On February 9th, the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission (HK SFC) published an AML/CTF circular which announced the publication of an updated sanctions list for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) program.

Links:

HK SFC Notice

HK SFC Circular

DRC Sanctions List

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Press Releases

Link:

HKMA Notice

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Last Friday, Swiss authorities added the following 2 persons: to their sanctions on Somalia:

SSID: 180-38510 Name: Ahmad Iman Ali

DOB: a) 1973 (approximately) b) 1974 (approximately) POB: Kenya Good quality a.k.a.: a) Sheikh Ahmed Iman Ali b) Shaykh Ahmad Iman Ali c) Ahmed Iman Ali d) Abu Zinira Nationality: Kenya

Modifications: Listed on 8 Mar 2018

SSID: 180-38521 Name: Abdifatah Abubakar Abdi

DOB: 15 Apr 1982 POB: Somalia Good quality a.k.a.: Musa Muhajir Address: a) Somalia b) Mombasa, Kenya Nationality: Somalia

Modifications: Listed on 8 Mar 2018

Note: OFAC listed these folks under their counter terrorism sanctions program. It would be nice to have cross-references of these things when they differ.

Links:

FINMA Notice

Data files of updates – PDF, XML

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On Monday, Swiss authorities added the following 2 persons: 

SSID: 200-38314 Name: Yousef Mohamed Mazen Ali

DOB: 17 May 1969 POB: Damascus Countryside, Syrian Arab Republic

Justification: Minister of Industry. Appointed in January 2018. Modifications: Listed on 7 Mar 2018

SSID: 200-38320 Name: Sara Imad Abdullah

DOB: 1968 POB: Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic

Justification: Minister of Information. Appointed in January 2018. Modifications: Listed on 7 Mar 2018

to their Syrian sanctions program, and modified the following listings:

SSID: 200-11951 Name: Ali Abdullah Ayyub

Title: General DOB: 1952 POB: Lattakia, Syrian Arab Republic Good quality a.k.a.: a) Abdallah b) Ayyoub (Ayub, Ayoub, Ayob)

Justification: Minister of Defence. Appointed in January 2018. Officer of the rank of General in the Syrian Army, in post after May 2011. Former Chief of General Staff of the Syrian Armed Forces. Person supporting the Assad regime and responsible for repression and violence against the civilian population in Syria. Other information: a) Position: Chief of General Staff of the Syrian Arab Army and Armed Forces since 18 Jul 2012 b) Rank: General in the Syrian Arab Army Modifications: Amended on 6 Nov 2013, 19 Jan 2016, 11 Oct 2016, 7 Mar 2018

SSID: 200-11955 Name: Fahd Jasim al-Furayj

Title: Lt. General DOB: 1 Jan 1950 POB: Hama, Syrian Arab Republic Good quality a.k.a.: a) Fahid (Fahed) b) Jasem (Jassim, Jassem) c) Al-Freij

Justification: Officer of the rank of General in the Syrian Army. Deputy Commander in Chief of the Syrian Armed Forces.Former Minister of Defence. ResponsibleAs a former Government Minister, shares responsibility for the regime’s violent repression and use of violence against the civilian population in Syriapopulation. Other information: a) Positions: Minister of Defence, Deputy Commander in Chief of the Syrian Armed Forces b) Rank: Lt. General Modifications: Amended on 6 Nov 2013, 19 Jan 2016, 11 Oct 2016, 7 Mar 2018

SSID: 200-35205 Name: Al-Sharif Ammar

DOB: 26 Jun 1969 POB: Lattakia, Syrian Arab Republic Good quality a.k.a.: a) Al-Charif (Sharif, Charif, al Shareef, Sherif) b) Amar c) Medhat Nationality: Syrian Arab Republic Identification document: a) Passport No. 010312413, Syrian Arab Republic, Date of issue: 14 Jul 2015, Place of issue: Damascus-Centre, Syrian Arab Republic, Expiry date: 13 Jul 2021 (Issue Number: 002-15-L093534) b) ID card No. 060-10276707, Syrian Arab Republic Justification: Leading Syrian businessman operating in Syria, active in the banking, insurance, and hospitality sectors. Founding partner of Byblos Bank Syria, major shareholder in Unlimited Hospitality Ltd, and board member of the Solidarity Alliance Insurance Company and the Al-Aqueelah Takaful Insurance Company. Modifications: Listed on 8 Nov 2016, amended on 7 Mar 2018

SSID: 200-35654 Name: Tourjman Mohammed Ramez

DOB: 1966 POB: Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic Good quality a.k.a.: a) Tourjuman b) Mohamed (Muhammad, Mohammad)

Justification: a) Information MinisterFormer Minister of Information. As a former Government Minister, shares responsibility for the regime’s violent repression against the civilian population. b) Appointed in July 2016. Modifications: Listed on 9 Dec 2016, amended on 16 Jun 2017, 7 Mar 2018

SSID: 200-35703 Name: al-Hamu Ahmad

DOB: 1947 Good quality a.k.a.: al-Hamo

Justification: a) Former Minister of Industry. As a former Government Minister shares responsibility for Industrythe regime’s violent repression against the civilian population. b) Appointed in July 2016. Modifications: Listed on 9 Dec 2016, amended on 16 Jun 2017, 7 Mar 2018

Links:

FINMA Notice

Data files of updates – PDF, XML

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Actually, two guidances – one for stored value facility licensees and one for Authorized Institutions. Here’s the text of the Authorized Institutions one:

8 March 2018

The Chief Executive

All Authorized Institutions

Dear Sir/Madam,

FATF Guidance on Counter Proliferation Financing

I am writing to draw your attention to a guidance paper recently issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) entitled “Guidance on Counter Proliferation Financing – The Implementation of Financial Provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolutions to Counter the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”1, which is available on the FATF’s website (http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/financingofproliferation/documents/gui dance-counter-proliferation-financing.html).

The paper provides guidance to facilitate both public and private sector stakeholders in understanding and implementing proliferation financing-related Targeted Financial Sanctions made under United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). Various sections of the guidance are relevant for Authorized Institutions (AIs) to better understand and mitigate proliferation financing risks, including:

 • Taking note of circumstances where customers and transactions are more vulnerable to be involved in proliferation financing activities, including factors that are relevant to the sanctions regime on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;

• Identifying high risk customers and transactions, and applying enhanced scrutiny, using a risk-based approach; and

• Undertaking reasonable efforts to collect additional information (e.g. available typologies of proliferation finance) related to identified high-risk customers and transactions in order to identify, and avoid engaging in, prohibited activities, and to enable follow-up actions.

AIs are recommended to review the paper carefully to enhance the understanding of proliferation financing-related Targeted Financial Sanctions and the range of possible approaches that can be adopted, depending on individual AI’s own situation, risk profile and risk appetite.

The HKMA is also reviewing the guidance to the public sector as set out in the paper, including the role of financial supervisors in contributing to the effective sharing of information such as typologies and case studies. The HKMA has recently discussed with industry representatives and other stakeholders to understand some of the challenges encountered in this area and we will continue to work closely with the banking industry and all relevant public authorities in combating proliferation financing.

Yours faithfully,

Links:

FATF Guidance – Stored Value Facility Licensees, Authorized Institutions

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Circular to Licensed Corporations and Associated Entities 

Anti-Money Laundering / Counter-Terrorist Financing

Early Alert on United Nations Sanctions 

The sanctions committee of the United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) which administers the sanctions regime for ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida added two individuals and an entity to its sanctions list Note 1 on 6 March 2018.  Please refer to the relevant press release issued by the UNSC in Attachment 1.

