On Tuesday, OFAC added the following 3 individuals to the SDN List under the Syria sanctions (and 1 of these also under the anti-terror program):

AQIL, Ibrahim (a.k.a. AKIEL, Ibrahim Mohamed; a.k.a. AKIL, Ibrahim Mohamed); DOB 24 Dec 1962; alt. DOB 01 Jan 1962; POB Bidnayil, Lebanon (individual) [SYRIA] (Linked To: HIZBALLAH).

SHALAN, Abd Al Nur (a.k.a. CHAALAN, Abdul Nur Ali; a.k.a. SHAALAN, Abdul Nur Ali; a.k.a. SHALAN, Abd Al Nur Ali; a.k.a. SHA'LAN, Abdul Nur Ali; a.k.a. SHALAN, Abdul-Nur Ali); DOB 17 May 1964; alt. DOB 1961; POB Baabda, Lebanon (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: HIZBALLAH).

SHUKR, Fu'ad (a.k.a. CHAKAR, Fu'ad; a.k.a. “CHAKAR, Al-Hajj Mohsin”), Harat Hurayk, Lebanon; Ozai, Lebanon; Al-Firdaws Building, Al-'Arid Street, Haret Hreik, Lebanon; DOB 1962; POB An Nabi Shit, Ba'labakk, Biqa' Valley, Lebanon; alt. POB Beirut, Lebanon (individual) [SYRIA] (Linked To: HIZBALLAH).

and changed the following listing:

BADR AL DIN, Mustafa (a.k.a. AL FIQAR, Dhu; a.k.a. BADREDDINE, Mustafa Amine; a.k.a. BADREDDINE, Mustafa Youssef; a.k.a. ISSA, Sami; a.k.a. SAAB, Elias Fouad; a.k.a. SA'B, Ilyas), Beirut, Lebanon; DOB 06 Apr 1961; POB Al-Ghobeiry, Beirut, Lebanon (individual) [SDGT]. -to- BADR AL DIN, Mustafa (a.k.a. AL FIQAR, Dhu; a.k.a. BADREDDINE, Mustafa Amine; a.k.a. BADREDDINE, Mustafa Youssef; a.k.a. ISSA, Sami; a.k.a. SAAB, Elias Fouad; a.k.a. SA'B, Ilyas), Beirut, Lebanon; DOB 06 Apr 1961; POB Al-Ghobeiry, Beirut, Lebanon (individual) |[SDGT] [SYRIA]| (|Linked To: HIZBALLAH|).

Link:

OFAC Notice

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On Tuesday, Canadian regulators implemented changes to its Consolidated List promulgated by the United Nations Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee. First, they changed the following listing:

QDi.228 Name: 1: MOHAMMED 2: AL GHABRA 3: na 4: na

Title: na Designation: na DOB: 1 Jun. 1980 POB: Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic Good quality a.k.a.: a) Mohammed El’ Ghabra b) Danial Adam na Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: British Passport no.: British number 094629366 National identification no.: na Address: East London, United Kingdom Listed on: 12 Dec. 2006 (amended on 13 Dec. 2011, 20 July 2015) Other information: Father’s name is Mohamed Ayman Ghabra. Mother’s name is Dalal. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 5 Oct. 2009.

and removed the following person from sanctions:

QDi.351 Name: 1: ALIASKHAB 2: ALIBULATOVICH 3: KEBEKOV 4:

Name (original script): Алиaсхаб Алибулатович Кебеков

Title: na Designation: na DOB: 1 Jan. 1972 POB: Teletl Village, Shamilskiy District, Republic of Dagestan, Russian Federation Good quality a.k.a.: na Low quality a.k.a.: a) Sheikh Abu Muhammad b) Ali Abu Muhammad c) Abu Muhammad Ali Al-DagestaniNationality: Russian Passport no.: Russian Foreign Travel Passport number 628605523, issued on 4 Jul. 2006, issued in Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation (expires on 16 Jul. 2016) National identification no.: Russian National Passport number 8203883123, issued on 16 Jul. 2005, issued in Department of Internal Affairs (OVD), Kirovskiy District, Republic of Dagestan, the Russian Federation (expires on 1 Jan. 2017) Address: Shosse Aeroporta, 5 Ap. 7 Makhachkala, Republic of Dagestan, Russian Federation Listed on: 23 Mar. 2015 Other information: Physical description: eye colour: brown; hair colour: grey; height: 170-175cm; build: heavy, oval face, beard. Tribal/ethnic background: Avar. Father’s name: Alibulat Kebekovich Kebekov, born in 1927. Wanted by Federal Russian authorities for terrorist crimes. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice.

Links:

OSFI Notice

UN Notices: Amendment, Deletion

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Last Thursday, OFAC added the following person:

LAI, Leonard (a.k.a. LAI, Yong Chian); DOB 16 Jun 1958; Passport E3251534E (Singapore) expires 20 Mar 2018 (individual) [DPRK

and company:

SENAT SHIPPING LIMITED (a.k.a. SENAT SHIPPING & TRADING PTE LTD; a.k.a. SENAT SHIPPING AGENCY LTD; a.k.a. SENAT SHIPPING AND TRADING LTD; a.k.a. SENAT SHIPPING AND TRADING PRIVATE LIMITED), 36-02 A, Suntec Tower, 9, Temasek Boulevard, Singapore 038989, Singapore; 9 Temasek Boulevard, 36-02A, Singapore 038989, Singapore; Panama City, Panama; PO Box 957, Offshore Incorporations Centre Road Town, Tortola, Virgin Islands, British; Identification Number IMO 5179245; alt. Identification Number IMO 5405737 [DPRK].

and cargo vessel:

DAWNLIGHT General Cargo Mongolia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9110236 (vessel) [DPRK].

to the sanctions against North Korea. In addition, they changed these records:

KIM, TONG-MYO'NG (a.k.a. KIM, CHIN-SO'K; a.k.a. KIM, TONG MYONG; a.k.a. “KIM, JIN SOK”), c/o Tanchon Commercial Bank, Saemul 1-Dong Pyongchon District, Pyongyang, Korea, North; DOB 1964; nationality Korea, North (individual) [NPWMD]. -to- |KIM, Tong-Myo'ng| (|a.k.a. KIM, CHIN-SO'K; a.k.a. KIM, HYOK CHOL; a.k.a. KIM, TONG MYONG; a.k.a. “KIM, JIN SOK”|)|; DOB 1964; alt. DOB 28 Aug 1962; nationality Korea, North; Passport 290320764| (individual) [NPWMD] (|Linked To: TANCHON COMMERCIAL BANK|).

