On Monday, Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) modified 3 sanctions programs on its Consolidated List. First, they implemented Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2015/532 by adding the following individual under the Al-Qaida program (the name had been previously added by the UN, OSFI and DFAT):

KEBEKOV, Aliaskhab, Alibulatovich

DOB: 01/01/1972.

POB: Teletl Village, Shamilskjy District, Republic of Dagestan, Russian Federationa.k.a: (1) AL-DAGESTANI, Abu, Muhammad, Ali

(2) MUHAMMAD, Ali, Abu

(3) MUHAMMAD, Sheikh, AbuNationality: Russian

Passport Details: Passport no. 628605523 Russian Foreign Travel Passport issued4.7.2006 by Federal Migration Service, expires 16.7.2016.

National Identification no: 8203883123 Russian National Passport issued 16.7.2015by Department of Internal Affaitrs, (OVD), Kirovskiy District, Dagestan, expires01.01.2017

Address: Shosse Aeroporta, 5 Ap 7, Makhachkala, Dagestan.

Other Information: Physical description, eye colour. brown, hair colour. grey,height. 170-175 cm, build. heavy, oval face, beard. Fathers name is AlibulatKebekovich Kebekov, INTERPOL – UN Security Council Special Notice has a photoavailable of the designated person.

Group ID: 13245.

Secondly, the following firm has been re-added to the Belarus sanctions:

BELTECHEXPORT

Address: Nezavisimost ave., 86-B, Minsk, Republic of Belarus, 220012. OtherInformation: Beltechexport is a main exporter of arms and military equipment inBelarus, which requires authorisation from the Belarusian authorities. Tel (+375 17)263-63-83. Fax (+375 17) 263-90-12. Listed on: 30/10/2013 Last Updated:30/03/2015 Group ID: 12000.

Lastly, the following entity was removed from the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010 (TAFA) following a review of the Council of the European Union, and documented in Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2015/513:

AL-TAKFIR AND AL-HIJRA

Other Information: EU listing only.

Links:

HMT Notices: Al-Qaida, Terrorism, Belarus

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2015/532

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2015/513

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On March 25th, OFAC added the following person to the anti-terror sanctions program:

KEBEKOV, Aliaskhab (a.k.a. AD-DAGESTANI, Abu Muhammad Ali; a.k.a. AD-DAGESTANI, Sheikh Ali Abu Muhammad; a.k.a. AL DAGESTANI, Ali Abu Muhammad; a.k.a. AL-DAGESTANI, Ali Abu Muhammad; a.k.a. ALIASKHAB, Abu Mukhammad; a.k.a. AL-QAWQAZI, Abu-Muhammad; a.k.a. KEBEKOV, Abu Mukhammad; a.k.a. KEBEKOV, Aliaskhab Alibulatovich; a.k.a. KEBEKOV, Magomed; a.k.a. “Ali Abu Muhammad”; a.k.a. “Ali Abu Mukhammad”; a.k.a. “Ali Abu-Mukhammad”; a.k.a. “Sheikh Abu Muhammad”), Russia; DOB 1972; alt. DOB 1969; POB Teletl County, Shamil District, Dagestan Republic; citizen Russia (individual) [SDGT].

The same person was added on the same day based on designation by OSFI and DFAT. It should be noted that the OFAC listing contains significantly different content (e.g. OFAC has many more AKAs than the UN listing).

Link:

OFAC Notice

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On March 25th, Australian and Canadian regulators added the following person:

QDi.351 Name: 1: ALIASKHAB 2: ALIBULATOVICH 3: KEBEKOV 4:

Name (original script): Алиaсхаб Алибулатович Кебеков Title: na Designation: na DOB: 1 Jan. 1972 POB: Teletl Village, Shamilskiy District, Republic of Dagestan, Russian Federation Good quality a.k.a.: na Low quality a.k.a.: a) Sheikh Abu Muhammad b) Ali Abu Muhammad c) Abu Muhammad Ali Al-Dagestani Nationality: Russian Passport no: Russian Foreign Travel Passport number 628605523, issued on 4 Jul. 2006, issued in Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation (expires on 16 Jul. 2016) National identification no: Russian National Passport number 8203883123, issued on 16 Jul. 2005, issued in Department of Internal Affairs (OVD), Kirovskiy District, Republic of Dagestan, the Russian Federation (expires on 1 Jan. 2017) Address: Shosse Aeroporta, 5 Ap. 7 Makhachkala, Republic of Dagestan, Russian Federation Listed on:23 Mar. 2015 Other information: Physical description: eye colour: brown; hair colour: grey; height: 170-175cm; build: heavy, oval face, beard. Tribal/ethnic background: Avar. Father’s name: Alibulat Kebekovich Kebekov, born in 1927. Wanted by Federal Russian authorities for terrorist crimes. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice.

to their Consolidated Lists under their Al-Qaida sanctions programs, after the implementation of the change by the United Nations.

The United Nations added a Narrative Summary for Mr. Kebekov.

Links:

OSFI Notice

UN Notice

UN Narrative Summary

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On March 25th, Swiss regulators updated both the Libya and Al-Qaida sanctions lists. Under the Al-Qaida program, the following 3 persons were added:

SSID: 10-30767 Foreign identifier: QDi.348 Name: Angga Dimas Pershada

Title: Secretary General DOB: 4 Mar 1985 POB: Jakarta, Indonesia Good quality a.k.a.: a)Angga Dimas Persada b) Angga Dimas Persadha c) Angga Dimas PrasondhaIdentification document: Passport No. W344982, Indonesia (issued under name AnggaDimas Peshada, born 4 Mar 1985 in Jakarta, Indonesia)