Licensed corporations (“LCs”) and associated entities (“AEs”) should update their screening databases with the above changes made by the UNSC sanctions committee for sanctions screening of customers and payments.  LCs and AEs are reminded to refer to our circular on United Nations Sanctions issued on 7 February 2018 Note 2 which sets out our expectations on actions that LCs and AEs should take regarding sanctions imposed by the UNSC. 

Should you have any queries regarding the contents of this circular, please contact Ms Kiki Wong on 2231 1569.

Intermediaries Supervision Department
Intermediaries Division
Securities and Futures Commission

Links:

HK SFC Notice

HK SFC Circular

UN Web Notice

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On Tuesday, Australian regulators implemented two sets of United Nations sanctions updates. First, under its counter terror sanctions, the following two individuals: 

QDi.411 Name: 1: SALIM 2: MUSTAFA 3: MUHAMMAD 4: AL-MANSUR
Name (original script): سالم مصطفى محمد ال منصور
Title: na Designation: na DOB: a) 20 Feb. 1962 b) 1959 POB: a) Baghdad, Iraq b) Tel Afar, Nineveh Province, Iraq Good quality a.k.a.: a) Salim Mustafa Muhammad Mansur Al-Ifri b) Saleem Al-Ifri c) Salim Mansur Mustafa d) Salim Mansur e) Hajji Salim Al-Shaklar Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Iraq Passport no: Iraq number A6489694, issued on 2 Sep. 2013 (expires on 31 Aug. 2021; name in Arabic script: سالم مصطفى محمد ال منصور) National identification no: a) Iraq national identification card 00813602, issued on 18 Sep. 2011 (name in Arabic script: سالم مصطفى محمد ال منصور) b) Iraq Certificate of Iraqi Nationality 300397, issued on 25 Jun. 2013 (name in Arabic script: سالم مصطفى محمد) Address: a) 17 Tamoz, Mosul, Iraq (previous address) b) Tel Afar – Al-Saad, Mosul, Iraq (previous address) Listed on: 6 Mar. 2018 Other information: Finance “emir” for Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). Physical description: hair colour: black; eye colour: honey; height: 170 cm. Speaks Arabic.

QDi.412 Name: 1: UMAR 2: MAHMUD 3: IRHAYYIM 4: AL-KUBAYSI
Name (original script): عمر محمود إرحيم الفياض الكبيسي
Title: na Designation: na DOB: a) 16 Jun. 1967 b) 1 Jan. 1967 POB: Al-Qaim, Al-Anbar Province, Iraq Good quality a.k.a.: a) Umar Mahmud Rahim al-Kubaysi b) Omar Mahmood Irhayyim Al-Fayyadh c) Umar Mahmud Rahim d) Umar Mahmud Rahim Al-Qubaysi e) Umar Mahmud Al-Kubaysi Arhaym f) Umar Mahmud Arhaym g) Omar Mahmood Irhayyim h) Omar Mahmood Irhayyim Al-Fayyadh Al-Kobaisi i) Umar al-Kubaysi Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Iraq Passport no: Iraq number A4059346, issued on 29 May 2013, issued in Baghdad, Iraq (expires on 27 May 2021) National identification no: a) Iraq national identification card 00405771, issued on 20 May 2013, issued in Iraq (name in Arabic script: عمر محمود إرحيم الفياض) b) Iraq Certificate of Iraqi Nationality 540763, issued on 13 Feb. 1984 (name in Arabic script: عمر محمود إرحيم) Address: Al-Qaim, Al-Anbar Province, Iraq Listed on: 6 Mar. 2018 Other information: Financial facilitator for Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). Director of Al-Kawthar Money Exchange (QDe.157). Physical description: sex: male, hair colour: black; height: 175 cm. Speaks Arabic. 

and one entity: 

QDe.157 Name: AL-KAWTHAR MONEY EXCHANGE
Name (original script): شركة الكوثر للتوسط ببيع وشراء العملات الأجنبية
A.k.a.: a) Al Kawthar Co. b) Al Kawthar Company c) Al-Kawthar Hawala F.k.a.: na Address: Al-Qaim, Al Anbar Province, Iraq Listed on: 6 Mar.2018Other information: Money exchange business and owned by Umar Mahmud Irhayyim al-Kubaysi (QDi.412) as of mid-2016. Facilitated financial transactions on behalf of companies associated with Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). Established in 2000 under License number 202, issued on 17 May 2000, and since withdrawn. 

were added.

Secondly, under its Somalia and Eritrea sanctions programs, the following persons were added:

SOi.016 Name 1: Ahmad 2: Iman 3: Ali 4: na

Title: na Designation: na DOB: a) Approximately 1973 b) Approximately 1974 POB: Kenya 

Good quality a.k.a.: a) Sheikh Ahmed Iman Ali b) Shaykh Ahmad Iman Ali c) Ahmed Iman 

Ali d) Abu Zinira Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Kenya Passport no: na National 

identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 8 March 2018 Other information: na

SOi.017 Name: 1: Abdifatah 2: Abubakar 3: Abdi 4: na

Title: na Designation: na DOB: 15 April 1982 POB: Somalia Good quality a.k.a.: Musa 

Muhajir Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Somalia Passport no: na National 

identification no: na Address: a) Somalia b) Mombasa, Kenya Listed on: 08 March 2018

Other information: na

Links:

UN notices – Counter Terrorism, Somalia and Eritrea

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Last Friday, Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) added the following 2 persons: 

ABDI, Abdifatah, Abubakar

DOB: 15/04/1982. POB: Somalia a.k.a: MUHAJIR, Musa Nationality:

Somalia Address: (1) Mombasa, Kenya. (2) Somalia. Other Information: UN Ref SOi.017 [Listing to be treated as temporary for 30 days from the date of listing by the UN or until the EU adds the new listing to an existing sanctions regulation (whichever is sooner) in accordance with Policing and Crime Act 2017] Listed on: 09/03/2018 Last Updated: 09/03/2018 Group ID: 13619.

ALI, Ahmad, Iman

DOB: (1) –/–/1973. (2) –/–/1974. POB: Kenya a.k.a: (1) ALI, Ahmed,

Iman (2) ALI, Shaykh, Ahmad, Iman (3) ALI, Sheikh, Ahmed, Iman (4) ZINIRA, Abu Nationality: Kenya Other Information: UN Ref SOi.016. [Listing to be treated as temporary for 30 days from the date of listing by the UN or until the EU adds the new listing to an existing sanctions regulation (whichever is sooner) in accordance with Policing and Crime Act 2017] Listed on: 09/03/2018 Last Updated: 09/03/2018 Group ID: 13618.

to their Somalia sanctions after their addition by the United Nations.