OCEAN MARITIME MANAGEMENT COMPANY LIMITED (a.k.a. EAST SEA SHIPPING COMPANY), Dongheung-dong Changgwang Street, Chung-ku, PO Box 125, Pyongyang, Korea, North; Donghung Dong, Central District, PO Box 120, Pyongyang, Korea, North; No. 10, 10th Floor, Unit 1, Wu Wu Lu 32-1, Zhong Shan Qu, Dalian City, Liaoning Province, China; 22 Jin Cheng Jie, Zhong Shan Qu, Dalian City, Liaoning Province, China; 43-39 Lugovaya, Vladivostok, Russia; CPO Box 120, Tonghung-dong, Chung-gu, Pyongyang, Korea, North; Bangkok, Thailand; Lima, Peru; Port Said, Egypt; Singapore; Brazil; Identification Number IMO 1790183 [DPRK]. -to- OCEAN MARITIME MANAGEMENT COMPANY LIMITED (|a.k.a. EAST SEA SHIPPING COMPANY; a.k.a. HAEYANG CREW MANAGEMENT COMPANY; a.k.a. KOREA MIRAE SHIPPING CO. LTD.|)|, Dongheung-dong Changgwang Street, Chung-ku, PO Box 125, Pyongyang, Korea, North; Donghung Dong, Central District, PO Box 120, Pyongyang, Korea, North; No. 10, 10th Floor, Unit 1, Wu Wu Lu 32-1, Zhong Shan Qu, Dalian City, Liaoning Province, China; 22 Jin Cheng Jie, Zhong Shan Qu, Dalian City, Liaoning Province, China; 43-39 Lugovaya, Vladivostok, Russia; CPO Box 120, Tonghung-dong, Chung-gu, Pyongyang, Korea, North; Bangkok, Thailand; Lima, Peru; Port Said, Egypt; Singapore; Brazil; Hong Kong, China; Shenzhen, China; Identification Number IMO 1790183| [DPRK].

RA, Kyong-Su, Beijing, China; Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative to Beijing, China (individual) [NPWMD]. -to- RA, Kyong-Su (|a.k.a. CHANG, MYONG HO; a.k.a. CHANG, MYO'NG-HO; a.k.a. CHANG, MYONG-HO|), Beijing, China; Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative to Beijing, China (individual) [NPWMD] (|Linked To: TANCHON COMMERCIAL BANK|).

which were designated under the non-proliferation or DPRK programs.

Links:

OFAC Notice

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Finnish regulators regularly recap EU sanctions decisions and regulations that come into force. On July 3rd, they listed the following:

• Financial sanctions
• Iran
• Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1050 continued the temporary suspensions and licensing conditions under the Joint Plan of Action until July 7th.
• Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1008
• Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1001
• Ukraine, Crimea and Sevastopol
• Ukraine: Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/971
• Crimea and Sevastopol: Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/959 continue sanctions until June 23, 2016
• Syria
• Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/961

 

• Export and import restrictions
• Iran
• Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1050 continued the temporary suspensions and licensing conditions under the Joint Plan of Action until July 7th. The ban on imports of Iranian petrochemical products, as well as a ban on the transport of Iranian crude oil continues to be suspended. The suspension of the crude oil ban only applies to carriage outside the EU. The import of crude oil and petroleum products in the EU is still not allowed. The ban on trade in gold or precious metals is also suspended.
• Ukraine, Crimea and Sevastopol
• Ukraine: Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/971 extends restrictions until 01.31.2016. Defence equipment exports and imports to Russia is prohibited. In addition, it is prohibited to export dual-use items and technology to Russia, or for Russian use, if they are or may be in whole or in part, for military purposes or for military end-users. Dual-use export is prohibited also for separately listed companies that produce products for both civilian and military use. Export restrictions also relates to exploration of oil and certain products related to oil production.
• Crimea and Sevastopol: Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/959 extends restrictive measures until June 23, 2016. The export of certain goods and technology to the Crimea or Sevastopol is prohibited. Subject to an export ban are the products suitable for use in transport, telecommunications and energy as well as oil, gas and related to the exploitation of mineral resources in key sectors. Also, technical assistance, brokering services and the provision of financing are prohibited related to the above functions. The restrictive measures also prohibit the provision of services directly related to the tourism sector in the Crimea and Sevastopol.

 

• Travel Restrictions
• Syria
• Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2015/973
• Iran
• Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1008

 

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Treasury Department Publishes National Money Laundering Risk Assessment and National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment

6/12/2015

​

Reports Identify Key Illicit Finance Concerns to the United States; Enable the Public and Private Sectors to More Effectively Manage and Combat Illicit Finance Risks

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today issued the National Money Laundering Risk Assessment (NMLRA) and the National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment (NTFRA). The purpose of these assessments is to help the public and private sectors understand the money laundering and terrorist financing methods used in the United States, the risks that these activities pose to the U.S. financial system and national security, and the status of current efforts to combat these methods. In doing so, these assessments enable the U.S. Government and financial institutions to more effectively detect and combat illicit finance.

This is the first NTFRA, and the NMLRA builds and expands on a previous Treasury money laundering report issued in 2005. The methodology for today’s reports is based on guidance set out in 2013 by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the international standard-setting body for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing safeguards, of which the United States is a founding member. The FATF requires all national governments to demonstrate their understanding of the money laundering and terrorist financing risks facing their financial systems. The assessments issued today will help to inform the FATF’s ongoing review of the United States regarding our compliance with the FATF Recommendations – which are global standards focused on these issues.

The United States is the world’s largest financial system and U.S. financial institutions play a central role in the global economy, processing trillions of dollars of transactions from around the world every day. While this position exposes the United States to increased risks for illicit finance, the U.S. Government has developed a robust regulatory framework, complemented by law enforcement and supervision efforts, which make it more difficult and costly for criminals and terrorists to access and use the U.S. financial system.

“Today’s assessments underscore our dedication to better understand and address the risk of illicit finance,” said Adam J. Szubin, Acting Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. “This comprehensive review will better inform the U.S. Government and our private sector partners about how to further safeguard and strengthen the U.S. economy and national security.”

