Publication of Amended Rough Diamonds Control Regulations

6/18/2018

 

OFAC is issuing an amendment to the Rough Diamonds Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 592, to: clarify several reporting requirements and remove another; clarify which entity may issue Kimberley Process Certificates for the export of rough diamonds from the United States; clarify the steps necessary to validate a Kimberley Process Certificate; add two definitions that define rough diamond packaging requirements and Kimberley Process voided certificates; and make certain technical and conforming changes to the penalties section of the regulations. This amendment will take effect upon publication in the Federal Register on Tuesday, June 19, 2018.

Links:

OFAC Notice

Rough Diamonds Control Regulations

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Link:

EU Notice

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On Tuesday, Swiss authorities added the following 2 persons: 

SSID: 10-39232 Name: Myrna Ajijul Mabanza

DOB: 11 Jul 1991 Good quality a.k.a.: a) Myrna Adijul Mabanza b) Myrna Ajilul Mabanza Address: a) Basilan Province, Philippines b) Zamboanga City, Philippines (previous address) c) Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (previous address) d) Daina, Saudi Arabia (previous address) Nationality: Philippines Identification document: a) ID card No. 73320881AG1191MAM20000, Philippines (Voter ID) b) ID card No. 200801087, Philippines (Student ID) c) ID card No. 140000900032, Philippines

Relation: Facilitator for Al-Qaida in Iraq (QE.J.115.04., SSID 10-17311) Other information: Facilitator for the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (SSID 10-17311). Gender: female. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice available. Modifications: Listed on 18 Jun 2018

SSID: 10-39262 Name: Abdulpatta Escalon Abubakar

DOB: a) 3 Mar 1965 b) 1 Jan 1965 c) 11 Jan 1965 POB: Tuburan, Basilan Province, Philippines Good quality a.k.a.: a) Abdulpatta Abubakar Escalon b) Abdul Patta Escalon Abubakar c) Abdul Patta Abu Bakar Address: a) Philippines b) Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (previous address) c) Daina, Saudi Arabia (previous address) Nationality: Philippines Identification document: a) Passport No. EC6530802, Philippines, Expiry date: 19 Jan 2021 (Philippines number) b) Passport No. EB2778599, Philippines (Philippines number) c) ID card No. 2135314355, Saudi Arabia d) ID card No. 202112421, Saudi Arabia

Relation: Facilitator for Al-Qaida in Iraq (QE.J.115.04., SSID 10-17311) Other information: Facilitator for the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (SSID 10-17311). Gender: male. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice available. Modifications: Listed on 18 Jun 2018

to their Al-Qaida/bin Laden/Taliban counter terrorism sanctions program.

Links:

FINMA Notice

Data files of updates – PDF, XML

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On Tuesday, Her Majesty’s Treasury implemented Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2018/875 by de-listing the following entity: 

CENTRAL BANK OF IRAQ

Address: Rashid Street, Baghdad, Iraq. Other Information: Branches in Mosul and Basra. Until the conflict, the Governor was Dr. Issam El Moulla Hweish. Funds or financial assets or economic resources received on or after 23 May 2003 are not to be regarded as frozen nor required to be transferred to the successor arrangements to the DFI. Listed on: 02/07/2003 Last Updated: 21/02/2013 19/06/2018 Group ID: 7813.

designated under the Iraq sanctions program.

Links:

HMT Notice

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2018/875

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On Tuesday, under the authority of the United Nations and European Union Financial Sanctions (Linking) Regulation, Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) added the following two individuals: 

1. ABUBAKAR Abdulpatta Escalon

DOB: (1) 03/03/1965. (2) 01/01/1965. (3) 11/01/1965. POB: Tuburan, Basilan Province, Philippines a.k.a: (1) ABUBAKAR, Abdul, Patta, Escalon (2) BAKAR, Abdul, Patta, Abu (3) ESCALON, Abdulpatta, Abubakar Nationality:

Philippines Passport Details: Passport No a) Philippines number EC6530802 (expires 19 Jan 2021) b) Philippines number EB2778599 National Identification no: a) Saudi Arabia 2135314355 b) Saudi Arabia

202112421 Address: (1) Philippines. (2) Daina, Saudi Arabia. (3) Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Other Information: UN Ref QDi.414. [Listing to be treated as temporary for 30 days from the date of listing by the UN or until the EU adds the new listing to an existing sanction’s regulation (whichever is sooner) in accordance with Policing and Crime Act 2017] Listed on: 19/06/2018 Last Updated: 19/06/2018 Group ID: 13678.