Justification: Angga Dimas Pershada was listed on 13 Mar 2015 pursuant to paragraphs 2and 4 of resolution 2161 (2014) as being associated with Al-Qaida for “participating in thefinancing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, inconjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of”, “recruiting for” and”otherwise supporting acts or activities of” Jemaah Islamiyah (QDe.092). Relation: a)Member of Jemaah Islamiyah (QE.J.92.02., SSID 10-17610) b) Leader of Hilal AhmarSociety Indonesia (HASI) (QDe.147, SSID 10-30782) Other information: a) Angga DimasPershada is an operative of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) (QDe.092) and a leader of Hilal AhmarSociety Indonesia (HASI) (QDe.147). Pershada, as of mid-2014, was Secretary General ofHASI and, as of 2013, oversaw HASI and raised funds for the organization. Prior to thatposition, Pershada was identified as HASI's chairman in Oct 2012. During the time thatPershada oversaw HASI, the organization’s deployments to Syria routinely included JImembers that were recruited and sent to join Syrian fighters. It was also during this time thatJI sent volunteers to Syria through HASI for military training. b) Pershada also engaged in anumber of public appearances to actively raise funds for HASI. In early 2013, Pershadaappeared on a talk show to raise funds for the group, and in Oct 2012, Pershada wasexpected to speak at several rallies and fundraising drives. Pershada has also providedsupport to JI over several years and has been a member of JI's foreign affairs division. c)Member of Jemaah Islamiyah (QDe.092) and leader of Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia(HASI) (QDe.147). Modifications: Listed on 25 Mar 2015

SSID: 10-30798 Foreign identifier: QDi.349 Name: Bambang Sukirno

POB: Indonesia Low quality a.k.a.: a) Pak Zahra b) Abu Zahra Nationality: IndonesiaIdentification document: Passport No. A2062513, Indonesia

Justification: Bambang Sukirno was listed on 13 Mar 2015 pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4of resolution 2161 (2014) as being associated with Al-Qaida for “participating in thefinancing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, inconjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of”, “recruiting for” and”otherwise supporting acts or activities of” Jemaah Islamiyah (QDe.092). Relation: a) Seniorleader of Jemaah Islamiyah (QE.J.92.02., SSID 10-17610) b) Has held leadership positionsin Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia (HASI) (QDe.147, SSID 10-30782) Other information: a)Bambang Sukirno is a senior leader of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) (QDe.092), who over anumber of years has held various senior leadership positions within JI. He has been involvedin managing aspects of the travel of JI members to Syria to support Syria-based oppositiongroups. Through Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia (HASI) (QDe.147), Sukirno also led severalJI missions to Syria that took place between late 2012 and early 2014. Sukirno hasrepresented JI in meetings with other violent extremists and was responsible for receivingfunds from donors that supported a network of violent extremists in Indonesia. b) Sukirnohas also helped raise funds for HASI and has held leadership positions in the organization.He spoke at several seminars that raised funds for HASI in May and Jun 2013. Sukirno wasHASI's spokesperson as of Oct 2013 and was also identified as HASI's Secretary General inSep 2012. Modifications: Listed on 25 Mar 2015

SSID: 10-30815 Foreign identifier: QDi.350 Name: Wiji Joko Santoso

DOB: 14 Jul 1975 POB: Rembang, Jawa Tengah, Indonesia Good quality a.k.a.: WijijokoSantoso Low quality a.k.a.: a) Abu Seif al-Jawi b) Abu Seif Nationality: IndonesiaIdentification document: Passport No. A2823222, Indonesia, Date of issue: 28 May 2012,Expiry date: 28 May 2017 (issued under name Wiji Joko Santoso, born 14 Jul 1975 inRembang, Jawa Tengah, Indonesia)

Justification: Wiji Joko Santoso was listed on 13 Mar 2015 pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4of resolution 2161 (2014) as being associated with Al-Qaida for “participating in thefinancing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, inconjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of”, “recruiting for” and”otherwise supporting acts or activities of” Jemaah Islamiyah (QDe.092). Relation: a) Headof the foreign affairs division and key outreach player of Jemaah Islamiyah (QE.J.92.02.,SSID 10-17610) b) Associated with Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia (HASI) (QDe.147, SSID10-30782) Other information: a) Wiji Joko Santoso is the head of the foreign affairs divisionof Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) (QDe.092) and a key player in the outreach efforts of JI in Syria. Asof mid-2013, Santoso was assisting extremists deploying to Syria, and as of early 2013 helikely made arrangements for JI members traveling to Turkey covertly as members of HilalAhmar Society Indonesia (HASI) (QDe.147) to train. Santoso has also been closelyassociated with HASI. b) On a number of occasions in 2012 and early 2013, Santosotravelled outside Indonesia on behalf of JI. JI also sent Santoso to the Philippines.Modifications: Listed on 25 Mar 2015

and one entity was added:

SSID: 10-30782 Foreign identifier: QDe.147 Name: Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia (HASI)Good quality a.k.a.: a) Yayasan Hilal Ahmar b) Indonesia Hilal Ahmar Society for SyriaJustification: Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia (HASI) was listed on 13 Mar 2015 pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4 of resolution 2161 (2014) as being associated with Al-Qaida for”participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts oractivities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of”, “recruitingfor” and “otherwise supporting acts or activities of” Jemaah Islamiyah (QDe.092). Relation:a) Related to Al-Qaida (QE.A.4.01., SSID 10-17297) b) Supports Jemaah Islamiyah(QE.J.92.02., SSID 10-17610) c) Related to Al-Nusrah Front For The People Of The Levant(QE.A.137.14., SSID 10-27843) Other information: a) Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia(HASI) is the ostensibly humanitarian wing of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) (QDe.092). Since 2011,HASI has operated as a non-governmental organization in Indonesia. While not indicative ofthe activities of the charitable sector as a whole, the activities of HASI demonstrate howterrorist groups, such as JI, continue to abuse charitable giving to raise and use funds tosupport violent acts and provide cover for logistical requirements for their terroristorganization. b) JI is responsible for numerous acts of terrorism including the Bali bombing in2002, which killed over 200 people from 27 countries. c) Since mid-2013, HASI has engagedin a number of activities to support the recruitment and travel of JI foreign terrorist fighters toSyria. These deployments to Syria routinely included JI members that were sent for militarytraining and to join Syrian fighters. In several instances, HASI supported the travel of JIofficials, including senior JI leader Bambang Sukirno (QDi.349) and JI operative AnggaDimas Pershada (QDi.348) to Syria. One of HASI's recent deployments to Syria took placein May 2014. d) JI has used HASI to raise funds, and together the two groups havecooperated on fundraising. As of 2013, HASI members participated in several fundraiserswith JI in Indonesia that raised tens of thousands of dollars. In addition, JI officials haveencouraged followers to provide material support for the fighting in Syria, including bycontributing donations to HASI. e) HASI also has ties to Al-Nusrah Front for the People ofthe Levant (QDe.137). f) HASI, which translates into English as “Indonesian Red CrescentSociety”, is not affiliated with the humanitarian group International Federation of the RedCross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). g) Operates in Lampung, Jakarta, Semarang,Yogyakarta, Solo, Surabaya and Makassar, Indonesia. Modifications: Listed on 25 Mar2015