The NMLRA finds that the United States has effectively kept pace with innovation, such that, criminals pursuing money laundering opportunities rely on costly and burdensome methods to mask their identities from financial institutions in order to open and maintain accounts. These include, but are not limited to, using cash, other monetary instruments, shell companies, and conducting transactions below customer identification thresholds. The report also finds that the U.S. framework for anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing effectively narrows many of the most significant vulnerabilities that money launderers seek to exploit through a core set of tools, including targeted financial sanctions, law enforcement investigations and prosecutions and regulatory preventive measures, and by working to enhance international standards.

The NTFRA finds that the U.S. Government has made it substantially more difficult for terrorist organizations to raise and move money through the U.S. financial system since the September 11, 2001 attacks. A notable trend highlighted in the report is a decrease in the use of the U.S banking system for terrorist financing-related transactions, as terrorists are forced into more expensive and less efficient methods to facilitate terrorist financing, such as cash smuggling. Such channels outside of the regulated financial system are riskier than straightforward bank transfers, making them more vulnerable to disruption and exposure. Nonetheless, the wealth and resources of the United States will continue to make it an attractive target for a wide range of terrorist organizations seeking to fund their activities, and the risk of terrorist financing through the U.S. financial system persists.

The review for these assessments was led by the Treasury Department’s Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, and developed in close coordination with offices and bureaus in the Treasury Department, the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, and across the intelligence community and staffs of the Federal functional regulators.

Links:

FinCEN Notice

2015 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment (NMLRA)

2015 National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment (NTFRA)

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Surprise! People are trying to evade the Crimean sanctions (from Executive Order 13685) from OFAC by omitting or oscuring references to Crimea. OFAC has issued an advisory highlighting the practices it has noticed, including:

In the context of financial transactions, OFAC has become aware that certain individuals or entitieshave engaged in a pattern or practice of repeatedly omitting originator or beneficiary addressinformation from Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT)messages involving individuals ordinarily resident in, or entities located in, Crimea (collectively,”Crimean individuals or entities”). Some SWIFT messages omit all originator or beneficiary addressinformation while other payment messages contain only partial address information for Crimeanindividuals or entities, including, for example, a street address but no reference to a town, city,region, or country. Financial institutions have discovered the data missing from these SWIFTmessages through enhanced due diligence efforts performed on one of the transaction parties afteridentifying a suspicious Crimea-related pattern or practice.

OFAC has also included a section of controls that firms should have in place to stay compliant with the very general Crimean sanctions, including:

• Ensuring that transaction monitoring systems include appropriate search terms correspondingto major geographic locations in Crimea and not simply references to “Crimea.” Forexample, payment instructions or trade documents may reference major cities or ports locatedin Crimea, and interdiction filters may not flag such transactions for review if the filters donot include an appropriately expansive list of search terms.
• Requesting additional information from parties (including financial institutions, corporateentities, and individuals) that previously have violated or attempted to violate U.S. sanctionson Crimea. Such prior conduct could include, for example, routing transactions to or throughU.S. financial institutions with inaccurate or incomplete address information for Crimeanindividuals or entities.
• Clearly communicating U.S. sanctions obligations to international partners (in both thefinancial and trade sectors) and discussing OFAC sanctions compliance expectations withcorrespondent banking and trade partners. Such communications should include, forexample, a description of the prohibition on the direct and indirect exportation orreexportation of goods, technology, and services (including financial services) from theUnited States to Crimea.

Links:

OFAC Notice

Crimea Sanctions Advisory

Executive Order 13685

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Last Tuesday, Australian regulators incorporated two changes to its Consolidated List's Al-Qaida sanctions program made by the United Nations. First, they updated the following person's listing:

QDi.228 Name: 1: MOHAMMED 2: AL GHABRA 3: na 4: na

Title: na Designation: na DOB: 1 Jun. 1980 POB: Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic Good

quality a.k.a.: a) Mohammed El’ Ghabra b) Danial Adam na Low quality a.k.a.: na

Nationality: British Passport no.: British number 094629366 National identification no.: na

Address: East London, United Kingdom Listed on: 12 Dec. 2006 (amended on 13 Dec.

2011, 20 July 2015) Other information: Father’s name is Mohamed Ayman Ghabra. Mother’s

name is Dalal. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on

5 Oct. 2009.

Secondly, the United Nations has removed the following person from its sanctions list:

QDi.351 Name: 1: ALIASKHAB 2: ALIBULATOVICH 3: KEBEKOV 4:

Name (original script): Алиaсхаб Алибулатович Кебеков

Title: na Designation: na DOB: 1 Jan. 1972 POB: Teletl Village, Shamilskiy District,

Republic of Dagestan, Russian Federation Good quality a.k.a.: na Low quality a.k.a.:

a) Sheikh Abu Muhammad b) Ali Abu Muhammad c) Abu Muhammad Ali Al-Dagestani

Nationality: Russian Passport no.: Russian Foreign Travel Passport number

628605523, issued on 4 Jul. 2006, issued in Federal Migration Service of the Russian

Federation (expires on 16 Jul. 2016) National identification no.: Russian National

Passport number 8203883123, issued on 16 Jul. 2005, issued in Department of Internal

Affairs (OVD), Kirovskiy District, Republic of Dagestan, the Russian Federation (expires

on 1 Jan. 2017) Address: Shosse Aeroporta, 5 Ap. 7 Makhachkala, Republic of

Dagestan, Russian Federation Listed on: 23 Mar. 2015 Other information: Physical

description: eye colour: brown; hair colour: grey; height: 170-175cm; build: heavy, oval

face, beard. Tribal/ethnic background: Avar. Father’s name: Alibulat Kebekovich

Kebekov, born in 1927. Wanted by Federal Russian authorities for terrorist crimes.

Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice.

Links:

UN Notice for Mohammed Al Ghabra

UN Notice for Aliaskhab Kebekov

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On July 29th, Her Majesty's Treasury (HMT) removed the following two entities from its Iran sanctions:

1. PETROPARS OPERATION & MANAGEMENT COMPANY

a.k.a: POMC

Address: South Pars Gas, Assaluyeh, Bushehr.

Other Information: Subsidiary of designated entity Petropars Iran Company. Tel:+98-772-7363852. Website: http://www.petropars.com/Subsidiaries/POMC.aspxGroup ID: 12881.

2. PETROPARS RESOURCES ENGINEERING LTD

a.k.a: PRE

Address: 4th Floor, No. 19 5th St., Gandi Ave, Tehran, Iran, 1517646113.

Other Information: Subsidiary of designated entity Petropars Iran Company. Tel:+98-21 88888910/13. Website: http://www.petropars.com/Subsidiaries/PRE.aspxGroup ID: 12882.

due to a June 22nd publication in the Offical Journal of the European Union of a May 5th judgment of the General Court of the European Union.