2. MABANZA Myrna Ajijul

DOB: 11/07/1991. a.k.a: (1) MABANZA, Myrna, Adijul (2) MABANZA, Myrna, Ajilul Nationality: Philippines National Identification no: a) Voter ID 73320881AG1191MAM20000 b) Student ID 200801087 c) Other ID 140000900032 Address: (1) Basilan Province, Philippines. (2) Daina, Saudi Arabia. (3) Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. (4) Zamboanga City, Philippines. Other Information: UN Ref QDi.413 [Listing to be treated as temporary for 30 days from the date of listing by the UN or until the EU adds the new listing to an existing sanction’s regulation (whichever is sooner) in accordance with Policing and Crime Act 2017]. Listed on: 19/06/2018 Last Updated: 19/06/2018 Group ID: 13677.

under the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida counter terrorism sanctions program.

Links:

HMT Notice

UN Press Release

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On Wednesday, Swiss regulators updated the following 4 individual listings: 

SSID: 80-11050 Foreign identifier: 14. Name: Darvish-Vand Javad

Justification: IRGC Brigadier-General; Former MODAFL Deputy for Inspection. ResponsibleInspection, responsible for all MODAFL facilities and installationsinstallations, who remains associated with, including through the provision of services to, MODAFL and the IRGC. Relation: Brigadier General of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) (104., SSID 80-9645) Modifications: Amended on 20 Jun 2018

SSID: 80-11198 Foreign identifier: 48. Name: Naqdi Mohammad Reza

DOB: 1953 (approximately)1953 POB: Nadjaf, Iraq

Justification: Brigadier General;IRGC Brigadier-General; Deputy Commander of IRGC for Cultural and Social Affairs. Former Commander of Basij Resistance Force. Modifications: Amended on 20 Jun 2018

SSID: 80-11219 Foreign identifier: 52. Name: Qasemi Rostam

DOB: 1961 Good quality a.k.a.: Ghasemi Rostam

Justification: Former Commander of Khatam al-Anbiya. Relation: Former Commander of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) (IRe.036, SSID 80-8462) Modifications: Amended on 20 Jun 2018

SSID: 80-11319 Foreign identifier: 75. Name: Zadeh Amir Ali Haji

Good quality a.k.a.: Hajizadeh Amir Ali

Justification: IRGC AirBrigadier-General ; IRGC Aerospace Force Commander, Brigadier GeneralCommander. Relation: Commander of IRGC Air Force (107., SSID 80-9668) Modifications: Amended on 20 Jun 2018

and 3 entity listings: 

SSID: 80-8878 Foreign identifier: 6. Name: Ashtian Tablo

Address: Ashtian Tablo, – No 67, Ghods Mirheydarimirheydari St, Yoosefabad, Tehran Justification: A manufacturerInvolved in the production and supply of specialist electrical equipment (switchgear) involvedand materials that have a direct application in the construction of the Fordow (Qom) facility, built without being declared to the IAEAIranian nuclear sector. Modifications: Amended on 20 Jun 2018

SSID: 80-9334 Foreign identifier: 60. Name: Noavaran Pooyamoj

Good quality a.k.a.: a) Noavaran Tejarat Paya b) Bastan Tejerat Mabna c) Behdis Tejarat d) Bazarganis Behdis Tejarat Alborz Company e) Behdis Tejarat General Trading Company f) Fanavaran Mojpooya g) Faramoj Company h) Tosee Danesh Fanavari Faramoj i) Green Emirate Paya j) Mehbang Sana k) Mohandesi Hedayat Control Paya l) Pooya Wave Company m) Towsee Fanavari Boshra Address: No 15, Eighth Street, Pakistan Avenue, Shahid Beheshti Avenue, Tehran

Justification: Involved in procurement of materials that are controlled and have direct application in the manufacture of centrifuges for Iran’s uranium enrichment programme. Modifications: Amended on 20 Jun 2018

SSID: 80-9605 Foreign identifier: 103.g Name: Shetab Gaman

Good quality a.k.a.: Taamin Gostaran Pishgaman Azar Address: Norouzi Alley, No 2, Larestan Street, Motahari Avenue, Tehran

Justification: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. Relation: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part (including all branches) and subsidiaries (103., SSID 80-9576) Modifications: Amended on 20 Jun 2018

made under the Iran sanctions program.