Links:

HMT Notice

UN Press Release

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Last Friday, Swiss authorities added the following persons: 

SSID: 100-38067 Name: Kampete Ilunga

DOB: 24 Nov 1964 POB: Lubumbashi Good quality a.k.a.: a) Gaston Hughes Ilunga Kampete b) Hugues Raston Ilunga Kampete Nationality: Congo DR Identification document: Other No. 1-64-86-22311-29, Congo DR (Military ID number)

Justification: As Commander of the Republican Guard (GR), Ilunga Kampete was responsible for the GR units deployed on the ground and involved in the disproportionate use of force and violent repression, in Sep 2016 in Kinshasa. In this capacity, Ilunga Kampete was therefore involved in planning, directing, or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations in DRC. Modifications: Listed on 21 Feb 2018

SSID: 100-38077 Name: Kumba Gabriel Amisi

DOB: 28 May 1964 POB: Malela Good quality a.k.a.: a) Gabriel Amisi Nkumba b) ‘Tango Fort’ c) ‘Tango Four’ Nationality: Congo DR Identification document: Other No. 1-64-87- 77512-30, Congo DR (military ID number)

Justification: Commander of the 1st defence zone of Congolese Army (FARDC) whose forces took part in the disproportionate use of force and violent repression, in Sep 2016 in Kinshasa. In this capacity, Gabriel Amisi Kumba was therefore involved in planning, directing, or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations in DRC. Modifications: Listed on 21 Feb 2018

SSID: 100-38091 Name: Luyoyo Ferdinand Ilunga

DOB: 8 Mar 1973 POB: Lubumbashi Nationality: Congo DR Identification document: Passport No. OB0260335, Congo DR, Date of issue: 15 Apr 2011, Expiry date: 14 Apr 2016 Justification: As Commander of the anti-riot body Légion Nationale d’Intervention of the Congolese National Police (PNC), Ferdinand Ilunga Luyoyo was responsible for disproportionate use of force and violent repression in Sep 2016 in Kinshasa. In this capacity, Ferdinand Ilunga Luyoyo was therefore involved in planning, directing, or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations in DRC. Modifications: Listed on 21 Feb 2018

SSID: 100-38104 Name: Kanyama Celestin

DOB: 4 Oct 1960 POB: Kananga Good quality a.k.a.: a) Kanyama Tshisiku Celestin b) Kanyama Celestin Cishiku Antoine c) Kanyama Cishiku Bilolo Célestin d) Esprit de mort Nationality: Congo DR Identification document: Passport No. OB0637580, Congo DR, Date of issue: 20 May 2014, Expiry date: 19 May 2019

Justification: As Kinshasa Police Commissioner (PNC), Celestin Kanyama was responsible for the disproportionate use of force and violent repression in Sep 2016 in Kinshasa. In this capacity, Celestin Kanyama was therefore involved in planning, directing, or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations in DRC. Other information: Was granted Schengen visa No 011518403, issued on 2.7.2016. Modifications: Listed on 21 Feb 2018

SSID: 100-38116 Name: Numbi John

DOB: 16 Aug 1962 POB: Jadotville-Likasi-Kolwezi Good quality a.k.a.: a) John Numbi Banza Tambo b) John Numbi Banza Ntambo c) Tambo Numbi Nationality: Congo DR Justification: Former Inspector-General of the Congolese National Police (PNC), John Numbi remains an influential figure who was notably involved in the campaign of violent intimidation in the Mar 2016 gubernatorial elections in the DRC’s four ex-Katangan provinces and as such is responsible for obstructing a consensual and peaceful solution towards elections in DRC. Modifications: Listed on 21 Feb 2018

SSID: 100-38126 Name: Kibelisa Roger

Good quality a.k.a.: Roger Kibelisa Ngambaswi Nationality: Congo DR

Justification: As Interior Director of the National Intelligence Service (ANR), Roger Kibelisa is involved in the intimidation campaign carried out by ANR officials towards opposition members, including arbitrary arrests and detention. Roger Kibelisa has therefore undermined the rule of law and obstructed a consensual and peaceful solution towards elections in DRC. Modifications: Listed on 21 Feb 2018

SSID: 100-38132 Name: Kaimbi Delphin

DOB: a) 15 Jan 1969 b) 15 Jul 1969 POB: Kiniezire/ Goma Good quality a.k.a.: a) Delphin Kahimbi Kasagwe b) Delphin Kayimbi Demba Kasangwe c) Delphin Kahimbi Kasangwe d) Delphin Kahimbi Demba Kasangwe e) Delphin Kasagwe Kahimbi Nationality: Congo DR Identification document: Diplomatic passport No. DB0006669, Congo DR, Date of issue: 13 Nov 2013, Expiry date: 12 Nov 2018

Justification: Head of Military Intelligence Body (ex-DEMIAP), part of the National Operations Centre, the command and control structure responsible for arbitrary arrests and violent repression in Kinshasa in Sep 2016, and responsible for forces that participated in intimidation and arbitrary arrests, which obstructs a consensual and peaceful solution towards elections in DRC. Modifications: Listed on 21 Feb 2018

SSID: 100-38146 Name: Boshab Evariste

DOB: 12 Jan 1956 POB: Tete Kalamba, Congo DR Good quality a.k.a.: Evariste Moshab Mabub Ma Bileng Nationality: Congo DR Identification document: Diplomatic passport No. DP 0000003, Congo DR, Date of issue: 21 Dec 2015, Expiry date: 20 Dec 2020 Justification: In his capacity as Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Interior and Security from Dec 2014 to Dec 2016, Evariste Boshab was officially responsible for the police and security services and coordinating the work of provincial governors. In this capacity, he was responsible for arrests of activists and opposition members, as well as disproportionate use of force, including between Sep 2016 and Dec 2016 in response to demonstrations in Kinshasa, which resulted in a large number of civilians being killed or injured by security services. Evariste Boshab was therefore involved in planning, directing, or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations in DRC. Other information: a) Former Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Interior and Security b) Schengen visa expired on 5.1.2017. Modifications: Listed on 21 Feb 2018

SSID: 100-38167 Name: Mupompa Alex Kande

DOB: 23 Sep 1950 POB: Kananga, Congo DR Good quality a.k.a.: a) Alexandre Kande Mupomba b) Kande-Mupompa Address: Messidorlaan 217/25, 1180 Uccle, Belgium Nationality: Congo DR Identification document: Passport No. OP 0024910, Congo DR, Date of issue: 21 Mar 2016, Expiry date: 20 Mar 2021

Justification: a) As Governor of Kasai Central, Alex Kande Mupompa is responsible for the ongoing disproportionate use of force, violent repression and extrajudicial killings committed by security forces and the PNC in Kasai Central from 2016, including the alleged unlawful killings of Kamiuna Nsapu militia members and civilians in Mwanza Lomba, Kasai Central, in Feb 2017. b) Alex Kande Mupompa was therefore involved in planning, directing, or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations in DRC. Other information: a) DRC and Belgian nationalities. b) Governor of Kasai Central. Modifications: Listed on 21 Feb 2018

SSID: 100-38181 Name: Musonda Jean-Claude Kazembe

DOB: 17 May 1963 POB: Kashobwe, Congo DR Nationality: Congo DR

Justification: a) As Governor of Haut Katanga until Apr 2017, Jean-Claude Kazembe Musonda was responsible for the disproportionate use of force and violent repression committed by security forces and the PNC in Haut Katanga, including between 15 and 31 Dec 2016, when 12 civilians were killed and 64 were injured as a result of the use of lethal force by security forces including PNC agents in response to protests in Lubumbashi. b) Jean-Claude Kazembe Musonda was therefore involved in planning, directing, or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations in DRC. Other information: Former Governor of Haut-Katanga. Modifications: Listed on 21 Feb 2018

SSID: 100-38190 Name: Mende Lambert

DOB: 11 Feb 1953 POB: Okolo, Congo DR Good quality a.k.a.: Lambert Mende Omalanga Nationality: Congo DR Identification document: Diplomatic passport No. DB0001939, Congo DR, Date of issue: 4 May 2017, Expiry date: 3 May 2022

