hassan Tabaja and Wael Bazzi and his companies builds on the State Department’s April 22, 2019 announcement of a Rewards for Justice (RFJ) reward offer for information leading to the disruption of Hizballah’s financial mechanisms.  The program provides rewards for information that helps bring terrorists to justice, prevents international acts of terrorism against U.S. persons or property, leads to the identification or location of a key terrorist leader, or disrupts terrorist financing.  OFAC is designating individuals and entities connected to two of the financiers highlighted in that announcement, Mohammad Bazzi and Adham Tabaja.  For more information about the reward offer or to submit information on Hizballah’s financial networks, visit the Rewards for Justice website at www.rewardsforjustice.net or contact the Rewards for Justice office via the confidential e-mail at LH@rewardsforjustice.net

Today’s action also builds on the unprecedented number of designations taken in 2018 exposing Hizballah’s terrorist support networks and pervasive use of seemingly legitimate businesses to launder money and foment regional conflict.  Hizballah and its proxies continue to use deceptive practices to circumvent sanctions, such as the use of family members and others to gain access to the formal financial system both in Lebanon and beyond.  As a standard practice, the regulated public should undertake know-your-customer due diligence to ensure awareness of the ultimate beneficiaries of transactions.  In cases with known links to designated terrorists, enhanced due diligence should be applied to ensure that the underlying activity is not in violation of U.S. sanctions.  The Treasury Department is determined to protect the integrity of the U.S., Lebanese, and international financial system to ensure that Hizballah cannot exploit them to further its political, financial, or operational agenda.  

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of these persons, and of any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by the designated persons, that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.  OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons.

Additionally, the two individuals and three entities designated today are subject to secondary sanctions pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations, which implements the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act of 2015.  Pursuant to this authority, OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on the opening or maintaining in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction for Hizballah, or a person acting on behalf of or at the direction of, or owned or controlled by, Hizballah.

Hizballah was designated by the Department of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in October 1997 and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) pursuant to E.O. 13224 in October 2001.  It was listed in January 1995 in the Annex to E.O. 12947, which targets terrorists who threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace process, and also designated in August 2012 pursuant to E.O. 13582, which targets the Government of Syria and its supporters.

BACKGROUND ON ADHAM TABAJA AND MOHAMMAD BAZZI

OFAC designated Adham Tabaja as an SDGT in June 2015 for providing support and services to Hizballah.  Adham Tabaja is a Hizballah member and majority owner of the designated Lebanon-based real estate development and construction firm Al-Inmaa Group for Tourism Works and its subsidiaries.  His company has been used by Hizballah as an investment mechanism.  He maintains direct ties to senior Hizballah organizational elements, including the terrorist group’s operational component, the Islamic Jihad, the unit responsible for carrying out the group’s overseas terrorist activities.  Specifically, Islamic Jihad member Husayn Ali Faour, whom OFAC designated concurrently with Adham Tabaja in June 2015, has worked with Adham Tabaja to secure and manage construction, oil, and other projects in Iraq.  Adham Tabaja’s global network of seemingly legitimate businesses combined with his ties to Hizballah’s terrorist unit make it critically important that his access to the international financial system is severed to ensure that he cannot fund this terrorist group.

Adham Tabaja maintains ties to other major Hizballah financiers, including Mohammad Bazzi, whom OFAC designated as an SDGT in May 2018 for assisting in, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, Hizballah.  Mohammad Bazzi, who operates or transacts in or through Belgium, Lebanon, Iraq, and several countries in West Africa, provided Hizballah financial assistance for many years and has provided millions of dollars to Hizballah generated from his business activities.  In addition, Mohammad Bazzi was a close associate of Yahya Jammeh who was identified on December 20, 2017, in the annex to E.O. 13818, which implemented the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.  Since his designation in May 2018, Mohammad Bazzi has continued to work with other Treasury-designated, senior Hizballah members.

WAEL BAZZI

Wael Bazzi was designated for acting for or on behalf of Mohammad Bazzi.

Since his designation in May 2018, Mohammad Bazzi has turned to his son, Wael Bazzi, to continue doing business in the Gambia.  Mohammad Bazzi has been able to conduct business through Wael Bazzi, upon whom he has continued to rely on to register new businesses and bid on Gambian government contracts.  Wael Bazzi formed a petroleum company to maintain his father’s access to the oil industry.  Additionally, Mohammad Bazzi coordinated with Wael Bazzi and a Belgium-based GTG employee to change GTG’s name after GTG’s designation.  Wael Bazzi was the purported owner of this new company, likely to obscure Mohammad Bazzi’s involvement and circumvent Mohammad Bazzi‘s designation. 