Links:

FINMA Notice

Data files of updates – PDF, XML

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Press Releases

Link:

HKMA Alert

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Circular to Licensed Corporations and Associated Entities 

Anti-Money Laundering / Counter-Terrorist Financing

Early Alert on United Nations Sanctions 

The sanctions committee of the United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) which administers the sanctions regime for ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida added two individuals to its sanctions list Note 1 on 18 June 2018.  Please refer to the relevant press release issued by the UNSC in Attachment 1.

Licensed corporations (“LCs”) and associated entities (“AEs”) should update their screening databases with the above changes made by the UNSC sanctions committee for sanctions screening of customers and payments.  LCs and AEs are reminded to refer to our circular on United Nations Sanctions issued on 7 February 2018 Note 2 which sets out our expectations on actions that LCs and AEs should take regarding sanctions imposed by the UNSC. 

Should you have any queries regarding the contents of this circular, please contact Ms Kiki Wong on 2231 1569.

Intermediaries Supervision Department
Intermediaries Division
Securities and Futures Commission

Enclosure

End

SFO/IS/035/2018

Links:

HK SFC Circular

UN Web Notices

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On Wednesday, Australian  & Canadian officials added the following 2 persons: 

QDi.413 Name: 1: MYRNA 2: AJIJUL 3: MABANZA 4: na
Title: na Designation: na DOB: 11 Jul. 1991 POB: na Good quality a.k.a.: a) Myrna Adijul Mabanza b) Myrna Ajilul Mabanza Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: PhilippinesPassport no: na National identification no: a) Voter ID 73320881AG1191MAM20000b) Student ID 200801087 c) Other ID 140000900032 Address: a) Basilan Province, Philippines b) Zamboanga City, Philippines (previous address) c) Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (previous address) d) Daina, Saudi Arabia (previous address) Listed on: 18 Jun. 2018Other information: Facilitator for the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). Gender: female. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/XXXXX.

QDi.414 Name: 1: ABDULPATTA 2: ESCALON 3: ABUBAKAR 4: na
Title: na Designation: na DOB: a) 3 Mar. 1965 b) 1 Jan. 1965 c) 11 Jan. 1965 POB: Tuburan, Basilan Province, Philippines Good quality a.k.a.: a) Abdulpatta Abubakar Escalon b) Abdul Patta Escalon Abubakar c) Abdul Patta Abu Bakar Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Philippines Passport no: a) Philippines number EC6530802 (expires 19 Jan. 2021) b) Philippines number EB2778599 National identification no: a) Saudi Arabia 2135314355 b) Saudi Arabia 202112421 Address: a) Philippines b) Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (previous address) c) Daina, Saudi Arabia (previous address) Listed on: 18 Jun. 2018 Other information: Facilitator for the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). Gender: male. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/XXXXX.

to their counter terrorism sanctions program after their addition by the United Nations ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee.

Link:

UN Notice – PDF (DFAT), HTML (OSFI)

OSFI Notice

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This is getting tedious….

Earlier today, Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) implemented Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2018/888 by amending the following two ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida counter terrorism sanctions listings: 

1. MABANZA Myrna Ajijul

DOB: 11/07/1991. a.k.a: (1) MABANZA, Myrna, Adijul (2) MABANZA, Myrna, Ajilul Nationality: Philippines Filipino National Identification no: a) Voter ID 73320881AG1191MAM20000 b) Student ID 200801087 c) Other ID 140000900032 Address: (1) Basilan Province, Philippines. (2) Daina, Saudi Arabia. (3) Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. (4) Zamboanga City, Philippines. Other Information: UN Ref QDi.413. [UN Listing (formerly temporary listing, in accordance with the Policing and Crime Act 2017]. [Listing to be treated as temporary for 30 days from the date of listing by the UN or until the EU adds the new listing to an existing sanction’s regulation (whichever is sooner) in accordance with Policing and Crime Act 2017]. Listed on: 19/06/2018 Last Updated: 19/06/2018 22/06/2018 Group ID: 13677.