The listings were amended for these two individuals:

SSID: 10-13973 Foreign identifier: QI.A.291.11. Name: Ibrahim Hassan Tali Al-AsiriDOB: a) 19 Apr 1982 b) 18 Apr 1982 c) 24/6/1402 (Hijri calendar) POB: Riyadh, SaudiArabia Good quality a.k.a.: a) Ibrahim Hassan Tali Asiri b) Ibrahim Hasan Talea Aseeri c)Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri d) Ibrahim Hasan Tali Asiri e) Ibrahim Hassan Tali Assiri f) IbrahimHasan Tali 'A 'Asiri g) Ibrahim Hasan Tali al-'Asiri h) Ibrahim al-'Asiri i) Ibrahim Hassan AlAsiri Low quality a.k.a.: a) Abu Saleh b) Abu-Salaah c) Abosslah Address: YemenNationality: Saudi Arabia Identification document: a) Passport No. F654645, SaudiArabia, Date of issue: 30 Apr 2005, Expiry date: 7 Mar 2010 (Issue date in Hijri Calendar24/06/1426. Expiry date in Hijri Calendar 21/03/1431.) b) ID card No. 1028745097, SaudiArabia

Relation: a) Associated with Nasir 'Abd-Al-Karim 'Abdullah Al-Wahishi (QI.A.274.10., SSID10-14723) b) Associated with Said Ali Al-Shihri (QI.A.275.10., SSID 10-14577) c) Associatedwith Qasim Yahya Mahdi Al-Rimi (QI.A.282.10., SSID 10-14546) d) Associated with AnwarNasser Abdulla Al-Aulaqi (QI.A.283.10., SSID 10-13998) e) Operative and principal bombmaker of Al-Qaida In The Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (QE.A.129.10., SSID 10-17330) Other information: Operative and principal bomb maker of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula(AQAP) (QE.A.129.10.). Believed to be hiding in Yemen as at Mar 2011. Wanted by SaudiArabia. INTERPOL Orange Notice (file #2009/52/OS/CCC, #81) has been issued for him.Also associated with Nasir 'abd-al-Karim 'Abdullah Al-Wahishi (QI.A.274.10.), Said Ali al-Shihri (QI.A.275.10.), Qasim Yahya Mahdi al-Rimi (QI.A.282.10.), and Anwar Nasser AbdullaAl-Aulaqi (QI.A.283.10.). Modifications: Amended on 25 Mar 2015

SSID: 10-14723 Foreign identifier: QI.A.274.10. Name: Nasir 'Abd-Al-Karim 'Abdullah Al-Wahishi

DOB: a) 1 Oct 1976 b) 8/10/1396 (Hijri calendar) POB: Yemen Good quality a.k.a.: a)Nasir al-Wahishi b) Abu Basir Nasir al-Wahishi c) Naser Abdel Karim al-Wahishi d) NasirAbd al-Karim al-Wuhayshi e) Abu Basir Nasir Al-Wuhayshi f) Nasser Abdul-karim Abdullahal-Wouhichi g) Abu Baseer al-Wehaishi h) Abu Basir Nasser al-Wuhishi i) Abdul KareemAbdullah Al-Woohaishi j) Nasser Abdelkarim Saleh Al Wahichi Low quality a.k.a.: a) AbuBasir b) Abu Bashir Nationality: Yemen Identification document: Passport No. 40483,Yemen, Date of issue: 5 Jan 1997

Relation: a) His deputy is Said Ali Al-Shihri (QI.A.275.10., SSID 10-14577) b) Leader of Al-Qaida In The Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (QE.A.129.10., SSID 10-17330) c) Associated withAl-Qaida (QE.A.4.01., SSID 10-17297) Other information: Since 2007, leader of Al-Qaidain Yemen (AQY). Since Jan 2009, leader of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula(QE.A.129.10.) operating in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. His deputy is Said Ali al-Shihri(QI.A.275.10.). Associated with senior Al-Qaida (QE.A.4.01.) leadership, claims he wassecretary to Usama Bin Laden prior to 2003. Arrested in Iran and extradited to Yemen in2003, where he escaped from prison in 2006 and remains fugitive as at Jan 2010.INTERPOL Orange Notice (file #2009/52/OS/CCC, #75) has been issued for him.Modifications: Amended on 9 Mar 2013, 25 Mar 2015

and the following 2 entities:

SSID: 10-17330 Foreign identifier: QE.A.129.10. Name: Al-Qaida In The ArabianPeninsula (AQAP)

Good quality a.k.a.: a) Al-Qaida of Jihad Organization in the Arabian Peninsula b) TanzimQa’idat al-Jihad fi Jazirat al-Arab c) Al-Qaida Organization in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)d) Al-Qaida in the South Arabian Peninsula e) Ansar al-Ahari'a (AAS) F.k.a.: Al-Qaida inYemen (AQY)

Relation: a) Leader is Nasir 'Abd-Al-Karim 'Abdullah Al-Wahishi (QI.A.274.10., SSID 10-14723, his deputy is Said Ali Al-Shihri (QI.A.275.10.))10-14723) b) Regional affiliate of Al-Qaida (QE.A.4.01., SSID 10-17297) Other information: AQAP is a regional affiliate of Al-Qaida (QE.A.4.01) and an armed group operating primarily in Arabian Peninsula. Location:Yemen. Alternative location: Saudi Arabia (2004 – 2006). Formed in Jan 2009 when Al-Qaida in Yemen combined with Saudi Arabian Al-Qaida operatives. Leader of AQAP is Nasir'abd-al-Karim 'Abdullah Al-Wahishi (QI.A.274.10.) and his deputy is Said Ali Al-Shihri(QI.A.275.10.). Ansar al-Shari'a was formed in early 2011 by AQAP and has takenresponsibility for multiple attacks in Yemen against both government and civilian targets.Modifications: Amended on 25 Mar 2015