Links:

HMT Notice

Court Judgment

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On Monday, Her Majesty's Treasury (HMT) released updates to 4 sanctions programs. First, following Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2015/1322, they added the folllowing person:

NOORZAI, Abdul, Basir

Title: Haji DOB: (1) –/–/1965. (2) –/–/1960. (3) –/–/1963. POB: Baluchistan
Province, Pakistan a.k.a: (1) AL-BASIR, Haji, Abd (2) BASEER, Abdul (3) BASIR,
Abdul (4) BASIR, Haji, Abdul (5) NOORZAI, Haji, Basir Nationality:

Afgan Passport Details: Pakistani passport no. AA3829182 National
Identification no: Pakistani national identification no.
5420124679187

5420124679187 Address: Chaman, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan. Other
Information: Owner of HAJI BASIR AND ZARMIL COMPANY HAWALA, which
provides financial services to Taliban in the region. Listed on: 03/08/2015 Last
Updated: 03/08/2015 Group ID: 13268.

and entity:

HAJI BASIR AND ZARJMIL COMPANY HAWALA

a.k.a: (1) Haji Abdul Basir and Zar Jameel Hawala (2) Haji Abdul Basir Exchange
shop (3) Haji Baseer Hawala (4) Haji Bashir and Zarjmil Hawala
Company (5) Haji Basir and Zarjamil Currency Exchange (6) Haji Basir
Hawala (7) Haji Zar Jamil, Haji Baseer Money Changer

Company (5) Haji Basir and Zarjamil Currency Exchange (6) Haji Basir

Hawala (7) Haji Zar Jamil, Haji Baseer Money Changer Other Information: Known
Addresses:(a) Branch Office 1: Sanatan (variant Sanatin) Bazaar, Sanatan Bazaar
Street, near Trench (variant Tranch) Road, Chaman, Baluchistan Province,
Pakistan(b) Branch Office 2: Quetta, Pakistan. (c) Branch Office 3: Lahore, Pakistan
(d) Branch Office 4: Peshawar, Pakistan (e) Branch Office 5: Karachi, Pakistan (f)
Branch Office 6: Islamabad, Pakistan (g) Branch Office 7: Kandahar Province,
Afghanistan (h) Branch Office 8: Herat Province, Afghanistan (i) Branch Office 9:
Helmand Province, Afghanistan (j) Branch Office 10: Dubai, United Arab Emirates
(k) Branch Office 11: Iran. Other Information: (a) Money service provider used by
senior Taliban leaders to transfer funds to Taliban commanders in the region. (b)
Owned by Abdul Basir Noorzai. Date of UN designation:27.3.2015 Listed on:
03/08/2015 Last Updated: 03/08/2015 Group ID: 13269.

and removed the following person:

SHER MOHAMMAD, Sangeen, Zadran

Title: Maulavi/Maulvi/Mullah DOB: (1) –/–/1976. (2) –/–/1979. POB: Tang Stor
Khel, Ziruk District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan a.k.a: (1) ZADRAN, Sangeen,
Khan (2) ZADRAN, Sangin Nationality: Afghan Other Information: UN Ref
TI.Z.152.11. Taliban Shadow Governor for Paktika Province as of late 2012. Senior
commander of the Haqqani Network. Senior lieutenant to Sirajuddin Jallaloudine
Haqqani. Also referred to as Sangin, Sangeen and Fateh and Noori. Reportedly
deceased September 2013. Listed on: 03/10/2011 Last Updated: 03/08/2015
Group ID: 12036.

from the Afghanistan sanctions on their Consolidated List.

Links:

HMT Notice

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2015/1322

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On Monday, HMT implemented Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2015/1133 by removing the following 2 people:

KOZIK, Leanid, Piatrovich

DOB: 13/07/1948. POB: Borisov a.k.a: KOZIK, Leonid, Petrovich National Identificationno: 3130748A017PB8 Position: Head of the Federation of Trade Unions OtherInformation: Former deputy Prime Minister and deputy Head of the President'sAdministration. Listed on: 22/05/2006 Last Updated: 14/07/2015 Group ID: 8893.

SKURAT, Viktar, Vatslavavich

a.k.a: SKURAT, Viktor, Vatslavovich Position: Head of the security department of thecompany ‘MZOR’ Other Information: MZOR is a state-owned holding company. FormerHead of the Security Department of the Ministry of Interior, from which he retired inFebruary 2013. Listed on: 29/03/2011 Last Updated: 14/07/2015 Group ID: 11730.

and 4 entities:

CJSC ASKARGOTERMINAL

Other Information: Subsidiary of LLC Triple Listed on: 26/03/2012 Last Updated:14/07/2015 Group ID: 12579.

JCJSC ALTERSOLUTIONS

Other Information: Subsidiary of LLC Triple Listed on: 26/03/2012 Last Updated:14/07/2015 Group ID: 12586.

JLLC TRIPLE-DEKOR

Other Information: Subsidiary of LLC Triple Listed on: 26/03/2012 Last Updated:14/07/2015 Group ID: 12584.

JLLC VARIANT

Other Information: Subsidiary of LLC Triple Listed on: 26/03/2012 Last Updated:14/07/2015 Group ID: 12583.

from sanctions on Belarus on the Consolidated List.

Links:

HMT Notice

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2015/1133

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1. On 1 August 2015, Council Regulation 2015/1328 of the Council of the EuropeanUnion, extended the measures of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) until14 January 2016. This amends Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictivemeasures against Iran.
2. In addition, on 1 August 2015, Council Regulation 2015/1327 of the Council of theEuropean Union adopted new grounds which allow competent authorities to authorisecertain activity in relation to the implementation of the JCPoA. This similarly amendsRegulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran.