2. ABUBAKAR Abdulpatta Escalon

DOB: (1) 03/03/1965. (2) 01/01/1965. (3) 11/01/1965. POB: Tuburan, Basilan Province, Philippines a.k.a: (1) ABUBAKAR, Abdul, Patta, Escalon (2) BAKAR, Abdul, Patta, Abu (3) ESCALON, Abdulpatta, Abubakar Nationality:

Philippines Filipino Passport Details: Passport No a) Philippines number EC6530802 (expires 19 Jan 2021) b) Philippines number EB2778599 National Identification no: a) Saudi Arabia 2135314355 b) Saudi Arabia

202112421 Address: (1) Philippines. (2) Daina, Saudi Arabia. (3) Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Other Information: UN Ref QDi.414. [UN Listing (formerly temporary listing, in accordance with the Policing and Crime Act 2017]. [Listing to be treated as temporary for 30 days from the date of listing by the UN or until the EU adds the new listing to an existing sanction’s regulation (whichever is sooner) in accordance with Policing and Crime Act 2017] Listed on: 19/06/2018 Last Updated: 19/06/2018 22/06/2018 Group ID: 13678.

to remove the temporary listing verbiage (and change the nationality from “Philippines” to “Filipino”).

Links:

HMT Notice

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2018/888

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Amazingly enough, it took until June 6th to see the first OFAC enforcement action of 2018, and Mr. Watchlist is really not impressed. Ericsson Inc (“EUS”) and Ericsson AB (“EAB”) agreed to pay a settlement of $145,893 for a single violation of the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations. While it’s an instructive case, it does seem a bit underwhelming:

On or around September 22, 2011, EAB signed a letter of intent with the Sudanese subsidiary of a third-country telecommunications company in order to provide equipment and services to upgrade and expand telecommunications network coverage in Sudan starting with a test network. Ericsson opted to connect its test network in Sudan via satellite, as it had done in other underdeveloped areas. Ericsson hired BCom Offshore SAL (“BCom”) to assist with installing, configuring, and servicing the satellite equipment destined for Sudan.

In late 2011, the high temperatures in Sudan caused some of Ericsson’s equipment to malfunction. In response, two now former EAB employees – a radio systems expert and project manager (“EAB Employee #1”), and a senior engagement director within EAB’s business unit responsible for managing the implementation of the Sudanese project (“EAB Employee #2”) – contacted an EUS subject matter specialist and director of business development with EUS’s Hosted Satellite Group (“EUS Employee”) to request assistance. The EUS Employee initially responded in a January 2, 2012 email to EAB Employee #1 and his manager (“EAB Manager”) among other EAB employees: “Please do not address any emails relating to this country [Sudan] to me. It is a serious matter and Ericsson can get fined and I can get fired.”

Notwithstanding the email cited above, the EAB personnel continued to discuss how to repair the damaged equipment with the EUS Employee while no longer referencing Sudan by name. For example, on January 27, 2012, EAB Employee #1 sent an email referencing Sudan by name to the EAB Manager and EUS Employee, to which the EAB Manager responded in Swedish “do not use that word ;).” Additionally, on February 22, 2012, the EUS Employee sent an email with “East Africa” in the subject line advising EAB Employee #1 and EAB Employee #2 on how to move forward with the Sudan project given the heat constraints.

On or about February 28, 2012, the EUS Employee met with EAB Employee #2 and the Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Ericsson’s principal subcontractor, BCom, in Barcelona, Spain at a sales conference to specifically discuss the overheating problem in Sudan. The group decided to solve the issue by purchasing an export controlled U.S.-origin satellite hub capable of withstanding the heat.

On March 22, 2012, at the direction of Employee #1, EAB purchased a satellite hub from a U.S.- based company for delivery to BCom’s office in Geneva, Switzerland. On or about March 28, 2012, EAB Employee #1 exchanged emails with Ericsson’s compliance department explaining what the satellite hub was for and why its purchase was necessary. Ericsson’s compliance department informed EAB Employee #1 that the supply of such a satellite hub to Sudan would violate Ericsson’s internal policy regarding sanctions compliance.

Despite the information from Ericsson’s compliance department, the EUS Employee, EAB Employee #1, and BCom’s COO agreed to provide the location of the customer purchasing the satellite hub as “Botswana” if future questions arose. Subsequently, on or about April 2, 2012, EAB Employee #1 structured Ericsson’s purchase of the satellite hub into a multistage transaction between EAB and BCom. The multistage transaction involved transshipping the hub through Switzerland and Lebanon, and ultimately to Sudan. Every stage of the transaction except the last was invoiced. BCom did not issue an invoice to EAB for the final stage of the transaction taking the satellite hub from Lebanon to Sudan. Ericsson has since terminated its relationship with BCom.