Justification: a) As Communications and Media Minister since 2008, Lambert Mende is responsible for the repressive media policy applied in DRC, which breaches the right to freedom of expression and information and undermines a consensual and peaceful solution towards elections in DRC. On 12 Nov 2016, he adopted a decree limiting the possibility for foreign media outlets to broadcast in the DRC. b) In breach of the political agreement settled on 31 Dec 2016 between the presidential majority and opposition parties, broadcasts have not resumed for a number of media outlets as at May 2017. c) In his capacity as Communications and Media Minister, Lambert Mende is therefore responsible for obstructing a consensual and peaceful solution towards elections in DRC, including by acts of violence, repression or inciting violence, or by undermining the rule of law. Other information: Minister of Communications and Media, and spokesperson of the Government. Modifications: Listed on 21 Feb 2018

SSID: 100-38217 Name: Ruhorimbere Eric

Title: Brigadier General DOB: 16 Jul 1969 POB: Minembwe, Congo DR Good quality a.k.a.: a) Eric Ruhorimbere Ruhanga b) Tango Two c) Tango Deux Nationality: Congo DR Identification document: Other No. 1-69-09-51400-64, Congo DR (Military ID number) Justification: a) As a Deputy Commander of the 21st military region since 18 Sep 2014, Eric Ruhorimbere was responsible for the disproportionate use of force and extrajudicial killings perpetrated by FARDC forces, notably against the Nsapu militia and women and children. b) Eric Ruhorimbere was therefore involved in planning, directing, or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations in DRC. Other information: Deputy Commander of the 21st military region (Mbuji- Mayi). Modifications: Listed on 21 Feb 2018

SSID: 100-38230 Name: Shadari Ramazani

DOB: 29 Nov 1960 POB: Kasongo, Congo DR Good quality a.k.a.: a) Emmanuel Ramazani Shadari Mulanda b) Shadary Nationality: Congo DR

Justification: a) As Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Interior and Security since 20 Dec 2016, Ramazani Shadari is officially responsible for the police and security services and coordinating the work of provincial governors. In this capacity, he is responsible for the recent arrests of activists and opposition members, as well as the disproportionate use of force since his appointment, such as the violent crackdown on members of the Bundu Dia Kongo (BDK) movement in Kongo Central, the repression in Kinshasa over Jan-Feb 2017 and the disproportionate use of force and violent repression in Kasai provinces. b) In this capacity, Ramazani Shadari is therefore involved in planning, directing, or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations in DRC. Other information: Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Interior and Security. Modifications: Listed on 21 Feb 2018

SSID: 100-38241 Name: Mutondo Kalev

DOB: 3 Mar 1957 Good quality a.k.a.: a) Kalev Katanga Mutondo b) Kalev Motono c) Kalev Mutundo d) Kalev Mutoid e) Kalev Mutombo f) Kalev Mutond g) Kalev Mutondo Katanga h) Kalev Mutund Nationality: Congo DR Identification document: Passport No. DB0004470, Congo DR, Date of issue: 8 Jun 2012, Expiry date: 7 Jun 2017

Justification: As long-term Head of the National Intelligence Service (ANR), Kalev Mutondo is involved in and responsible for the arbitrary arrest, detention and mistreatment of opposition members, civil society activists and others. He has therefore undermined the rule of law and obstructed a consensual and peaceful solution towards elections in DRC, as well as planning or directing acts that constitute serious human rights violations in DRC. Other information: Head (formally Administrator-General) of the National Intelligence Service (ANR). Modifications: Listed on 21 Feb 2018

to their sanctions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Note: even though the press release was issued on March 9th, the files on the SECO site have a date of February 21st.

Links:

FINMA Notice

Data files of updates – PDF, XML

Edited with BlogPad Pro

Today, OFAC added the following persons: 

AFANASYEV, Sergei (a.k.a. AFANASYEV, Sergey), Russia; DOB 16 May 1963; Gender Male (individual) [CAATSA – RUSSIA] (Linked To: MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE). 

 

MOLCHANOV, Grigoriy Viktorovich; DOB 01 Jan 1956 to 31 Dec 1956; citizen Russia; Gender Male (individual) [CAATSA – RUSSIA] (Linked To: MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE). 

to a new Russia-related CAATSA sanctions program that previously had no designations. 

Similarly, the following persons:

ASLANOV, Dzheykhun Nasimi Ogly (a.k.a. ASLANOV, Jay; a.k.a. ASLANOV, Jayhoon), Russia; DOB 01 Jan 1990; POB Azerbaijan; Gender Male (individual) [CYBER2] (Linked To: INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC). 

 

BOGACHEVA, Anna Vladislavovna, Russia; DOB 13 Mar 1988; Gender Female (individual) [CYBER2] (Linked To: INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC). 

 

BOVDA, Maria Anatolyevna (a.k.a. BELYAEVA, Maria Anatolyevna), Russia; DOB 21 Feb 1986; Gender Female (individual) [CYBER2] (Linked To: INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC). 

 

BOVDA, Robert Sergeyevich, Russia; DOB 27 Aug 1989; Gender Male (individual) [CYBER2] (Linked To: INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC). 

 

BURCHIK, Mikhail Leonidovich (a.k.a. ABRAMOV, Mikhail), Russia; DOB 07 Jun 1986; Gender Male (individual) [CYBER2] (Linked To: INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC). 

 

BYSTROV, Mikhail Ivanovich, Russia; DOB 21 Dec 1958; Gender Male (individual) [CYBER2] (Linked To: INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC). 

 

KAVERZINA, Irina Viktorovna, Russia; DOB 18 Jul 1986; Gender Female (individual) [CYBER2] (Linked To: INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC). 

 

KRYLOVA, Aleksandra Yuryevna, Russia; DOB 01 Jul 1986; Gender Female (individual) [CYBER2] (Linked To: INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC). 

 

PODKOPAEV, Vadim Vladimirovich, Russia; DOB 01 May 1985; Gender Male (individual) [CYBER2] (Linked To: INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC). 

 

POLOZOV, Sergey Pavlovich, Russia; DOB 13 Oct 1987; Gender Male (individual) [CYBER2] (Linked To: INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC). 

 

VASILCHENKO, Gleb Igorevich, Russia; DOB 13 Apr 1991; Gender Male (individual) [CYBER2] (Linked To: INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC). 

 

VENKOV, Vladimir, Russia; DOB 28 May 1990; Gender Male (individual) [CYBER2] (Linked To: INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC).

and entity: 

INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC (a.k.a. AZIMUT LLC; a.k.a. GLAVSET LLC; a.k.a. MEDIASINTEZ LLC; a.k.a. MIXINFO LLC; a.k.a. NOVINFO LLC), 55 Savushkina Street, St. Petersburg, Russia [CYBER2].  

were added to the Cyber-related sanctions program.

And the following existing listings were modified to add them to the Cyber program, and some were also added to the CAATSA program:

ALEXSEYEV, Vladimir Stepanovich; DOB 24 Apr 1961; Passport 100115154 (Russia); First Deputy Chief of GRU (individual) [CYBER2] (Linked To: MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE). -to- ALEXSEYEV, Vladimir Stepanovich; DOB 24 Apr 1961; Passport 100115154 (Russia); First Deputy Chief of GRU (individual) [CYBER2] [CAATSA – RUSSIA] (Linked To: MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE). 

 

CONCORD CATERING, Nab. Lieutenant Schmidt D. 7, von Keyserling Mansion, St. Petersburg 119034, Russia; Ulitsa Volkhonka Dom 9, Moscow 119019, Russia [UKRAINE-EO13661]. -to- CONCORD CATERING, Nab. Lieutenant Schmidt D. 7, von Keyserling Mansion, St. Petersburg 119034, Russia; Ulitsa Volkhonka Dom 9, Moscow 119019, Russia [UKRAINE-EO13661] [CYBER2] (Linked To: INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC). 