Wael Bazzi has helped Mohammad Bazzi and a Lebanon-based associate facilitate payments for a business contract.  Additionally, Wael Bazzi likely established an account for Voltra Transcor Energy, in connection with Mohammad Bazzi’s attempted use of an intermediary company to move money to GTG and circumvent OFAC sanctions.  In 2017, Mohammad Bazzi planned to submit his son, Wael Bazzi, to fill the Lebanese Consular position in the Gambia because he could exert his influence over Wael.  As of at least early 2018, Wael Bazzi has been witting of Mohammad Bazzi’s involvement in illicit activity.

On August 9, 2018, GTG changed its name to Energy Engineers Procurement and Construction.

DESIGNATED WAEL BAZZI-OWNED OR -CONTROLLED COMPANIES

Voltra Transcor Energy BVBA

Voltra Transcor Energy BVBA was designated for being owned or controlled by Wael Bazzi.

Wael Bazzi is the Chief Executive of Belgium-based Voltra Transcor Energy BVBA, which is involved in the petroleum products industry.  Wael Bazzi established an account for Voltra Transcor Energy, which Mohammad Bazzi attempted to use as an intermediary company to move money to GTG and circumvent OFAC sanctions. 

OFFISCOOP NV

OFFISCOOP NV was designated for being owned or controlled by Wael Bazzi.

Wael Bazzi is the Chief Executive, Managing Director, and Director of Belgium-based OFFISCOOP NV, which is involved in the management consulting services industry.

BSQRD Limited

BSQRD Limited was designated for being owned or controlled by Wael Bazzi.

Wael Bazzi is the Chief Executive, Director, and 50% owner of United Kingdom-based BSQRD Limited, which is involved in the computer-related services industry.

HASSAN TABAJA

Hassan Tabaja was designated for acting for or on behalf of Adham Tabaja.

Hassan Tabaja managed multiple properties in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) belonging to his brother, Adham Tabaja; however, in the summer of 2018 Emirati authorities took swift action against Hassan Tabaja and the assets he controlled as a result of his nefarious activities.  Hassan Tabaja is the legal representative for Adham Tabaja, has Power of Attorney (PoA) for him, and is named the executor of his property.  Accordingly, Hassan Tabaja was granted the power to make legal, real estate, and financial decisions; sign for business matters; buy and sell vehicles; take out loans; take out insurance policies; and cancel the PoA and any agreements in conjunction with and on behalf of Adham Tabaja.

Hassan Tabaja, likely on behalf of Adham Tabaja, has also pursued business transactions with Mohamad Noureddine, a Lebanese money launderer, whom OFAC designated as a SDGT pursuant to E.O. 13224 in January 2016, for providing financial services to or in support of, Hizballah.

What Mr. Watchlist wants to know is – did these designations directly derive from the reward offered just two days earlier under the Rewards for Justice program? If so, we are all dutifully impressed….

Links:

OFAC Notice

Treasury Press Release

April 23, 2019: SECO amends 1 counter terrorism listing

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On Tuesday, Swiss officials amended the following individual listing under its Al-Qaida/bin Laden/Taliban counter terrorism sanctions program:

SSID: 10-17115 Foreign identifier: QI.Z.187.05. Name: ZulkarnaenAris Sumarsono

DOB: 1963 POB: Gebang village, Masaran, Sragen, Central Java, Indonesia Good quality a.k.a.: a) Zulkarnan b) Zulkarnain c) Zulkarnin d) Arif Sunarso e) Aris SumarsonoZulkarnaen f) Aris Sunarso g) Ustad Daud Zulkarnaen h) Murshid Low quality a.k.a.: Murshid Nationality: Indonesia

Other information: Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jun 20102010. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 7 Jun 2018. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link available. Modifications: Amended on 17 Apr 2019

By the way, I’ve decided to stop providing the link to the FINMA notice – unlike the OFAC notices, the FINMA notice is per program, not per update The specific file links are more important.

Links:

Data files of updates – PDF, XML

April 23, 2019: UN, DFAT amend one Central African Republic listing

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On Tuesday, Australian regulators amended the following person:

CFi.012 Name: 1: ABDOULAYE 2: HISSENE 3: na 4: na

Title: na Designation: na DOB: a) 1967 b) 1 Jan. 1967 POB: a) Ndele, Bamingui- Bangoran, Central African Republic b) Haraze Mangueigne, Chad Good quality a.k.a.: a) Abdoulaye Issène b) Abdoulaye Hissein c) Hissene Abdoulaye d) Abdoulaye Issène Ramadane e) Abdoulaye Issene Ramadan f) Issene Abdoulaye Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: a) Central African Republic b) Chad Passport no: CAR diplomatic passport no. D00000897, issued on 5 Apr. 2013 (valid until 4 April 2018) National identification no: na Chad national identity card no. 103- 00653129-22, issued on 21 April 2009 (expires on 21 April 2019) Address: a) KM5, Bangui, Central African Republic b) Nana-Grebizi, Central African Republic c) Ndjari, Ndjamena, Chad Listed on: 17 May 2017 ( amended on 1 Mar. 2019; 18 Apr. 2019 ) Other information: Hissène was formerly the Minister of Youth and Sports as part of the Cabinet for the Central African Republic’s former President Michel Djotodia. Prior to that, he was the head of the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace, a political party. He also established himself as a leader of armed militias in Bangui, in particular in the “PK5” (3rd district) neighborhood. Father’s name is Abdoulaye. Mother’s name is Absita Moussa. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/6098910

designated by the United Nations Central African Republic Sanctions Committee.