SSID: 10-17777 Foreign identifier: QE.T.132.11. Name: Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)Good quality a.k.a.: a) Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan b) Tehrik-e-Taliban c) Pakistani Taliban d)Tehreek-e-Taliban Relation: Leader is Hakimullah Mehsud (QI.M.286.10., SSID 10-16178) Other information:Tehrik-e Taliban is based in the tribal areas along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. Formedin 2007, its leader is Hakimullah Mehsud (QI.M.286.10.). Wali Ur Rehman is the Emir of TTPfor South Waziristan. Modifications: Amended on 6 Jun 2014, 25 Mar 2015

and the following 4 individuals were delisted:

SSID: 10-14251 Foreign identifier: QI.A.21.01. Name: Ahmed Mohammed Hamed AliDOB: 13 Jan 1967 POB: Badari, Asyout, Egypt Good quality a.k.a.: a) Abdurehman,Ahmed Mohammed b) Ahmed Hamed c) Ali Ahmed Mohammed d) Ali Hamed e) HemedAhmed f) Shieb Ahmed Low quality a.k.a.: a) Abu Fatima b) Abu Islam c) Abu Khadiijah d)Ahmed The Egyptian e) Ahmed, Ahmed f) Al-Masri Ahmad g) Al-Surir Abu Islam h) ShuaibNationality: Egypt

Other information: Afghanistan. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822(2008) was concluded on 15 Jun 2010. Modifications: De-listed on 25 Mar 2015

SSID: 10-14577 Foreign identifier: QI.A.275.10. Name: Said Ali Al-Shihri

DOB: 12 Sep 1973 POB: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia Good quality a.k.a.: a) Sa’id Ali Jabir al-Kathim al-Shihri b) Said Ali Al Shahri c) Said Ali Jaber Al Khasaam Al Shahri d) Said AliJaber Al Khassam Low quality a.k.a.: a) Abu-Sayyaf b) Abu-Sufyan al-Azidi c) Abu-Sayyafal-Shihri d) Abu Sufian Kadhdhaab Matrook e) Salah f) Salah Abu Sufyan g) Salah al-Din h)Abu Osama i) Abu Sulaiman j) Nur al-Din Afghani Azibk k) Alahhaddm l) Akhdam m) AbuSufian Al Azadi n) Abu Asmaa Nationality: Saudi Arabia Identification document: a)Passport No. C102432, Saudi Arabia, Date of issue: 22 Apr 2000, Expiry date: 26 Feb 2005(Issue date in Hijri Calendar 17/01/1421. Expiry date in Hijri Calendar 17/01/1426.) b) IDcard No. 1008168450, Saudi Arabia

Relation: a) Deputy to Nasir 'Abd-Al-Karim 'Abdullah Al-Wahishi (QI.A.274.10., SSID 10-14723) b) Leader of Al-Qaida In The Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (QE.A.129.10., SSID 10-17330) c) Associated with Al-Qaida (QE.A.4.01., SSID 10-17297) Other information: SinceJan 2009, deputy to Nasir 'abd-al-Karim 'Abdullah al-Wahishi (QI.A.274.10.), leader of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (QE.A.129.10.) operating in Yemen and Saudi Arabia.Associated with senior Al-Qaida (QE.A.4.01.) leadership. Was in custody of the UnitedStates of America between 2001-2007, detainee number 372. Fugitive in Saudi Arabiaamong the 85 most wanted persons. Located in Yemen as at Jan 2010. Modifications: De-listed on 25 Mar 2015

SSID: 10-15555 Foreign identifier: QI.F.27.01. Name: Mustafa Mohamed Fadhil

DOB: a) 23 Jun 1976 b) 1 Jan 1976 POB: Kairo, Egypt Good quality a.k.a.: a) Al MasriAbd Al Wakil b) Ali Hassan c) Anis Abu d) Elbishy Moustafa Ali e) Fadil Mustafa Muhamad f)Fazul Mustafa g) Mohammed Mustafa h) Mustafa Ali Elbishy Low quality a.k.a.: a) Husseinb) Jihad Abu c) Khalid d) Man Nu e) Yussrr Abu f) Al-Nubi Abu Nationality: KenyaIdentification document: ID card No. 12773667, Kenya (Serial number 201735161.)

Other information: Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) wasconcluded on 21 Jun 2010. Modifications: De-listed on 25 Mar 2015

SSID: 10-16178 Foreign identifier: QI.M.286.10. Name: Hakimullah Mehsud

DOB: 1979 (approximately) POB: Pakistan Good quality a.k.a.: Hakeemullah Mehsud Low quality a.k.a.: Zulfiqar Nationality: Pakistan

Relation: Leader of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (QE.T.132.11., SSID 10-17777) Otherinformation: Reportedly born in South Waziristan, Pakistan, and believed to be residing inPakistan. Leader of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (QE.T.132.11.), an organization basedin the tribal areas along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. Modifications: De-listed on 25Mar 2015

Under the Libya sanctions program, the following person was amended:

SSID: 130-20375 Name: Abdulhafiz Mas’ud

Title: Colonel DOB: 1 Jan 1937 POB: Tripoli, Libya Good quality a.k.a.: AbdulhafidMassoud Nationality: Libya

Justification: 3rd in command of Armed Forces.Significant role in Military Intelligence. Other information: Position: Armed ForcesCommander. Modifications: Amended on 25 Mar 2015

and the following 2 persons were delisted:

SSID: 130-20398 Name: Qadhaf Al-Dam Ahmed Mohammed

DOB: 1952 POB: Egypt

Justification: Cousin of Muammar Qadhafi. Since 1995, he is believed to have hadcommand of an elite army battalion in charge of Qadhafi’s personal security and to have akey role in External Security Organisation. He has been involved in planning operationsagainst Libyan dissidents abroad and was directly involved in terrorist activity. Relation:Cousin of Qadhafi Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar (SSID 130-12987) Modifications: De-listed on 25 Mar 2015

SSID: 130-20474 Name: Zidane Mohamad Ali

DOB: 1958 Identification document: Passport No. B/0105075, Libya (expires end 2013)Justification: Minister for Transport in Colonel Qadhafi’s Government; involved in violenceagainst demonstrators. Modifications: De-listed on 25 Mar 2015

The Libyan changes are listed twice for each person – once for financial sanctions and once for travel restrictions.