 

FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE (a.k.a. FEDERALNAYA SLUZHBA BEZOPASNOSTI; a.k.a. FSB), Ulitsa Kuznetskiy Most, Dom 22, Moscow 107031, Russia; Lubyanskaya Ploschad, Dom 2, Moscow 107031, Russia [CYBER2]. -to- FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE (a.k.a. FEDERALNAYA SLUZHBA BEZOPASNOSTI; a.k.a. FSB), Ulitsa Kuznetskiy Most, Dom 22, Moscow 107031, Russia; Lubyanskaya Ploschad, Dom 2, Moscow 107031, Russia [CYBER2] [CAATSA – RUSSIA]. 

 

GIZUNOV, Sergey (a.k.a. GIZUNOV, Sergey Aleksandrovich); DOB 18 Oct 1956; Passport 4501712967 (Russia); Deputy Chief of GRU (individual) [CYBER2] (Linked To: MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE). -to- GIZUNOV, Sergey Aleksandrovich (a.k.a. GIZUNOV, Sergey); DOB 18 Oct 1956; Gender Male; Passport 4501712967(Russia); Deputy Chief of GRU (individual) [CYBER2] [CAATSA – RUSSIA] (Linked To: MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE). 

 

KOROBOV, Igor (a.k.a. KOROBOV, Igor Valentinovich); DOB 03 Aug 1956; nationality Russia; Passport 100119726 (Russia); alt. Passport 100115101 (Russia); Chief of GRU (individual) [CYBER2] (Linked To: MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE). -to- KOROBOV, Igor Valentinovich (a.k.a. KOROBOV, Igor); DOB 03 Aug 1956; nationality Russia; Gender Male; Passport 100119726 (Russia); alt. Passport 100115101 (Russia); Chief of GRU (individual) [CYBER2] [CAATSA – RUSSIA] (Linked To: MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE). 

 

KOSTYUKOV, Igor (a.k.a. KOSTYUKOV, Igor Olegovich); DOB 21 Feb 1961; Passport 100130896 (Russia); alt. Passport 100132253 (Russia); First Deputy Chief of GRU (individual) [CYBER2] (Linked To: MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE). -to- KOSTYUKOV, Igor Olegovich (a.k.a. KOSTYUKOV, Igor); DOB 21 Feb 1961; Passport 100130896 (Russia); alt. Passport 100132253 (Russia); First Deputy Chief of GRU (individual) [CYBER2] [CAATSA – RUSSIA] (Linked To: MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE). 

 

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY CONCORD MANAGEMENT AND CONSULTING (a.k.a. KONKORD MENEDZHMENT I KONSALTING, OOO; a.k.a. LLC CONCORD MANAGEMENT AND CONSULTING; a.k.a. OBSHCHESTVO S OGRANNICHENNOI OTVETSTVENNOSTYU KONKORD MENEDZHMENT I KONSALTING), D. 13 Litera A, Pom. 2-N N4, Naberezhnaya Reki Fontanki, St. Petersburg 191011, Russia; Registration ID 1037843002515 [UKRAINE-EO13661]. -to- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY CONCORD MANAGEMENT AND CONSULTING (a.k.a. KONKORD MENEDZHMENT I KONSALTING, OOO; a.k.a. LLC CONCORD MANAGEMENT AND CONSULTING; a.k.a. OBSHCHESTVO S OGRANNICHENNOI OTVETSTVENNOSTYU KONKORD MENEDZHMENT I KONSALTING), D. 13 Litera A, Pom. 2-N N4, Naberezhnaya Reki Fontanki, St. Petersburg 191011, Russia; Registration ID 1037843002515 [UKRAINE-EO13661] [CYBER2] (Linked To: INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC). 

 

MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (a.k.a. GLAVNOE RAZVEDYVATEL’NOE UPRAVLENIE (Cyrillic: ГЛАВНОЕ РАЗВЕДЫВАТЕЛЬНОЕ УПРАВЛЕНИЕ); a.k.a. GRU; a.k.a. MAIN INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT), Khoroshevskoye Shosse 76, Khodinka, Moscow, Russia; Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Frunzenskaya nab., 22/2, Moscow 119160, Russia [CYBER2]. -to- MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (a.k.a. GLAVNOE RAZVEDYVATEL’NOE UPRAVLENIE (Cyrillic: ГЛАВНОЕ РАЗВЕДЫВАТЕЛЬНОЕ УПРАВЛЕНИЕ); a.k.a. GRU; a.k.a. MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF; a.k.a. MAIN INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT), Khoroshevskoye Shosse 76, Khodinka, Moscow, Russia; Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Frunzenskaya nab., 22/2, Moscow 119160, Russia [CYBER2] [CAATSA – RUSSIA]. 

 

PRIGOZHIN, Yevgeniy Viktorovich (a.k.a. PRIGOZHIN, Evgeny), Russia; DOB 1961; Gender Male (individual) [UKRAINE-EO13661]. -to- PRIGOZHIN, Yevgeniy Viktorovich (a.k.a. PRIGOZHIN, Evgeny), Russia; DOB 01 Jun 1961; Gender Male (individual) [UKRAINE-EO13661] [CYBER2] (Linked To: INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC).

Additionally, General License 1 for the Cyber-related sanctions program, which permits certain activities with the FSB, was replaced with General Licence 1A. The changes are cosmetic, adding CAATSA to the regulatory environment of the license.

And finally, updated FAQs were released for both the General License:

501. What does General License 1A (GL 1A), “Authorizing Certain Transactions with the Federal Security Service,” authorize?

GL 1A authorizes transactions with the Federal Security Service (a.k.a. Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti) (a.k.a. FSB) that are necessary and ordinarily incident to requesting, receiving, utilizing, paying for, or dealing in certain licenses and authorizations for the importation, distribution, or use of certain information technology products in the Russian Federation.  It also authorizes transactions necessary and ordinarily incident to compliance with rules and regulations administered by, and certain actions or investigations involving, the FSB.

This general license does not authorize U.S. persons to engage in transactions with the FSB except for the limited purposes described above, nor does it authorize the exportation, reexportation, or provision of any goods, technology, or services to the Crimea region of Ukraine. 

A prior version of this general license was issued on February 2, 2017 (GL 1).  On March 15, 2018, GL 1 was amended and reissued as GL 1A to ensure the scope of activities already authorized with respect to the FSB is not affected by the designation of the FSB under Section 224 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).  The changes to GL 1 are limited to adding CAATSA authorities.  GL 1A replaces and supersedes GL 1 effective March 15, 2018.  [03-15-2018]

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502. What sanctions remain in place on the FSB following the issuance of GL 1A?

GL 1A only authorizes certain transactions with the FSB acting in its administrative and law enforcement capacities.  The GL was issued in order to ensure that U.S. persons engaging in certain business activities in Russia that are not otherwise prohibited are not unduly impacted.  All other transactions involving any property subject to U.S. jurisdiction or within the possession or control of U.S. persons in which the FSB has an interest, including all other transactions directly or indirectly with the FSB, remain prohibited unless exempt or otherwise authorized by OFAC. [03-15-2018]

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503. Does GL 1A authorize the exportation of hardware or software directly to the FSB, or where the FSB is the end user of such hardware and software?