Link:

UN Notice


April 24, 2019: EU, OFSI remove DHDS from counter terror sanctions

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Yesterday, UK regulators implemented Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/622 by removing:

DJAMAT HOUMAT DAAWA SALAFIA (DHDS)

a.k.a: (1) Djamaat Houmah Al-Dawah Al-Salafiat (2) Katibat el Ahouel Address: Algeria.Other Information: UN Ref QE.D.102.03. Associated with the Armed Islamic Group and the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. Listed on: 18/11/2003 Last Updated: 19/01/2012 24/04/2019 Group ID: 7883.

from their ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida counter terrorism sanctions.

Links:

OFSI Notice

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/622

April 24, 2019: SECO amends Hissene Abdoulaye listing under CAR sanctions

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Yesterday, Swiss officials amended the following individual Central African Republic sanctions listing:

SSID: 300-36301 Name: Hissene Abdoulaye

Sex: M DOB: a) 1967 b) 1 Jan 1967 POB: a) Ndele, Bamingui-Bangoran, Central African Republic b) Haraze Mangueigne, Chad Good quality a.k.a.: a) Abdoulaye Issène b) Abdoulaye Hissein c) Hissene Abdoulaye d) Abdoulaye Issène Ramadane e) Abdoulaye Issene Ramadan f) Issene Abdoulaye Address: a) KM5, Bangui, Central African Republic b) Nana-Grebizi, Central African Republic c) Ndjari, Ndjamena, Chad Nationality: a) Central African Republic b) Chad Identification document: a) Diplomatic passport No. D00000897, Central African Republic, Date of issue: 5 Apr 2013, Expiry date: 4 Apr 2018 b) ID card No. 103-00653129-22, Chad, Date of issue: 21 Apr 2009, Expiry date: 21 Apr 2019

Other information: Hissène was formerly the Minister of Youth and Sports as part of the Cabinet for the Central African Republic’s former President Michel Djotodia. Prior to that, he was the head of the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace, a political party. He also established himself as a leader of armed militias in Bangui, in particular in the “PK5” (3rd district) neighborhood. Father’s name is Abdoulaye. Mother’s name is Absita Moussa. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice available. Modifications: Listed on 17 May 2017, amended on 1 Mar 2019, 18 Apr 2019

Links:

FINMA Notice

Data files of updates – PDF, XML

April 24, 2019: SECO delists 1 from counter terror sanctions

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Yesterday, Swiss officials removed:

SSID: 10-14190 Foreign identifier: QI.A.160.04. Name: Fethi Ben Hassen Ben Salem Al- Haddad

DOB: a) 28 Jun 1963 b) 28 Mar 1963 POB: Tataouene, Tunisia Good quality a.k.a.: a) Fethi ben Assen Haddad b) Fathy Hassan Haddad Address: a) Number 184 Via Fulvio Testi, Cinisello Balsamo, (MI), Italy b) Number 1 Via Porte Giove, Mortara, (PV), Italy (Domicile) Nationality: Tunisia Identification document: Passport No. L183017, Tunisia, Date of issue: 14 Feb 1996, Expiry date: 13 Feb 2001

Other information: Italian Fiscal Code: HDDFTH63H28Z352V. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 30 Jul 2009. Modifications: De-listed on 18 Apr 2019

from their Al-Qaida/bin Laden/Taliban counter terror program.

Links:

FINMA Notice

Data files of updates – PDF, XML

OFAC Enforcement Action: Haverly Systems

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Interesting case: Haverly settled two Apparent Violations of the Ukraine Related Sanctions Regulations (the first under this program) for $75,375, knocked down from a base penalty of $125,000 (and a maximum of $590,282). The violations were not self-reported, but were non-egregious.