Links:

FINMA Notices – Libya, Al-Qaida

Data files of updates – Libya: PDF, XML, Al-Qaida: PDF, XML

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On March 25th, OFAC levied a Civil Monetary Penalty against PayPal for violations of the Iran, Cuba, Sudan, terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destructioin sanctions programs. These violations started in 2009 and occured as recently as September 2013, some of which included explicit references to sanctioned countries (e.g. “Tehran” or “Sudan”).

Here's the detail of one set of violations singled out by OFAC:

Separately, between October 20, 2009 and April 1, 2013, PayPal processed 136 transactions
totaling $7,091.77 to or from a PayPal account registered to Kursad Zafer Cire, an individual
designated by the U.S. State Department on January 12, 2009 pursuant to Executive Order 13382
of June 28, 2005, “Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their
Supporters,” in apparent violation of the WMDPSR. PayPal stated to OFAC that it failed to
identify its customer as a potential Specially Designated National (SDN) at the time of his
designation because the MSB’s automated interdiction filter was not “working properly.”
Starting approximately six months later, PayPal’s automated interdiction filter appropriately
flagged Cire’s account five times (on July 30, 2009, September 3, 2009, October 21, 2009,
October 24, 2009, and November 16, 2009) for potential matches to the SDN, and on each
occasion, separate PayPal Risk Operations Agents dismissed the alerts without requesting
additional information to clear the potential SDN name matches. PayPal stated that this conduct
did not comply with the MSB’s internal policies and procedures for handling SDN name
matches. On February 14, 2013, PayPal’s interdiction filter again flagged Cire’s account for a
sixth time due to a potential match to the SDN, and a PayPal Risk Operations Agent followed the
MSB’s procedures for handling an SDN name match by creating a “case” for the match,
restricting Cire’s account, and requesting additional information from the customer. Upon
receiving the requested information, which included a copy of Cire’s passport showing a date of
birth and place of birth that were identical to those of the SDN, PayPal’s Risk Operations Agent
dismissed the match due to an apparent misunderstanding of why the interdiction filter had
flagged Cire’s account for review. On April 3, 2013, PayPal’s interdiction filter flagged Cire’s
account for a seventh time, and the MSB appropriately blocked the account and reported it to
OFAC.

The total base penalty for all these violations was $17,018,443. Here are OFAC's list of aggravating factors:

1) PayPal’s
management demonstrated reckless disregard for U.S. economic sanctions requirements in
deciding to operate a payment system without implementing appropriate controls to prevent the
system from processing transactions in apparent violation of OFAC regulations;

2) PayPal
management and supervisors knew of the conduct giving rise to the apparent violations;

3)
PayPal’s conduct resulted in harm to U.S. sanctions program objectives, and the MSB provided
economic benefit to Cire and undermined the integrity of the WMDPSR by operating an account
and processing transactions on behalf of an SDN for approximately three-and-a-half years; and

4) PayPal’s OFAC compliance program was inadequate to prevent the apparent violations.

and mitigating factors:

1) PayPal hired new management within its Compliance Division, identified OFAC-related issues with regard to the MSB’s payment system in 2011, and undertook various measures to strengthen PayPal’s OFAC screening processes and measures, including steps to implement more effective controls;

2) PayPal has not received a penalty notice or Finding of Violation in the five years preceding the earliest date of the transactions giving rise to the apparent violations; and

3) PayPal substantially cooperated with OFAC’s investigation, including by submitting the relevant documents and information in a clear and organized fashion, answering numerous follow-up inquiries for information over the course of OFAC’s investigation, and by entering into a statute of limitations tolling agreement and an extension to the agreement.

Links:

OFAC Notice

OFAC Web Notice

OFAC Settlement Agreement

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Literally in a footnote to the March 25th announcement of the enforcement action against PayPal, OFAC also released enforcment information about a $780,000 penalty against Life for Relief and Development. The base penalty for “knowingly and willingly” conspiring to send 3 funds transfers totaling $236,000 to Iraq in violation of those sanctions was $1,300,000.

Here’s OFAC’s calculus:

• LRD appears to have willfully violated U.S. economic sanctions
  regulations; prior to the relevant transactions,
• LRD had written notice from OFAC that such
  transfers were prohibited and that OFAC did not authorize such transactions;
• LRD’s highest
  management levels—i.e., its President—knew of the conduct giving rise to the apparent
  violations and directed the funds transfers to Iraq via Jordan;
• U.S. economic sanctions program
  objectives were harmed because funds were successfully transferred to Iraq;
• LRD does not have
  prior OFAC sanctions history, including receipt of a penalty notice or Finding of Violation
  during the five years preceding the date of the earliest transaction giving rise to the apparent
  violations;
• LRD undertook a remedial response to the transactions and agreed to establish an
  OFAC compliance program;
• LRD cooperated by waiving the statute of limitations regarding the
  apparent violations; and
• the civil settlement with OFAC is an element of LRD’s cooperation
  agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice.

Link:

OFAC Enforcement Information

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On March 26th, OSFI notified the public about an advisory issued by FINTRAC regarding dealings with countries with identified AML deficiencies. The notice summarized the measures firms are required to undertake regarding dealings with Iran and North Korea under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA):

• Continue to classify clients, banks and other financial institutions based in, or connected to Iran or the DPRK as high risk (including branches and subsidiaries of such entities based in countries outside Iran or the DPRK);
• Continue to apply enhanced customer due diligence measures with respect to such clients and entities; and
• Continue to take the FATF’s concerns into account when monitoring financial transactions emanating from, or destined to Iran or the DPRK.