No. GL 1A does not authorize the export of any goods, technology, or services directly or indirectly to the FSB or any other blocked person or entity, except for the limited purposes of complying with certain rules, regulations, and investigations involving the FSB or requesting certain licenses or authorizations for the importation, distribution, or use of information technology products in the Russian Federation. [03-15-2018]

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 and for the CAATSA program:

546. In section 10(a)(2)(A) of SSIDES, are persons “subject to sanctions imposed by the United States with respect to the Russian Federation” limited to persons listed on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List, or does it include persons identified on the Sectoral Sanctions Identifications (SSI) List as well?

 

For purposes of implementing section 10(a)(2)(A) of SSIDES, OFAC will interpret the phrase “subject to sanctions imposed by the United States with respect to the Russian Federation” to be persons subject to sanctions under SSIDES, as amended, UFSA, as amended, provisions of CAATSA with respect to the Russian Federation, and any covered Executive order as defined in Section 10(f)(1) of SSIDES.  Persons “subject to sanctions imposed by the United States with respect to the Russian Federation” include persons listed on either the SDN or SSI List, as well as persons subject to sanctions pursuant to OFAC’s 50 percent rule.  [03-15-2018]

And, if you are unfamiliar, as Mr. Watchlist was, SSIDES stands for Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014…

Links:

OFAC Notice

Cyber-Related General License 1A

FAQs – General License 1A-related, CAATSA-related

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PRESS

Note: the email notice contains a link to “Read more” which is a broken link.

UPDATE: The EU has since sent out a second email saying that this was published in error… so ignore all the stuff you just read…

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The European Union said that the Syrian sanctions press release was sent in error – no wonder the link at the bottom broke…

Never mind…

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Financial Sanctions update Spring 2018

There is a legal obligation to comply with EU Council Regulations relating to financial sanctions as soon as they are adopted.  Once a person or entity has been sanctioned under EU Financial Sanctions, there is a legal obligation not to transfer funds or make funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to that person or entity.

 

The Central Bank is responsible for the administration, supervision, and enforcement of relevant aspects of financial sanctions in Ireland. In carrying out this role the Central Bank publishes ‘updates’ on its website to assist with compliance with the relevant regulations. Firms should ensure to check the EU and UN websites and lists on a regular basis.

 

·         EU Sanctions Map

In 2017, we saw the introduction of the EU Sanctions Map website by the Estonian Presidency, which in due course will be administered by the Commission. The website provides detailed information and summaries of each of the regimes.

 

·         Consolidated list of sanctions

The consolidated list of persons, groups and entities subject to EU financial sanctions can be downloaded from Financial Sanctions Database – FSF platform  accessible via the following address: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/europeaid/fsd/fsf

In order to access the FSF platform you need to have an “EU Login” account.
Please follow the instructions provided on the EU Login page displayed when you click on the above link.

The former links to the sanction files are replaced by the FSF platform. However, to allow a smooth transition, they will still be available up to the 31^st of March 2018. Please note this is not a Central Bank website and no questions regarding access should be directed to the Central Bank.

 

·         FATF High-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions 

The FATF identifies jurisdictions with weak measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CFT) in two FATF public documents that are issued three times a year. The FATF’s process to publicly list countries with weak AML/CFT regimes has proved effective. As of November 2017, the FATF has reviewed over 80 countries and publicly identified 64 of them. Of these 64, 52 have since made the necessary reforms to address their AML/CFT weaknesses and have been removed from the process (see also, an overview of the jurisdictions currently identified in this process).

 

 

·         EU sanctions measures for 2017. 

Please find below the completed table of EU sanctions measures for 2017. As summarised below, there are 108 different entries (up from 85 in 2016 and 102 in 2015), encompassing 32 separate regimes. 

 

These entailed 175 legal acts as follows: 23 Council Regulations, 73 Commission Implementing Regulations, 50 Council Decisions and 29 Council Implementing Decisions.  

 

·         Two new regimes were introduced Mali (CR 2017/1770) and Venezuela (CR 2017/2063), and no regime was repealed. 

 

·         The most significant new measures introduced were in respect of DPRK, for which there are 17 separate entries including a new parent Regulation, CR 2017/1509. 

 

·         The Al-Qaida / ISIL regime has the most entries, with 22 Commission Implementing Regulations, followed by DPRK (17), Libya (11), Ukraine (Territorial Integrity) (6), Syria (5) and Terrorism – CP931 (5).

 

·         The complete list is available on the ‘Financial Sanctions Updates 2018’ page on the Central bank website.

 

   

 

·         Financial Sanctions Updates 2018

The Central Bank Financial Sanctions Updates 2018 page is now live.

This site is subject to change from time to time. While the Central Bank of Ireland attempts to assure the correctness and timeliness of all material posted on the site, it takes no responsibility for errors or omissions which may be the result of technical causes, or otherwise. Further, the Central Bank of Ireland specifically disclaims all responsibility for damage or loss arising as a result of use of information provided herein.   

 

The Central Bank of Ireland maintains the right to delete or modify in part or in full any information on this site without prior notice.

 

·         European Union Consolidated Financial Sanctions List

The Consolidated list is updated on a regular basis.  Ensure you have a login as outlined above in order to receive automatic emails about updates.

                                                

·         Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List

The Consolidated Sanctions List includes all individuals and entities subject to sanctions measures imposed by the Security Council. The inclusion of all names on one Consolidated Sanctions List is to facilitate the implementation of the measures, and implies neither that all names are listed under one regime, nor that the criteria for listing specific names are the same.

 

·         To subscribe to Financial Sanctions alerts please register on the Central Bank website. 

 

 

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Taxation: 3 jurisdictions removed, 3 added to EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions

The EU’s list of non-cooperative jurisdictions in taxation matters has been adjusted in the light of:

• commitments made by listed jurisdictions;
• an assessment of jurisdictions for which no listing decision had yet been taken.

Moves have also been made to improve transparency in the listing process.

On 13 March 2018, the Council removed Bahrain, the Marshall Islands and Saint Luciafrom the list and added the Bahamas, Saint Kitts and Nevis and the US Virgin Islands.

The EU’s list is intended to promote good governance in taxation worldwide, maximising efforts to prevent tax avoidance, tax fraud and tax evasion. It was prepared during 2017 in parallel with work within the OECD.

“I am glad to see more jurisdictions that we listed in December committing themselves to reforming their tax policies in a manner that will remedy our concerns”, said Vladislav Goranov, minister for finance of Bulgaria, which currently holds the Council presidency. “We call on all jurisdictions on the list to do likewise, and on all those that have already made commitments to implement them in a timely manner. Our aim is to achieve optimal tax transparency worldwide”, he said.

Three jurisdictions removed

The EU list is contained in annex I of conclusions issued by the Council on 5 December 2017. Annex II cites a number of other jurisdictions that have undertaken commitments to reform their tax policies and which are subject to close monitoring.

Since the list was first published on 5 December 2017, Bahrain, the Marshall Islands and Saint Lucia have made commitments at a high political level to remedy EU concerns. In the light of an expert assessment of those commitments, the Council decided to move the three jurisdictions from annex I to annex II.

Implementation of their commitments will be carefully monitored.

Three jurisdictions added

When it first published the list, the Council agreed to put on hold a screening of the tax systems of Caribbean jurisdictions that were struck by hurricanes in September 2017. The process was restarted in January 2018, when letters were sent requesting commitments to remedy EU concerns. The Bahamas, Saint Kitts and Nevis and the US Virgin Islands are added to the list (annex I) as a result of that process. This is because they have failed to make commitments at a high political level in response to all of the EU’s concerns.