You have to wonder why this is an OFAC matter more than a BIS matter. Yeah, there is the involvement of the US employee, but it would seem that the export control issue is the more important one. Maybe OFAC noticed that they hadn’t done anything on the enforcement front this year?

And here is OFAC’s reasoning behind the final settlement for the self-reported egregious violation, which had a base penalty of $118,115 and a maximum penalty of $360,230:

OFAC considered the following to be aggravating: 

1. several EAB employees and an employee of EUS willfully violated the SSR by forming a conspiracy with the employees of a third-country company with the specific purpose of evading the U.S. embargo on Sudan; 
2. at least one of the EAB employees involved was a manager; 
3. those employees ignored warnings from Ericsson’s compliance department that the transaction at issue was prohibited; 
4. EAB’s actions caused harm to the sanctions program objectives with respect to Sudan; and 
5. Ericsson is a large and commercially sophisticated entity.

OFAC considered the following to be mitigating: 

1. Ericsson cooperated with OFAC by filing a voluntary self-disclosure, performing a thorough internal investigation, and signing a tolling agreement; 
2. neither Ericsson, EUS, nor EAB have received a penalty notice or finding of violation from OFAC in the five years preceding the date of the transaction giving rise to the apparent violation; 
3. Ericsson’s remedial response to the apparent violation and adoption of additional compliance controls and procedures; and 
4. the low likelihood of recurrence given the individual characteristics of the apparent violation.

OFAC does point out the lesson they are trying to impart:

This enforcement action highlights the importance of empowering compliance personnel to prevent transactions prohibited by U.S. economic and trade sanctions. Entities should ensure their sanctions compliance teams are adequately staffed, receive sufficient technology and other resources, and are delegated appropriate authority to ensure compliance efforts meet an entity’s risk profile. Sanctions compliance personnel should be equipped with the tools necessary to review, assess, and proactively address sanctions-related issues that arise with ongoing or prospective transactions, customers, or counter-parties.

Honestly, Mr. Watchlist is not impressed.

Link:

OFAC Enforcement Information

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Press Releases

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HKMA Alert

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Press Releases

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HKMA Alert

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Press Releases

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HKMA Alert

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Press Releases

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HKMA Alert

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Press Releases

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HKMA Alert

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Press Releases

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HKMA Alert

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On Friday, OSFI announced that, on June 25th, seven individuals were added to the Special Economic Measures (Burma) Regulations. However, the notice says that the amended regulations will be published in the Canada Gazette at a later date – but that Canadians are responsible for the new names immediately. Not sure how that works, but…

And Global Affairs Canada issued the following press release:

Canada imposes further sanctions in response to ongoing crisis in Myanmar

From: Global Affairs Canada

News release

June 25, 2018 – Ottawa, Ontario – Global Affairs Canada

The Honourable Chrystia Freeland, Minister of Foreign Affairs, today announced targeted sanctions under the Special Economic Measures (Burma) Regulations against seven additional Myanmar nationals involved in the military operations launched in Rakhine State in August 2017, which have led to the ongoing crisis.

These sanctions are imposed as a result of the significant role played by senior military officials in the brutal violence and persecution against the Rohingya communities in Myanmar, which has forced over 720,000 Rohingya to flee their homes.

Canada is committed to protecting the human rights of the Rohingya and all other ethnic groups in Myanmar. We will continue to work together with the international community, including the European Union.

 

Links:

OSFI Notice

Global Affairs Canada Press Release

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Last Thursday, OFAC added the following three persons: 

to the SDN List under the Global Magnitsky human rights violations sanctions program.

And the Treasury Department issued the following press release:

Links:

OFAC Notice

Treasury Press Release

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On Friday, Swiss authorities removed the following entity: 

SSID: 70-2147 Name: General Establishment For Grain Trading

Good quality a.k.a.: a) Grain Board Of Iraq b) State Organization Of Grain Address: a) Bab Al Mouadham-Midan, P.O.Box 329, Baghdad, Iraq b) Allque, Irkheta, Karada Al- Shakira, P.O.Box 2261, Baghdad, Iraq

Modifications: De-listed on 5 Jul 2018

from its Iraq sanctions program.

Links:

FINMA Notice

Data files of updates – PDF, XML

Edited with BlogPad Pro