Links:

HMT Notice

Council Regulation 2015/1328

Council Regulation 2015/1327

Posted with Blogsy

On Monday, HMT implemented Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2015/1330 by removing the following person from the Consolidated List:

KEBEKOV, Aliaskhab, Alibulatovich

DOB: 01/01/1972. POB: Teletl Village, Shamilskjy District, Republic of Dagestan,
Russian Federation a.k.a: (1) AL-DAGESTANI, Abu, Muhammad,
Ali (2) MUHAMMAD, Ali, Abu (3) MUHAMMAD, Sheikh, Abu

Ali (2) MUHAMMAD, Ali, Abu (3) MUHAMMAD, Sheikh, Abu Nationality:
Russian Passport Details: Passport no. 628605523 Russian Foreign Travel Passport
issued 4.7.2006 by Federal Migration Service, expires 16.7.2016. National
Identification no: 8203883123 Russian National Passport issued 16.7.2015 by
Department of Internal Affaitrs, (OVD), Kirovskiy District, Dagestan, expires
01.01.2017 Address: Shosse Aeroporta, 5 Ap 7, Makhachkala, Dagestan, Russian
Federation. Other Information: Physical description, eye colour. brown, hair
colour. grey, height. 170-175 cm, build. heavy, oval face, beard. Fathers name is
Alibulat Kebekovich Kebekov, INTERPOL – UN Security Council Special Notice has a
photo available of the designated person. Listed on: 31/03/2015 Last Updated:
03/08/2015 Group ID: 13245

and amended the following listing:

AL GHABRA, Mohammed

DOB: 01/06/1980. POB: Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic a.k.a: (1) ADAM,
Danial (2) EL’ GHABRA, Mohammed

Danial (2) EL’ GHABRA, Mohammed Nationality: British Passport Details:
094629366 (British) Address: East London, United Kingdom. Other Information:
UN Ref QI.A.228.06. Father’s name is Mohamed Ayman Ghabra. Mother’s name is
Dalal. Listed on: 21/12/2006 Last Updated: 03/08/2015 Group ID: 8983.

Links:

HMT Notice

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2015/1330

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On Monday, OFAC designated the following persons:

AYDIN, Mustafa, Turkey; DOB 26 May 1988; Passport U04663595 (Turkey) (individual) [SYRIA] (Linked To: MILENYUM ENERGY S.A.; Linked To: BLUE ENERGY TRADE LTD. CO.; Linked To: ABDULKARIM GROUP).

DUZGOREN, Erkan, Turkey; DOB 17 Jun 1980 (individual) [SYRIA] (Linked To: MILENYUM ENERGY S.A.).

DUZGOREN, Serkan, Turkey; DOB 28 Jan 1979 (individual) [SYRIA] (Linked To: MILENYUM ENERGY S.A.).

KENAR, Ufuk, Turkey; DOB 24 Apr 1980 (individual) [SYRIA] (Linked To: MILENYUM ENERGY S.A.).

and entities:

AQUA SHIPPING LTD. (a.k.a. AQUA SHIPPING LTD.-MAI), c/o Milenyum Denizcilik Gemi Hizmetleri Acentelik ve Ozel Ogretim Hizmetleri Ltd. Sti, Nazli Sokak 9, Halilrifatpasa Mah, Sisli, Istanbul 34384, Turkey; Trust Company Complex, Ajeltake Road, Ajeltake Island, Majuro, Marshall Islands; Identification Number IMO 5849194 [SYRIA] (Linked To: MILENYUM ENERGY S.A.).

BLUE ENERGY TRADE LTD. CO., P.O. Box 556, Charlestown, Saint Kitts and Nevis [SYRIA] (Linked To: MILENYUM ENERGY S.A.).

EBLA TRADE SERVICES S.A.L./OFF-SHORE, Beirut, Lebanon; Nakhle Center, Property Number: 295/24, Baabda, Furn, Chebbak, Lebanon [SYRIA] (Linked To: MILENYUM ENERGY S.A.; Linked To: BLUE ENERGY TRADE LTD. CO.).

GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF SYRIAN PORTS (a.k.a. “GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF PORTS”), Algazaer Street, Lattakia, Syria [SYRIA].

GREEN SHIPPING LTD., c/o Milenyum Denizcilik Gemi Hizmetleri Acentelik ve Ozel Ogretim Hizmetleri Ltd. Sti, Nazli Sokak 9, Halilrifatpasa Mah, Sisli, Istanbul 34384, Turkey; Trust Company Complex, Ajeltake Road, Ajeltake Island, Majuro, Marshall Islands; Identification Number IMO 5848165 [SYRIA] (Linked To: MILENYUM ENERGY S.A.).

LATTAKIA PORT GENERAL COMPANY (a.k.a. LATAKIA PORT GENERAL COMPANY), BP 220, Latakia, Syria; Postal Box 220, Lattakia, Syria; Baghdad Street, Lattakia, Syria [SYRIA].

MILENYUM ENERGY S.A. (a.k.a. MILENYUM DENIZCILIK GEMI; a.k.a. MILENYUM DENIZCILIK GEMI HIZMETLERI ACENTELIK VE OZEL OGRETIM HIZMETLERI LIMITED SIRKETI; a.k.a. MILENYUM SHIPPING), c/o Milenyum Denizcilik Gemi H., Hizmetleri Ltd. Sti, Nazli Sokak 9, Halilrifatpasa Mah, Sisli, Istanbul 34384, Turkey; Ataturk Mahallesi Gulay Sokak, No. 12/3, Atasehir, Istanbul, Turkey; No. 18 D. 1 Kemankes Mah. Necatibey Cad., Akce Sok., Karakoy, Istanbul, Turkey; Sierra Leone; Avenida Norte Enrique Geenzeier El Cangrejo, Panama 0834-1082, Panama; Website http://www.milenyumshipping.com; Company Number 792313 (Panama) [SYRIA] (Linked To: ABDULKARIM, Wael; Linked To: ABDULKARIM GROUP).

MORGAN ADDITIVES MANUFACTURING CO. (a.k.a. MORGAN MIDDLE EAST LLC), Office No. 2206, 22nd Floor, Jafza View 19, Sheikh Zayed Road Besides Jafza View 18, Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Suite 13, First Floor, Oliaji Trade Centre, Francis Rachel Street, Victoria, Mahe, Seychelles; Website http://www.morganme.com; alt. Website morgan.ae [SYRIA] (Linked To: ABDULKARIM, Wael).

SYRIAN CHAMBER OF SHIPPING (a.k.a. “SCOS”), Al Jazaeer Street, Farid Hanna Bldg, 8th Fl., P.O. Box 1731, Lattakia, Syria; Al Mina Street, Tartous, Syria [SYRIA].

SYRIAN GENERAL AUTHORITY FOR MARITIME TRANSPORT (a.k.a. SYRIAMAR; a.k.a. SYRIAN GENERAL ESTABLISHMENT FOR MARINE TRANSPORT; a.k.a. SYRIAN GENERAL ORGANIZATION FOR MARITIME TRANSPORT), BP 28, Bur Sa'id Street, Latakia, Syria; BP 225, Yarmouk Street, Latakia, Syria; BP 915, al-Mina Street, Tartous, Syria; BP 730, Argentine Street, Damascus, Syria; Port Road, Lattakia, Syria [SYRIA].