In addition, FINTRAC stated that they “expected” firms to take identified AML deficiencies into account when dealing with the following countries:

• Algeria
• Myanmar
• Ecuador
• Afghanistan
• Angola
• Guyana
• Indonesia
• Iraq, Lao PDR
• Panama
• Papua New Guinea
• Sudan
• Syria
• Uganda
• Yemen
• Bosnia and Herzegovina (identified by MONEYVAL, not FATF)

Link:

OSFI Notice

FINTRAC Advisory

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Each year, OFAC hosts two symposium – a spring one for people new to sanctions, and a fall one for more seasoned practitioners. This year's spring one is May 11th, and you can register now if there are still spots (always very limited seating).

Links:

OFAC Notice

Registration Link

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On March 31, Australian and Canadian regulators followed the United Nations mandate in removing the following person:

QDi.254 Name: 1: ABD AL-RAHMAN 2: MUHAMMAD 3: JAFFAR 4: ‘ALI

Name (original script):عبد الرحمن محمد جعفر علي

Title: na Designation: na DOB: 15 Jan. 1968 POB: Muharraq, Bahrain Good quality a.k.a.: a) Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Jaffir b) Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Jafir ‘Ali c) Abd al-Rahman Jaffir Ali d) Abdul Rahman Mohamed Jaffer Ali e) Abdulrahman Mohammad Jaffar Low quality a.k.a.: a) ‘Ali Al-Khal b) Abu Muhammad Al-Khal Nationality: Bahraini Passport no.: na National identification no.: na Address: na Listed on: 10 Oct. 2008 Other information: Bahrain-based financier and facilitator for Al-Qaida (listed under permanent reference number QDe.004). In Jan. 2008, convicted by the Bahraini High Criminal Court for financing terrorism, undergoing terrorist training, facilitating the travel of others to receive terrorist training abroad, and for membership in a terrorist organization. Released after Court verdict and completion of his sentence. Located in Bahrain (as of May 2

from the Al-Qaida sanctions list in their Consolidated List.

Link:

OSFI Notice

UN Notice

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On March 31, Canadian and Australian regulators added the following person:

TAi.173 Name: 1: ABDUL BASIR 2: NOORZAI 3: na 4: na

Name (original script): عبد البصیر نورزی

Title: Haji Designation: na DOB: a) 1965 b) 1960 c) 1963 POB: Baluchistan Province, Pakistan Good quality a.k.a.: a) Haji Abdul Basir b) Haji ‘Abd Al-Basir c) Haji Basir Noorzai d) Abdul Baseer e) Abdul Basir Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Afghan Passport no.: Pakistani passport number AA3829182 National identification no.:Pakistani national identification number 5420124679187 Address: Chaman, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan Listed on: 27 March 2015 Other information: Owner of Haji Basir and Zarjmil Company Hawala (TAe.014), which provides financial services to Taliban in the region.

and entity:

TAe.014 Name: HAJI BASIR AND ZARJMIL COMPANY HAWALA

Name (original script): د حاجی بصیر او ضرجمیل کمپنی حواله

A.k.a.: a) Haji Bashir and Zarjmil Hawala Company b) Haji Abdul Basir and Zar Jameel Hawala c) Haji Basir Hawala d) Haji Baseer Hawala e) Haji Abdul Basir Exchange Shop f) Haji Basir and Zarjamil Currency Exchange g) Haji Zar Jamil, Haji Abdul Baseer Money Changer F.k.a.: na Address: a) Branch Office 1: Sanatan (variant Sanatin) Bazaar, Sanatan Bazaar Street, near Trench (variant Tranch) Road, Chaman, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan b) Branch Office 2: Quetta, Pakistan c) Branch Office 3: Lahore, Pakistan d) Branch Office 4: Peshawar, Pakistan e) Branch Office 5: Karachi, Pakistan f)Branch Office 6: Islamabad, Pakistan g) Branch Office 7: Kandahar Province, Afghanistan h) Branch Office 8: Herat Province, Afghanistan i) Branch Office 9: Helmand Province, Afghanistan j) Branch Office 10: Dubai, United Arab Emirates k) Branch Office 11: Iran Listed on: 27 March 2015 Other information: Money service provider used by senior Taliban leaders to transfer funds to Taliban commanders in the region. Owned by Abdul Basir Noorzai (TAi.173).

to their Taliban sanctions in their Consolidated List on the heels of the same change made by the UN.

Links:

OSFI Notice

UN Notice

UN Notice (PDF)

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Based on the agreement on parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which will replace the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) of temporary sanctions relief, if negotiations complete successfully by June 30th, OFAC has issued guidance which states, basically, that nothing has changed:

• The parameters announced on April 2, 2015 for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by the P5+1 and Iran do not immediately relieve, suspend or terminate any sanctions on Iran. The only sanctions relief in force is the relief provided pursuant to the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) reached on November 24, 2013 and extended through June 30, 2015.

• The parameters announced on April 2, 2015 provide a path for sanctions on Iran to be suspended and eventually terminated in exchange for IAEA verified implementation by Iran of its key nuclear commitments.

• As of today and until a JCPOA is concluded, other than the sanctions relief provided under the JPOA, all U.S. sanctions remain in place and will continue to be vigorously enforced.

• The sanctions relief provided for under the JPOA reached on November 24, 2013 remains in effect, as described in published Guidance and Frequently Asked Questions​.

Links:

OFAC Notice

Guidance on Iranian sanctions

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On April 3rd, OFAC removed the following person from the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (NPWMD) program on its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List:

TAHIR, Buhary Seyed Abu; DOB 17 Apr 1959; POB Chennai, India; nationality Sri Lanka; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Passport M2068357 (Sri Lanka) issued 04 Sep 2001 expires Sep 2006; alt. Passport M1754102 (Sri Lanka) issued 16 Mar 1999 expires 16 Mar 2004 (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR].