The practical upshot is that Haverly invoiced Rosneft (on the SSI List under Directive 2) with terms of 30 and 70 days, under the magic 90 day limit. However, Rosneft asked for additional info and, by the time Haverly came up with it, it was past 90 days, making for a prohibited extension of credit:

From on or about May 31, 2016, to on or about October 27, 2016, Rosneft made four attempts to remit payment related to the second invoice, each of which was rejected by financial institutions after determining the transaction was prohibited by OFAC’s regulations as debt of greater than 90 days maturity of an SSI entity subject to Directive 2. At points during the period associated with these rejected payment attempts, Haverly received information from Rosneft, including copies of Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication messages amongst and between financial institutions regarding the rejected transactions — some of which contained information and instructions stating that the underlying activity may have a nexus to sectoral sanctions.

However, at the time of the payment attempts Haverly did not have a sanctions compliance program and did not recognize that the delayed collection of payment was prohibited. Haverly did not approach OFAC for guidance or authorization, however, and instead explored various options to collect the payment associated with the second invoice from Rosneft. At the suggestion of Rosneft, Haverly re-issued and re-dated the second invoice. Haverly then successfully received payment on the second invoice from Rosneft on January 11, 2017.

And here are the General Factors considered in calculating the final penalty:

OFAC considered the following to be aggravating factors:

(1) With respect to the second apparent violation, Haverly demonstrated reckless disregard for U.S. economic sanctions requirements by repeatedly ignoring warning signs that its conduct constituted or likely constituted a violation of OFAC’s regulations;

(2) Haverly’s management team had actual knowledge of the conduct giving rise to the apparent violations; and

(3) Haverly did not possess a formal OFAC sanctions compliance program at the time the apparent violations occurred.

OFAC found the following to be mitigating factors:

(1) The apparent violations resulted in minimal actual harm to the sanctions program objectives of the URSR, and OFAC would have likely authorized the transactions had Haverly requested a license to receive the payments;

(2) Haverly has not received a Penalty Notice or Finding of Violation from OFAC in the five years preceding the earliest date of the transactions giving rise to the apparent violations;

(3) Haverly is a small company with a limited number of employees; and

(4) Haverly engaged in remedial efforts that included the creation of a Sanctions Compliance Officer position, and implementation of a risk-based compliance program with screening designed to review all current and future clients of Haverly for OFAC purposes.

OFAC added in Haverly’s commitments to better compliance, including regular risk assessments, a commitment to creating a culture of compliance and ongoing training.

OFAC closes with a warning about SSI violations:

This enforcement action highlights the risks associated with engaging in transactions involving sectors of the Russian economy subject to U.S. economic and trade sanctions. The development and implementation of a risk-based sanctions compliance program would provide such companies with an ability to assess prospective and real-time transactions for potential prohibitions and violations of OFAC’s regulations. An effective sanctions compliance program includes policies, procedures, and controls capable of identifying at-risk transactions and customers or counter-parties for review; escalating such matters to a sanctions compliance officer or point-of-contact for proper analysis; an ability to respond and react to warning signs regarding potential violations, including transactions blocked or rejected by financial institutions in accordance with OFAC’s regulations; and an adequate training program. OFAC encourages companies to exercise enhanced due diligence in business relationships with entities subject to the SSI List and to avoid the use of unorthodox business practices — such as the amendment or alteration of trade documents, or resubmission of payment information without a sanctions- related term, phrase, or location.

Link:

OFAC Enforcement Information

April 29, 2019: EU, OFSI remove 1, amend 1 on terror sanctions list

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Yesterday, UK regulators implemented Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/663 by removing:

AL-HADDAD, Fethi Ben Hassen Ben Salem

DOB: (1) 28/06/1963. (2) 28/03/1963. POB: Tataouene, Tunisia a.k.a: (1) AL HADDAD, Fathy, Hassan (2) HADDAD, Fethi, ben Assen Nationality: Tunisian Passport Details: L183017 (Tunisian). Issued on 14 Feb 1996. Expired on 13 Feb 2001 National Identification no: Italian Fiscal Code HDDFTH63H28Z352V Address: (1) No 1 Via Porte Giove, Mortara (PV), Italy (Domicile). (2) No 184 Via Fulvio Testi, Cinisello Balsamo (MI), Italy.Other Information: UN Ref QI.A.160.04. Listed on: 19/03/2004 Last Updated: 17/06/201129/04/2019 Group ID: 8015.

from their ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions program, and amending the following designation under that program:

ZULKARNAEN SUMARSONO, Aris

DOB: –/–/1963. POB: Gebang village, Masaran, Sragen, Central Java, Indonesia a.k.a: (1) SUMARSONO, Aris ZULKARNAEN (2) SUNARSO, Arif (3) SUNARSO, Aris (4) ZULKARNAEN, Ustad, Daud (5) ZULKARNAIN (6) ZULKARNAN (7) ZULKARNIN Nationality: Indonesian Other Information: UN Ref QI.Z.187.05. Also referred to as Murshid. Listed on: 18/05/2005 Last Updated: 02/06/2008 29/04/2019 Group ID: 8636.

Links:

OFSI Notice

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/663

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