SYRIAN SHIPPING AGENCIES COMPANY (a.k.a. “SHIPCO”; a.k.a. “SHIPPING AGENCIES CO.”), Port Said Street, P.O. Box 28, Lattakia, Syria; Port Street, P.O. Box 3, Tartous, Syria; Joul Jammal Street, P.O. Box 28, Banias, Syria; Brazil Street, P.O. Box 12477, Damascus, Syria [SYRIA].

TARTOUS PORT GENERAL COMPANY, Al Mina Street, Tartous, Syria; Postal Box 86, Tartous, Syria [SYRIA].

THE EAGLES L.L.C. (a.k.a. THE EAGLES INTERNATIONAL LLC), Plot No. 41, Airport Free Trade Zone, Damascus, Syria [SYRIA] (Linked To: ABDULKARIM, Wael; Linked To: ABDULKARIM GROUP).

and vessels:

AQUA Sierra Leone flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 7529641 (vessel) [SYRIA] (Linked To: MILENYUM ENERGY S.A.; Linked To: AQUA SHIPPING LTD.).

BLUE DREAM Saint Kitts and Nevis flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8002664 (vessel) [SYRIA] (Linked To: MILENYUM ENERGY S.A.).

BLUE WAY Panama flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8800298 (vessel) [SYRIA] (Linked To: MILENYUM ENERGY S.A.).

BLUEGAS Sierra Leone flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 7909839 (vessel) [SYRIA] (Linked To: MILENYUM ENERGY S.A.).

FINIKIA; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9385233 (vessel) [SYRIA] (Linked To: SYRIAN GENERAL AUTHORITY FOR MARITIME TRANSPORT).

GREEN LIGHT Panama flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8810700 (vessel) [SYRIA] (Linked To: MILENYUM ENERGY S.A.; Linked To: GREEN SHIPPING LTD.).

LAODICEA; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9274343 (vessel) [SYRIA] (Linked To: SYRIAN GENERAL AUTHORITY FOR MARITIME TRANSPORT).

MARIANA Sierra Leone flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8016835 (vessel) [SYRIA] (Linked To: MILENYUM ENERGY S.A.).

SOURIA; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9274331 (vessel) [SYRIA] (Linked To: SYRIAN GENERAL AUTHORITY FOR MARITIME TRANSPORT).

TALA Panama flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8012114 (vessel) [SYRIA] (Linked To: MILENYUM ENERGY S.A.).

under its Syrian sanctions program. It's interesting to note, by the way, which countries have no compunction offering flagging services to the Syrians.

Link:

OFAC Notice

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On Wednesday, OFAC added the following two Qatari citizens to the SDN List, under its anti-terror sanctions program:

AL-KA'BI, Sa'd bin Sa'd Muhammad Shariyan (a.k.a. AL-KA'BI, Sa'd al-Sharyan; a.k.a. AL-KA'BI, Sa'd Bin Sa'd Muhammad Shiryan; a.k.a. AL-KA'BI, Sa'd Sa'd Muhammad Shiryan; a.k.a. “Abu Haza'”; a.k.a. “Abu Hazza'”; a.k.a. “Abu Sa'd”; a.k.a. “Abu Suad”; a.k.a. “'Umar al-Afghani”); DOB 15 Feb 1972; nationality Qatar; Passport 00966737 (Qatar) (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: AL-NUSRAH FRONT).

AL-KAWARI, 'Abd al-Latif Bin 'Abdallah Salih Muhammad (a.k.a. AL-KAWARI, 'Abd-al-Latif 'Abdallah; a.k.a. AL-KAWARI, 'Abd-al-Latif 'Abdallah Salih; a.k.a. AL-KAWWARI, 'Abd-al-Latif 'Abdallah; a.k.a. AL-KUWARI, 'Abd-al-Latif 'Abdallah Salih; a.k.a. “Abu Ali al-Kawari”), al-Laqtah, Qatar; DOB 28 Sep 1973; nationality Qatar; Passport 01020802 (Qatar); alt. Passport 00754833 (Qatar) issued 20 May 2007; alt. Passport 00490327 (Qatar) issued 28 Jul 2001; National ID No. 27363400684 (Qatar) (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: ISLAMIC ARMY).

Link:

OFAC Notice

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On Tuesday, HMT released a notice about changes to the Libyan sanctions program. Council Regulation 2015/1324 added to the list of grounds for releasing frozen funds. Council Regulation 2015/1323 amended 20 individual listings and 16 entity listings.

Links:

HMT Notice

Council Regulation 2015/1323

Council Regulation 2015/1324

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The company sold and shipped 3 duct fabrication machines (worth $500,000) to a SDN List entity (China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corp.) sanctioned under the NPWMD (non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) sanctions program without OFAC's authorization. The non-egregious violations were not voluntarily self-reported. The base penalty was $250,000 and the statutory maximum was $1,000,000.

Here's OFAC”s explanation of how they calculated the ultimate settlement amount:

OFAC considered the following to be aggravating factors:

(1) PPI failed to
exercise a minimal degree of caution or care with respect to OFAC sanctions;

(2) PPI had
knowledge that the transaction involved CNPM, a Specially Designated National;

(3) PPI did not
have a sanctions compliance program in place at the time of the transaction; and

(4) the
transaction likely provided economic benefit to a Specially Designated National.

OFAC
considered the following to be mitigating factors:

(1) PPI has not received a Penalty Notice or
Finding of Violation from OFAC in the five years preceding the date of the transaction giving
rise to the Alleged Violations;

(2) PPI is a small, family-owned business with only ten
employees;

(3) PPI took remedial steps to implement a sanctions compliance program; and

(4)
PPI substantially cooperated with OFAC by responding promptly and completely to OFAC’s
additional requests for information and documents.