Link:

OFAC Notice

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On April 7th, Canadian regulators published the Regulations Amending the Regulations Establishing a List of Entities, which adds the following terrorist group to the Canadian terror list:

Islamic State–Sinai Province (ISSP) (also known among other
names as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, Ansar Jerusalem and Islamic
State–Sinai State)

and in French:

État Islamique – Province du Sinaï (EIPS) [connu notamment sous
les noms suivants : Ansar Beit al-Makdis; Partisans de Jérusalem;
État islamique – État du Sinaï]

Link:

Canada Gazette of April 7, 2015

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On April 6th, OFAC released the Consolidated Sanctions List (the 5 non-SDN lists – Palestinian Leadership Council List, Part 561 List, Iran Sanctions Act List, Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, Sectoral Sanctions Identification List) in the new advanced format that it previously had released the SDN List in. The new format, which had been developed by the Wolfsberg Group and the United Nations, “incorporates a variety of features that ensure maximum flexibility for sanctions list creators, while also limiting the need for future changes to the underlying data specification due to the standard’s adaptability.”

Links:

OFAC Notice

Advanced Format FAQ

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On April 6th, OFAC removed the following 6 entity listings from the counter-terrorism sanctions program:

AFGHAN SUPPORT COMMITTEE (a.k.a. AHYA UL TURAS; a.k.a. JAMIAT AYAT-UR-RHAS AL ISLAMIA; a.k.a. JAMIAT IHYA UL TURATH AL ISLAMIA; a.k.a. LAJNAT UL MASA EIDATUL AFGHANIA; a.k.a. “ASC”), Grand Trunk Road, near Pushtoon Garhi Pabbi, Peshawar, Pakistan; Cheprahar Hadda, Mia Omar Sabaqah School, Jalalabad, Afghanistan [SDGT].

LAJNAT UL MASA EIDATUL AFGHANIA (a.k.a. AFGHAN SUPPORT COMMITTEE; a.k.a. AHYA UL TURAS; a.k.a. JAMIAT AYAT-UR-RHAS AL ISLAMIA; a.k.a. JAMIAT IHYA UL TURATH AL ISLAMIA; a.k.a. “ASC”), Grand Trunk Road, near Pushtoon Garhi Pabbi, Peshawar, Pakistan; Cheprahar Hadda, Mia Omar Sabaqah School, Jalalabad, Afghanistan [SDGT].

JAMIAT AYAT-UR-RHAS AL ISLAMIA (a.k.a. AFGHAN SUPPORT COMMITTEE; a.k.a. AHYA UL TURAS; a.k.a. JAMIAT IHYA UL TURATH AL ISLAMIA; a.k.a. LAJNAT UL MASA EIDATUL AFGHANIA; a.k.a. “ASC”), Grand Trunk Road, near Pushtoon Garhi Pabbi, Peshawar, Pakistan; Cheprahar Hadda, Mia Omar Sabaqah School, Jalalabad, Afghanistan [SDGT].

JAMIAT IHYA UL TURATH AL ISLAMIA (a.k.a. AFGHAN SUPPORT COMMITTEE; a.k.a. AHYA UL TURAS; a.k.a. JAMIAT AYAT-UR-RHAS AL ISLAMIA; a.k.a. LAJNAT UL MASA EIDATUL AFGHANIA; a.k.a. “ASC”), Grand Trunk Road, near Pushtoon Garhi Pabbi, Peshawar, Pakistan; Cheprahar Hadda, Mia Omar Sabaqah School, Jalalabad, Afghanistan [SDGT].

AHYA UL TURAS (a.k.a. AFGHAN SUPPORT COMMITTEE; a.k.a. JAMIAT AYAT-UR-RHAS AL ISLAMIA; a.k.a. JAMIAT IHYA UL TURATH AL ISLAMIA; a.k.a. LAJNAT UL MASA EIDATUL AFGHANIA; a.k.a. “ASC”), Grand Trunk Road, near Pushtoon Garhi Pabbi, Peshawar, Pakistan; Cheprahar Hadda, Mia Omar Sabaqah School, Jalalabad, Afghanistan [SDGT].

“ASC” (a.k.a. AFGHAN SUPPORT COMMITTEE; a.k.a. AHYA UL TURAS; a.k.a. JAMIAT AYAT-UR-RHAS AL ISLAMIA; a.k.a. JAMIAT IHYA UL TURATH AL ISLAMIA; a.k.a. LAJNAT UL MASA EIDATUL AFGHANIA), Grand Trunk Road, near Pushtoon Garhi Pabbi, Peshawar, Pakistan; Cheprahar Hadda, Mia Omar Sabaqah School, Jalalabad, Afghanistan [SDGT].

and updated the following listing:

REVIVAL OF ISLAMIC HERITAGE SOCIETY (a.k.a. JAMIA IHYA UL TURATH; a.k.a. JAMIAT IHIA AL-TURATH AL-ISLAMIYA; a.k.a. REVIVAL OF ISLAMIC SOCIETY HERITAGE ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT; a.k.a. “RIHS”), Pakistan; Afghanistan; Office in Kuwait is NOT designated [SDGT]. -to- REVIVAL OF ISLAMIC HERITAGE SOCIETY (|a.k.a. AFGHAN SUPPORT COMMITTEE; a.k.a. AHIYAHU TURUS; a.k.a. AHYA UL TURAS; a.k.a. AHYA UTRAS; a.k.a. AL-FORQAN AL-KHAIRYA; a.k.a. AL-FURQAN AL-KHARIYA; a.k.a. AL-FURQAN CHARITABLE FOUNDATION; a.k.a. AL-FURQAN FOUNDATION WELFARE TRUST; a.k.a. AL-FURQAN KHARIA; a.k.a. AL-FURQAN UL KHAIRA; a.k.a. AL-FURQAN WELFARE FOUNDATION; a.k.a. AL-TURAZ ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. AL-TURAZ TRUST; a.k.a. FORKHAN RELIEF ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. HAYAT UR RAS AL-FURQAN; a.k.a. HAYATURAS; a.k.a. HAYATUTRAS; a.k.a. HIYAT ORAZ AL ISLAMIYA; a.k.a. JAMIA IHYA UL TURATH; a.k.a. JAMIAT AL-HAYA AL-SARAT; a.k.a. JAMIAT AYAT-UR-RHAS AL ISLAMIA; a.k.a. JAMIAT IHIA AL-TURATH AL-ISLAMIYA; a.k.a. JAMIAT IHYA UL TURATH AL ISLAMIA; a.k.a. JAMITO AHIA TORAS AL-ISLAMI; a.k.a. LAJNAT UL MASA EIDATUL AFGHANIA; a.k.a. LAJNATUL FURQAN; a.k.a. ORGANIZATION FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT PAKISTAN; a.k.a. RAIES KHILQATUL QURANIA FOUNDATION OF PAKISTAN; a.k.a. REVIVAL OF ISLAMIC SOCIETY HERITAGE ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT; a.k.a. “AL MOSUSTA FURQAN”; a.k.a. “AL-FORKAN”; a.k.a. “AL-FURKAN”; a.k.a. “AL-MOSASATUL FURQAN”; a.k.a. “ASC”; a.k.a. “HITRAS”; a.k.a. “JAMIAT AL-FURQAN”; a.k.a. “MOASSESA AL-FURQAN”; a.k.a. “MOSASA-TUL-FORQAN”; a.k.a. “RIHS”; a.k.a. “SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION”|)|, House Number 56, E. Canal Road, University Town, Peshawar, Pakistan; Afghanistan; Near old Badar Hospital in University Town, Peshawar, Pakistan; Chinar Road, University Town, Peshawar, Pakistan| [SDGT].