At the same time, the Council decided to add Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, the British Virgin Islands and Dominica to annex II. This was justified by commitments made to address deficiencies identified by the EU. Those commitments were assessed by EU experts, and their implementation will be carefully monitored.

The process continues with regard to an eighth Caribbean jurisdiction, the Turks and Caicos Islands, from which a commitment at a high political level is being sought by 31 March 2018 to address EU concerns.

Transparency

Since the list was first published in December 2017, moves have been made to boost transparency.

Public information on the commitments made by third country jurisdictions was initially limited to the contents of annexes I and II. However, in February 2018 the working group responsible for the listing process (the ‘code of conduct group’) asked for all of its letters seeking commitments to be published on the Council’s website. On 6 March, a compilation of those letters was issued as a public document.

Moreover, commitments letters received from third country jurisdictions are being made public as soon as consent for publication is secured. And a specific Council webpage on the EU list is being prepared.

Nine jurisdictions remain

The decisions of 13 March 2018 were taken at a meeting of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council, without discussion.

As a result, 9 jurisdictions remain on the EU list: American Samoa, Bahamas, Guam, Namibia, Palau, Samoa, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago and the US Virgin Islands.

These include 6 of the original 17, plus three of the Caribbean jurisdictions. (Eight of the original 17 were delisted on 23 January 2018.)

Whereas the list is to be revised at least once a year, the ‘code of conduct group’ can recommend an update at any time.

Jurisdictions that remain on the list are strongly encouraged to make the changes requested of them. Their tax legislation, policies and administrative practices result or may result in a loss of revenues for the EU’s member states. Pending commitments to make such changes, the EU and the member states could apply defensive measures. Annex I includes recommendations on steps to take to be delisted.

Link:

EU Notice

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Press Releases

Link:

HKMA Notice

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Last Friday, Swiss authorities amended the following 3 individual Sudan sanctions listings:

SSID: 190-3078 Name: Alnsiem Musa Hilal Abdalla

DOB: a) 1 Jan 1964 b) 1959 POB: Kutum Low quality a.k.a.: a) Sheikh Musa Hilal b) Abd Allah c) Abdallah d) AlNasim e) Al Nasim f) AlNaseem g) Al Naseem h) AlNasseem i) Al Nasseem Address: a) Kabkabiya, Sudan b) Kutum, Sudan (resides in Kabkabiya and the city of Kutum, Northern Darfur and has resided in Khartoum) Nationality: Sudan Identification document: a) Diplomatic passport No. D014433, Sudan, Date of issue: 21 Feb 2013, Expiry date: 21 Feb 2015 b) Diplomatic passport No. D009889, Sudan, Date of issue: 17 Feb 2011, Expiry date: 17 Feb 2013 c) Other No. A0680623, Sudan (Certificate of nationality)

Justification: a) Formerly member of the National Assembly of Sudan from Al-Waha district b) Formerly special adviser to the Ministry of Federal Affairs c) Paramount Chief of the Mahamid Tribe in North Darfur d) Report from Human Rights Watch states they have a memo dated 13 Feb 2004 from a local government office in North Darfur ordering “security units in the locality” to “allow the activities of the mujahideen and the volunteers under the command of the Sheikh Musa Hilal to proceed in the areas of [North Darfur] and to secure their vital needs”. On 28 Sep 2005, 400 Arab militia attacked the villages of Aro Sharrow (including its IDP camp), Acho, and Gozmena in West Darfur. We also believe that Musa Hilal was present during the attack on Aro Sharrow IDP camp: his son had been killed during the SLA attack on Shareia, so he was now involved in a personal blood feud. There are reasonable grounds to believe that as the Paramount Chief he had direct responsibility for these actions and is responsible for violations of international humanitarian and human rights law and other atrocities Other information: Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL- UN Security Council Special NoticeNotice. Modifications: Amended on 19 Apr 2013, 6 Jun 2014, 17 Oct 2017, 17 Oct 2017, 14 Mar 2018

SSID: 190-3082 Name: Sharif Adam YacubShareif Adam

DOB: 1976 (approximately)1 Jan 1970 POB: El-Fasher Good quality a.k.a.: a) Adam Yacub Shant b) Adam Yacoub Nationality: Sudan Identification document: a) Passport No. P00182993, Sudan, Date of issue: 19 Jul 2010, Expiry date: 18 Jul 2015 b) ID card No. 103-0037-6235, Sudan (as mentioned in the passport) 

Justification: a) Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) Commander. b) SLA soldiers under the command of Adam Yacub Shant violated the cease-fire agreement by attacking a Government of Sudan military contingent that was escorting a convoy of trucks near Abu Hamra, Northern Darfur on Jul 23, 2005, killing three soldiers. After the attack Government military weapons and ammunition were looted. The Panel of Experts has information establishing that the attack by SLA soldiers took place and was clearly organized; consequently it was well planned. It is therefore reasonable to assume, as the Panel concluded, that Shant, as the confirmed SLA Commander in the area, must have had knowledge of and approved or ordered the attack. He therefore bears direct responsibility for the attack and meets the criteria for being listed. Other information: a) Reportedly deceased on 7 Jun 2012. b) Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. Modifications: Amended on 19 Apr 2013, 14 Mar 2018

SSID: 190-3092 Name: Mayu Jibril Abdulkarim Ibrahim

DOB: 1 Jan 1967 POB: Nile District, El-Fasher, El-Fasher, North-Darfur Good quality a.k.a.: a) General Gibril Abdul Kareem Barey b) Tek c) Gabril Abdul Kareem Badri Address: Tine, Sudan (resides in Tine, on the Sudanese side of the border with Chad) Nationality: Sudan Identification document: a) Other No. 192-3238459-9, Sudan (National ID number) b) Other No. 302581, Sudan (Certificate of nationality) Justification: a) National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) Field Commander b) Mayu is responsible for the kidnapping of African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) personnel in Darfur during Oct 2005. Mayu openly attempts to thwart the AMIS mission through intimidation; for example he threatened to shoot down African Union (AU) helicopters in the Jebel Moon area in Nov 2005. Through such actions Mayu has clearly violated SCR 1591 in constituting a threat to stability in Darfur and meets the criteria to be designated by the Committee to be subjected to sanctions Other information: Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special NoticeNotice. Modifications: Amended on 19 Apr 2013, 10 Oct 2013, 6 Jun 2014, 17 Oct 2017, 14 Mar 2018

Links:

FINMA Notice

Data files of updates – PDF, XML

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It got re-issued on Monday…

Use of chemical weapons in Syria: EU adds 4 persons to sanctions list

On 19 March 2018, the Council added 4 persons to the list of those targeted by EU restrictive measures against the Syrian regime. The EU added these 4 persons for their role in the development and use of chemical weapons against the civilian population, in line with the EU’s policy to fight the proliferation and use of chemical weapons.

These persons include a high-ranking military official and 3 scientists working at the Scientific Studies and Research Centre, the government entity responsible for developing and producing non-conventional weapons, including chemical weapons, and the missiles to deliver them. This entity is under EU restrictive measures since 1 December 2011.

The EU already imposed restrictive measures on Syrian persons specifically for their role in the development and use of chemical weapons on 17 July 2017.

Today’s decision brings to 261 persons the total number of persons targeted by a travel ban and an assets freeze for being responsible for the violent repression against the civilian population in Syria, benefiting from or supporting the regime, and/or being associated with such persons.

In addition, 67 entities are targeted by an assets freeze. More broadly, sanctions currently in place against Syria include an oil embargo, restrictions on certain investments, a freeze of the assets of the Syrian central bank held in the EU, export restrictions on equipment and technology that might be used for internal repression as well as on equipment and technology for the monitoring or interception of internet or telephone communications. These measures were last extended on 29 May 2017 and are in place until 1 June 2018.