Link:

OFAC Enforcement Action

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On Friday, Australian & Canadian regulators added the following entity:

QDe.148 Name: THE ARMY OF EMIGRANTS AND SUPPORTERS

Name (original script): تنظيم جيش المهاجرين و الأنصار

A.k.a.: a) Battalion of Emigrants and Supporters b) Army of Emigrants and Supporters organization c) Battalion of Emigrants and Ansar d) Jaysh al-Muhajirin wal-Ansar (JAMWA) Address: Jabal Turkuman area, Lattakia Governorate, Syrian Arab Republic Listed on: 6 August 2015 Other information: Established by foreign terrorist fighters in 2013. Location: Syrian Arab Republic. Affiliated with Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115) and Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137).

to its Consolidated List under its Al-Qaida sanctions after the change was made by the United Nations. They also modified the following listing, under the same program:

QDi.109 Name: 1: ZULKIFLI 2: ABDUL HIR 3: na 4: na

Title: na Designation: na DOB: a) 5 Jan. 1966 b) 5 Oct. 1966 POB: Muar Johor, Malaysia Good quality a.k.a.: a) Musa Abdul Hir b) Muslimin Abdulmotalib c) Salim Alombra d) Armand Escalante e) Normina Hashim f) Henri Lawi g) Hendri Lawi h) Norhana Mohamad i) Omar Salem j) Ahmad Shobirin k) Bin Abdul Hir Zulkifli Low quality a.k.a.: a) Abdulhir Bin Hir b) Hassan c) Hogalu d) Hugalu e) Lagu f) Marwan (prominently known as) Nationality: Malaysian Passport no: A 11263265 National identification no: a) 660105-01-5297 b) driver license D2161572, issued in California, USA Address: a) Seksyen 17, Shah Alam, Selangor, Malaysia (previous location) b) Maguindanao, the Philippines (as at Jan. 2015) Listed on: 9 Sep. 2003 (amended on 25 Jan. 2010, 6 Aug. 2015) Other information: The Court for the Northern District of California, USA, issued a warrant of arrest for him on 1 Aug. 2007. At large Confirmed to have died in Maguindanao, in the Southern Philippines in January 2015. Mother’s name is Minah Binto Aogist Abd Aziz. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 19 Jun. 2009.

Link:

OSFI Notice

UN Notice – HTML (OSFI), PDF (DFAT)

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The firm settled 48 apparent violations of sanctions on North Korea, Iran, Sudan and Cuba. The violations were voluntarily self-disclosed and were considered non-egregious.

Between 2008 and 2011, the firm issued insurance policies, and paid claims, for North Korean vessels, and covered shipping transactions involving Cuba, Iran and Sudan – all while not having an OFAC compliance program.

The total base penalty for all 48 violations was $755,042 – you can see all the detail in OFAC’s notice. Here’s how you get to $271K:

The following were considered aggravating factors:

• Navigators
  managers and supervisors knew or had reason to know that the majority of the insurance policies
  and claims payments at issue involved OFAC-sanctioned countries;
• Navigators is a
  commercially sophisticated financial institution; and
• Navigators did not have a formal OFAC
  compliance program in place at the time the apparent violations occurred.

The following were
considered mitigating factors:

• Navigators has not received a penalty notice or Finding of
  Violation from OFAC in the five years preceding the earliest date of the apparent violations;
• Navigators took appropriate remedial action in response to the apparent violations, including the
  formation and implementation of a comprehensive OFAC compliance program; and
• Navigators
  cooperated with OFAC’s investigation by providing all information in a responsive, well-
  organized fashion, and by signing a tolling agreement and two extensions to that agreement

Link:

OFAC Enforcement Action

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Following the agreement on the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), OFAC issued updated guidance, FAQs and a civil aviation industry licensing guidelines.

Links:

OFAC Notice

Iran sanctions Guidance

Iran Sanctions Frequently Asked Questions

Third Amended Statement of Licensing Policy

Posted with Blogsy

On Tuesday, Swiss regulators modifed the listings for the following 3 individuals:

SSID: 10-13523 Foreign identifier: QI.A.255.08. Name: Adil Muhammad Mahmud Abd Al-
Khaliq

DOB: 2 Mar 1984 POB: Bahrain Good quality a.k.a.: a) Adel Mohamed Mahmoud Abdul
Khaliq b) Adel Mohamed Mahmood Abdul Khaled Nationality: Bahrain Identification
document: Passport No. 1632207, Bahrain

Other information: Has acted on behalf of and provided financial, material and logistical
support to Al-Qaida (listed under permanent reference number QE.A.4.01.)QE.A.4.01) and
the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG, listed under permanent reference number
QE.L.11.01.), including provision of electrical parts used in explosives, computers, GPS
devices and military equipment. Trained by Al-Qaida in small arms and explosives in South
Asia and fought with Al-Qaida in Afghanistan.LIFG QE.L.11.01). Arrested in the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) in Jan 2007 on charges of being a member of Al-Qaida and the LIFG.
Following his conviction in the UAE in late 2007, he was transferred to Bahrain in early 2008
to serve out the remainder of his sentencesentence. Following his release in 2008, he
resumed fundraising activities for Al-Qaida, at least through 2012. He also collected money
for the Taliban. Modifications: Amended on 14 Aug 2013, 11 Aug 2015

SSID: 10-14159 Foreign identifier: QI.A.228.06. Name: Mohammed Al Ghabra

DOB: 1 Jun 1980 POB: Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic Good quality a.k.a.: a)
Mohammed El’ Ghabra b) Danial Adam Address: East London, United Kingdom
Nationality: United Kingdom Identification document: Passport No. 094629366, United
Kingdom

Other information: Father’s name is Mohamed Ayman Ghabra. Mother’s name is Dalal.
Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 5 Oct 2009.
Modifications: Amended on 11 Aug 2015

SSID: 10-16886 Foreign identifier: QI.T.57.02. Name: Ibrahim Ali Abu Bakr Tantoush
DOB: 2 Feb 1966 POB: al Aziziyya, Libya Good quality a.k.a.: a) Abd al-Muhsin b) Ibrahim
Ali Muhammad Abu Bakr c) Abdul Rahman d) Abu Anas e) Ibrahim Abubaker Tantouche f)
Ibrahim Abubaker Tantoush g) ‘Abd al-Muhsi h) ‘Abd al-Rahman i) Abdel Ilah Sabri Low
quality a.k.a.: Al-Libi Address: Johannesburg, South AfricaTripoli, Libya (as at Feb 2014)
Nationality: Libya Identification document: a) Passport No. 203037, Libya, Place of issue:
Tripoli b) Passport No. 347834, Libya, Expiry date: 21 Feb 2014 (issued under name Ibrahim
Ali Tantoush)