Link:

OFAC Notice

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On April 8th, Australian regulators added the following person to its Consolidated List, under its Al-Qaida sanctions program, following the change made by the United Nations:

QDi.352 Name: 1: MAULANA 2: FAZLULLAH 3: na 4: na

Title: na Designation: na DOB: 1974 POB: Kuza Bandai village, Swat Valley, Khyber

Pakhtunkhawa Province, Pakistan Good quality a.k.a.: a) Mullah Fazlullah b) Fazal Hayat

Low quality a.k.a.: Mullah Radio Nationality: na Passport no.: na National identification

no.: na Address: Afghanistan/Pakistan border region Listed on: 7 April 2015 Other

information: Commander of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (QDe.132) since 7 Nov. 2013.

Led the local TTP in Pakistan’s northwest valley of Swat from 2007 to 2009.

Canadian regulators made the same change on the 9th.

Link:

UN Notice (PDF)

UN Notice (HTML)

OSFI Notice

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On April 8th, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added the following 2 persons:

GONZALEZ VALENCIA, Abigael (a.k.a. GOMEZ FLORES, Luis Angel; a.k.a. GONZALEZ VALENCIA, Abigail; a.k.a. GONZALEZ VALENCIA, Luis Angel; a.k.a. TAK TOLEDO, Jonathan Paul; a.k.a. TAK TOLEDO, Paul Jonathan); DOB 18 Oct 1972; alt. DOB 28 Oct 1979; POB Aguililla, Michoacan, Mexico; alt. POB Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico; alt. POB Apatzingan, Michoacan, Mexico; Gender Male; Passport JX755855 (Canada); C.U.R.P. GOVA721018HMNNLB07 (Mexico); alt. C.U.R.P. GOFL721018HJCMLS02 (Mexico); alt. C.U.R.P. GOVL721018HMNNLS08 (Mexico) (individual) [SDNTK] (Linked To: LOS CUINIS).

OSEGUERA CERVANTES, Nemesio (a.k.a. OSEGUERA CERVANTES, Ruben; a.k.a. “Mencho”); DOB 17 Jul 1966; alt. DOB 17 Jul 1964; POB Naranjo de Chila, Aguililla, Michoacan, Mexico (individual) [SDNTK] (Linked To: CARTEL DE JALISCO NUEVA GENERACION).

and 2 entities:

CARTEL DE JALISCO NUEVA GENERACION (a.k.a. CJNG; a.k.a. NEW GENERATION CARTEL OF JALISCO), Mexico [SDNTK].

LOS CUINIS (a.k.a. LOS CUINIS DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. LOS QUINIS), Mexico [SDNTK].

to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List under its Kingpin Act anti-narcotics sanction program.

Link:

OFAC Notice

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On April 13th, OFAC issued a broad General License for the Syrian sanctions program, authorizing all transactions for the publication and marketing of “manuscripts, books,
journals, and newspapers in paper or
electronic format” – unless, of course, the transaction involves the Syrian government or any other blocked person.

Links:

OFAC Notice

General License

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On April 9th, Her Majesty's Treasury (HMT) updated both the Iran (Human Rights) and the Iran (Nuclear Proliferation) sanctions on their Consolidated List.

Under the Human Rights sanctions program, HMT implemented Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2015/548, which removes the following 3 individuals from the list:

Additionally, there were a number of amended listings, which HMT was not ready to implement on the 9th.

Under the Nuclear Proliferation sanctions program, a number of court decisions (by the General Court of the European Union) removed 40 entities, including Bank Tejarat, from sanctions. However, the Council adopted Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2015/549, which restored 33 of these. The following seven listings, therefore, have been removed:

Links:

HMT Iran (Human Rights) Notice

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2015/548

HMT Iran (Nuclear Proliferation) Notice

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2015/549

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On April 14th, OFAC added the following 2 persons to the SDN List under their Yemen-related sanctions program:

AL HOUTHI, Abdul Malik (a.k.a. AL-HOUTHI, Abdel-Malek; a.k.a. AL-HOUTHI, Abdel-Malik; a.k.a. AL-HOUTHI, Abdul Malik Badruddin Ameerudin Hussain; a.k.a. AL-HOUTHI, Abdul-Malik; a.k.a. AL-HOUTHI, Abdulmalik Bin Bader Al-Deen); DOB 1982; alt. DOB 1981; alt. DOB 1980; POB Dahyan Governorate, Yemen; nationality Yemen; Leader of the Houthi group (individual) [YEMEN].

SALEH, Ahmed Ali (a.k.a. SALEH, Ahmad Ali Abdullah; a.k.a. SALEH, Ahmed Ali Abdullah; a.k.a. SALIH AL-AHMAR, Ahmad Ali Abdallah); DOB 25 Jul 1972; alt. DOB 1970; POB Sana'a, Yemen; nationality Yemen; Gender Male; Diplomatic Passport 00000017 (Yemen) issued 27 Oct 2008 expires 26 Oct 2014; Yemen's former Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates; Former Commander of Yemen's Republican Guard (individual) [YEMEN].

Link:

OFAC Notice

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