The EU remains committed to finding a lasting political solution to the conflict in Syria under the existing UN-agreed framework. As stated in the EU strategy on Syria adopted in April 2017, the EU believes that there can be no military solution to the conflict and strongly supports the work of the UN Special Envoy and the intra-Syrian talks in Geneva.

The legal acts adopted by the Council, including the names of the persons concerned, are published in the Official Journal of 19 March 2018.

Link:

EU Notice

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Link:

Treasury Press Release

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On Monday, OFAC added the following individuals to the SDN List:

CONTRERAS, Willian Antonio (a.k.a. CONTRERAS, William), Capital District, Venezuela; DOB 17 Aug 1968; citizen Venezuela; Gender Male; Cedula No. 9953939 (Venezuela); Passport 041067710 (Venezuela) expires 12 Jan 2016; Vice Minister of Internal Commerce, within the Ministry of Popular Power of Economy and Finance; National Superintendent for the Defense of Socioeconomic Rights (SUNDDE) (individual) [VENEZUELA]. 

 

LEPAJE SALAZAR, Nelson Reinaldo, Aragua, Venezuela; DOB 24 Apr 1969; citizen Venezuela; Gender Male; Cedula No. 10049353 (Venezuela); Passport 064906043 (Venezuela) expires 12 Jan 2016; alt. Passport 009551291(Venezuela) expires 04 Mar 2013; Acting in the Capacity of the Head of the Office of the National Treasury (individual) [VENEZUELA]. 

 

MATA GARCIA, Americo Alex (Latin: MATA GARCÍA, Américo Alex) (a.k.a. MATA, Americo (Latin: MATA, Américo)), Miranda, Venezuela; DOB 02 Jan 1976; citizen Venezuela; Gender Male; Cedula No. 12711021 (Venezuela); Passport C1506013 (Venezuela); Alternate Director on the Board of Directors of the National Bank of Housing and Habitat; Former Vice Minister of Agricultural Economics; Former President of the Agricultural Bank of Venezuela (individual) [VENEZUELA]. 

 

ROTONDARO COVA, Carlos Alberto (a.k.a. ROTONDARO COVA, Carlos; a.k.a. ROTONDARO, Carlos), Capital District, Venezuela; DOB 11 Sep 1965; citizen Venezuela; Gender Male; Cedula No. 6157070 (Venezuela); Passport 083445280(Venezuela) expires 29 Jan 2019; alt. Passport 022740782 (Venezuela) expires 24 May 2014; Former President of the Board of Directors of the Venezuelan Institute of Social Security (IVSS) (individual) [VENEZUELA].

In addition, the President issued a new Venezuela-related Executive Order, the nub of which is this:

All transactions related to, provision of financing for, and other dealings in, by a United States person or within the United States, any digital currency, digital coin, or digital token, that was issued by, for, or on behalf of the Government of Venezuela on or after January 9, 2018, are prohibited as of the effective date of this order.

And OFAC issued two new FAQs – one for the new Executive Order:

and one related to digital currencies:

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560. Are my OFAC compliance obligations the same, regardless of whether a transaction is denominated in digital currency or traditional fiat currency?

Yes, the obligations are the same. U.S. persons (and persons otherwise subject to OFAC jurisdiction) must ensure that they block the property and interests in property of persons named on OFAC’s SDN List or any entity owned in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons, and that they do not engage in trade or other transactions with such persons. 

As a general matter, U.S. persons and persons otherwise subject to OFAC jurisdiction, including firms that facilitate or engage in online commerce or process transactions using digital currency, are responsible for ensuring that they do not engage in unauthorized transactions prohibited by OFAC sanctions, such as dealings with blocked persons or property, or engaging in prohibited trade or investment-related transactions. Prohibited transactions include transactions that evade or avoid, have the purpose of evading or avoiding, cause a violation of, or attempt to violate prohibitions imposed by OFAC under various sanctions authorities. Additionally, persons that provide financial, material, or technological support for or to a designated person may be designated by OFAC under the relevant sanctions authority.

Persons including technology companies; administrators, exchangers, and users of digital currencies; and other payment processors should develop a tailored, risk-based compliance program, which generally should include sanctions list screening and other appropriate measures. An adequate compliance solution will depend on a variety of factors, including the type of business involved. There is no single compliance program or solution suitable for every circumstance. [03-19-18]

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561. How will OFAC use its existing authorities to sanction those who use digital currencies for illicit purposes?

The United States’ whole-of-government strategies to combat global threats such as terrorism, transnational organized crime, malicious cyber activity, narcotics trafficking, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, and human rights abuses include targeting an array of activities, including the use of digital currencies or other emerging payment systems to conduct proscribed financial transactions and evade U.S. sanctions. The strategies draw from a broad range of tools and authorities to respond to the growing and evolving threat posed by malicious actors using new payment mechanisms. OFAC will use sanctions in the fight against criminal and other malicious actors abusing digital currencies and emerging payment systems as a complement to existing tools, including diplomatic outreach and law enforcement authorities. To strengthen our efforts to combat the illicit use of digital currency transactions under our existing authorities, OFAC may include as identifiers on the SDN List specific digital currency addresses associated with blocked persons. [03-19-18]

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562. How will OFAC identify digital currency-related information on the SDN List?

OFAC may add digital currency addresses to the SDN List to alert the public of specific digital currency identifiers associated with a blocked person. OFAC’s digital currency address listings are not likely to be exhaustive. Parties who identify digital currency identifiers or wallets that they believe are owned by, or otherwise associated with, an SDN and hold such property should take the necessary steps to block the relevant digital currency and file a report with OFAC that includes information about the wallet’s or address’s ownership, and any other relevant details. [03-19-18]

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And, for good measure, Treasury issued the following press release:

Links:

OFAC Notice

Executive Order

FAQs – Executive Order, Digital Currency

Treasury Press Release

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On Monday, Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) implemented Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2018/413 by changing the following 2 Somalia sanctions listings:

1. ABDI Abdifatah Abubakar

DOB: 15/04/1982. POB: Somalia a.k.a: MUHAJIR, Musa Nationality:

Somalia Address: (1) Mombasa, Kenya. (2) Somalia. Other Information: UN Ref SOi.017 [Listing to be treated as temporary for 30 days from the date of listing by the UN or until the EU adds the new listing to an existing sanctions regulation (whichever is sooner) in accordance with Policing and Crime Act 2017] [UN Listing (formerly temporary listing, in accordance with Policing and Crime Act 2017]. Listed on: 09/03/2018 Last Updated: 09/03/2018 19/03/2018 Group ID: 13619.

2. ALI Ahmad Iman

DOB: (1) –/–/1973. (2) –/–/1974. POB: Kenya a.k.a: (1) ALI, Ahmed,

Iman (2) ALI, Shaykh, Ahmad, Iman (3) ALI, Sheikh, Ahmed, Iman (4) ZINIRA, Abu Nationality: Kenya Other Information: UN Ref SOi.016. [Listing to be treated as temporary for 30 days from the date of listing by the UN or until the EU adds the new listing to an existing sanctions regulation (whichever is sooner) in accordance with Policing and Crime Act 2017] [UN Listing (formerly temporary listing, in accordance with Policing and Crime Act 2017]. Listed on: 09/03/2018 Last Updated: 09/03/2018 19/03/2018 Group ID: 13618.

Links:

HMT Notice

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2018/413

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