Relation: a) Associated with Afghan Support Committee (ASC) (QE.A.69.02., SSID 10-
17137) b) Associated with Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (QE.R.70.02., SSID 10-
17716) c) Associated with Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (QE.L.11.01., SSID 10-17675)
Other information: a) Associated with Afghan Support Committee (ASC) (QE.A.69.02.),
Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS)(QE.R.70.02.) and the Libyan Islamic Fighting
Group (LIFG) (QE.L.11.01.). Photograph and fingerprints available for inclusion in the
INTERPOL-UNSC Special Notice. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822
(2008) was concluded on 8 Jun 2010. b) a.k.a Abdel Ilah Sabri: false identity related to
fraudulent South African identification number 6910275240086 linked to South African
passport number 434021161; both documents have been confiscated. Modifications:
Amended on 11 Aug 2015

and removed the following person:

SSID: 10-30948 Name: Aliaskhab Alibulatovich Kebekov Spelling variant: Алиaсхаб
Алибулатович Кебеков (Russian)

DOB: 1 Jan 1972 POB: Teletl Village, Shamilskiy District, Republic of Dagestan, Russian
Federation Low quality a.k.a.: a) Sheikh Abu Muhammad b) Ali Abu Muhammad c) Abu
Muhammad Ali Al-Dagestani Address: Shosse Aeroporta, 5 Ap. 7 Makhachkala, Republic of
Dagestan, Russian Federation Nationality: Russian Federation Identification document:
a) Travel document No. 628605523, Russian Federation, Date of issue: 4 Jul 2006, Expiry
date: 16 Jul 2016 (Russian Foreign Travel Passport issued in Federal Migration Service of
the Russian Federation) b) Passport No. 8203883123, Russian Federation, Date of issue:
16 Jul 2005, Expiry date: 1 Jan 2017 (Russian National Passport issued in Department of
Internal Affairs (OVD), Kirovskiy District, Republic of Dagestan, the Russian Federation)
Justification: Aliaskhab Alibulatovich Kebekov was listed on 23 Mar 2015 pursuant to
paragraphs 2 and 4 of resolution 2161 (2014) as being associated with Al-Qaida for
“participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or
activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of”,
“supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to”, “recruiting for” and
“otherwise supporting acts or activities” of Al-Qaida (QDe.004), Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (QDe.010), Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of
Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM) (QDe.100), Islamic Jihad Group (QDe.119), Emarat Kavkaz
(QDe.131), Aiman Muhammed Rabi Al-Zawahiri (QDi.006) and Doku Khamatovich Umarov
(QDi.290). Relation: a) Related to Al-Qaida (QE.A.4.01., SSID 10-17297) b) Related to
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (QE.I.10.01., SSID 10-17586) c) Related to Riyadus-
Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM)
(QE.R.100.03., SSID 10-17726) d) Related to Islamic Jihad Group (QE.I.119.05., SSID 10-
17571) e) Related to Emarat Kavkaz (QE.E.131.11., SSID 10-17455) f) Related to Aiman Muhammed Rabi Al-Zawahiri (QI.A.6.01., SSID 10-14766) g) Related to Doku Khamatovich
Umarov (QI.U.290.11., SSID 10-16939) Other information: a) In the middle of 2011,
Aliaskhab Alibulatovich Kebekov (A. A. Kebekov) established and became a leader of a
terrorist sabotage group in the Republic of Dagestan, the Russian Federation, in order to
pursue terrorist activities in the Republic of Dagestan aimed at disrupting the current
constitutional order and killing Russian law-enforcement officers. b) The group controlled by
A. A. Kebekov is responsible, among other things, for a car bomb attack in Makhachkala,
Republic of Dagestan, on 6 Nov 2011. c) In early 2012, the extremist web-site guraba.info
posted a video address by A. A. Kebekov entitled “Kadiy “Imarat Kavkaz” Abu Muhammad”,
where he called for conducting extremist activities. d) On 13 Nov 2012, Internet-site
vdagestan.com posted a video address by A. A. Kebekov entitled “Zakiat”, which includes
statements and expressions calling for terrorist and extremist activities and justifying
terrorism. e) In a video address of 18 Mar 2014 posted in a social media website, A. A.
Kebekov announced that due to the death of Doku Khamadovich Umarov (QDi.290), leader
of the international terrorist organization Emarat Kavkaz (QDe.131), he would now lead
Emarat Kavkaz. f) On 23 Jun 2014, video hosting “Izlesene” published a video “Sharif Ik Ali
Abu Muhammad: Position of Emarat Kavkaz in connection with Fitnah (rebellion) in Sham
(Levante). g) On 7 Jul 2014 in a video address made by “Kavkaz Center” and posted on
Youtube, A. A. Kebekov, posing as Sheikh Ali Abu Muhammad, refers, in particular, to a
“decree from our Sharif Hafiz Allah Aiman Al–Zawahiri”, which testifies to Emarat Kavkaz
structural subordination to Al-Qaida (QDe.004), its readiness to execute orders and
instructions from its leaders. h) On 22 Jul 2014, Emarat Kavkaz’s official Internet website
“Kavkaz Center” published a statement on A. A. Kebekov’s election as leader of the
organization. i) In the video address, A. A. Kebekov outlines the position of Emarat Kavkaz
on the conflict between Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq
(QDe.115) and Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137), as well as positions
terrorist group Jaish Al-Mahajareen wal-Ansar (not listed) operating in Syria as a branch of
Emarat Kavkaz. j) A. A. Kebekov is wanted by Federal Russian authorities for terrorist
crimes, in particular illegally manufacturing weapons, establishing an armed group,
participating in an armed group in the Russian Federation, participating in an armed group in
a foreign country, public calls for terrorist activity or public justification of terrorism, public
calls for extremist activities, establishing and leading a terrorist community. k) A. A. Kebekov
is linked to the following individuals and entities on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List: Aiman
Muhammed Rabi Al-Zawahiri (QDi.006), Doku Khamatovich Umarov, Al-Qaida, Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (QDe.010), Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage
Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM) (QDe.100), Islamic Jihad Group (QDe.119),
Emarat Kavkaz. l) Physical description: eye colour: brown; hair colour: grey; height: 170-
175cm; build: heavy, oval face, beard. Tribal/ethnic background: Avar. Father’s name:
Alibulat Kebekovich Kebekov, born in 1927. Wanted by Federal Russian authorities for
terrorist crimes. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special
Notice. Modifications: Listed on 2 Apr 2015, de-listed on 11 Aug 2015

from their Consolidated List under the Al-Qaida/bin Laden/Taliban program.

Links:

FINMA Notice

Data files of updates – PDF, XML

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