On Tuesday, UK officials implemented Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/696 by amending the following counter terror listing to remove the “temporary listing” notice:

ALVI Mohammed Masood Azhar

DOB: (1) 10/07/1968. (2) 10/06/1968. POB: Bahawalpur, Punjab Province, Pakistan a.k.a: (1) AZHAR, Masud (2) ESAH, Wali, Adam (3) ISAH, Wali, Adam Nationality: Pakistan Other Information: UN Ref: QDi.422. Founder of Jaish-i-Mohammed (QDe.019). Former leader of Harakat ul-Mujahidin / HUM (QDe.008). [UN Listing (formerly temporary listing, in accordance with the Policing and Crime Act 2017)]. (Listing to be treated as temporary for 30 days from the date of listing by the UN or until the EU adds the new listing to an existing sanctions regulation (whichever is sooner) in accordance with Policing and Crime Act 2017). Listed on: 02/05/2019 Last Updated: 02/05/2019 07/05/2019 Group ID: 13787.

Links:

OFSI Notice

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/696

INTERNAL CONTROLS

An effective SCP should include internal controls, including policies and procedures, in order to identify, interdict, escalate, report (as appropriate), and keep records pertaining to activity that may be prohibited by the regulations and laws administered by OFAC. The purpose of internal controls is to outline clear expectations, define procedures and processes pertaining to OFAC compliance (including reporting and escalation chains), and minimize the risks identified by the organization’s risk assessments. Policies and procedures should be enforced, weaknesses should be identified (including through root cause analysis of any compliance breaches) and remediated, and internal and/or external audits and assessments of the program should be conducted on a periodic basis.

Given the dynamic nature of U.S. economic and trade sanctions, a successful and effective SCP should be capable of adjusting rapidly to changes published by OFAC. These include the following: (i) updates to OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (the “SDN List”), the Sectoral Sanctions Identification List (“SSI List”), and other sanctions- related lists; (ii) new, amended, or updated sanctions programs or prohibitions imposed on targeted foreign countries, governments, regions, or persons, through the enactment of new legislation, the issuance of new Executive orders, regulations, or published OFAC guidance or other OFAC actions; and (iii) the issuance of general licenses.

General Aspects of an SCP: Internal Controls

Effective OFAC compliance programs generally include internal controls, including policies and procedures, in order to identify, interdict, escalate, report (as appropriate), and keep records pertaining to activity that is prohibited by the sanctions programs administered by OFAC. The purpose of internal controls is to outline clear expectations, define procedures and processes pertaining to OFAC compliance, and minimize the risks identified by an entity’s OFAC risk assessments. Policies and procedures should be enforced, and weaknesses should be identified (including through root cause analysis of any compliance breaches) and remediated in order to prevent activity that might violate the sanctions programs administered by OFAC.

I. The organization has designed and implemented written policies and procedures outlining the SCP. These policies and procedures are relevant to the organization, capture the organization’s day-to-day operations and procedures, are easy to follow, and designed to prevent employees from engaging in misconduct.

II. The organization has implemented internal controls that adequately address the results of its OFAC risk assessment and profile. These internal controls should enable the organization to clearly and effectively identify, interdict, escalate, and report to appropriate personnel within the organization transactions and activity that may be prohibited by OFAC. To the extent information technology solutions factor into the organization’s internal controls, the organization has selected and calibrated the solutions in a manner that is appropriate to address the organization’s risk profile and compliance needs, and the organization routinely tests the solutions to ensure effectiveness.

III. The organization enforces the policies and procedures it implements as part of its OFAC compliance internal controls through internal and/or external audits.

IV. The organization ensures that its OFAC-related recordkeeping policies and procedures adequately account for its requirements pursuant to the sanctions programs administered by OFAC.

V. The organization ensures that, upon learning of a weakness in its internal controls pertaining to OFAC compliance, it will take immediate and effective action, to the extent possible, to identify and implement compensating controls until the root cause of the weakness can be determined and remediated.

VI. The organization has clearly communicated the SCP’s policies and procedures to all relevant staff, including personnel within the SCP program, as well as relevant gatekeepers and business units operating in high-risk areas (e.g., customer acquisition, payments, sales, etc.) and to external parties performing SCP responsibilities on behalf of the organization.

VII. The organization has appointed personnel for integrating the SCP’s policies and procedures into the daily operations of the company or corporation. This process includes consultations with relevant business units, and confirms the organization’s employees understand the policies and procedures.

Circular to Licensed Corporations and Associated Entities

Anti-Money Laundering / Counter-Financing of Terrorism

(1)  United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Ordinance

(2)  United Nations Sanctions (ISIL and Al-Qaida) Regulation

(1)  United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Ordinance 

Further to our circular issued on 18 April 2019, an updated list specifying terrorists and terrorist associates designated by the United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) was published under section 4 of the United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Ordinance (“the UNATMO”) (Cap. 575) in the Gazette (G.N. (E.) 23 of 2019) on 23 April 2019.  A relevant press release issued by the UNSC, reflecting the updates since the previous list was published in the Gazette (G.N. (E.) 22 of 2019), is attached in Attachment 1 ^{Note 1}.

The aforesaid list can be found on the Government’s website (https://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/pdf/20192323e/egn2019232323.pdf).

(2)  United Nations Sanctions (ISIL and Al-Qaida) Regulation 

Further to our circular issued on 18 April 2019, an updated list specifying “individuals, groups, undertakings and entities” was published under section 25 of the United Nations Sanctions (ISIL and Al-Qaida) Regulation (Cap. 537CB) on the website of the Commerce and Economic Development Bureau on 23 April 2019. A relevant press release issued by the UNSC, reflecting the updates since the previous list was published on the website of the Commerce and Economic Development Bureau, is attached in Attachment 1 ^{Note 1}.

The aforesaid list obtained from the website of the Commerce and Economic Development Bureau is attached in Attachment 2.

Licensed corporations (“LCs”) and associated entities (“AEs”) are reminded to refer to Chapter 6 of the Guideline on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (For Licensed Corporations) (“AML Guideline”) which contains guidance on the appropriate measures that LCs and AEs should take to ensure compliance with the regulations made under the UNATMO (Cap. 575) and the United Nations Sanctions Ordinance (Cap.537) ^{Note 2}.  The Securities and Futures Commission expects all new designations to be screened by LCs and AEs against their client lists as soon as practicable whenever there are updates.  LCs and AEs are also reminded to report any transactions or relationships they have or have had with any designated person or entity to the Joint Financial Intelligence Unit.

Should you have any queries regarding the contents of this circular, please contact Ms Kiki Wong at 2231 1569 who will assist to refer your queries to the relevant officer.

Intermediaries Supervision Department
Intermediaries Division
Securities and Futures Commission

Enclosure

End

SFO/IS/020/2019

Links:

HK SFC Notice

HK SFC Circular

UN Press Releases (Attachment 1)

Commerce and Economic Development Bureau List (Attachment 2)

On Tuesday, OFAC removed:

CRISTOPHER FIGUERA, Manuel Ricardo, Caracas, Capital District, Venezuela; DOB 08 Nov 1963; Gender Male; Cedula No. 8375799 (Venezuela) (individual) [VENEZUELA].

from its Venezuela sanctions program, and the Treasury Department issued a corresponding press release:

Links:

OFAC Notice

Treasury Press Release

Apparently, the United Nations ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee reviews its listings periodically (this is the first one I’m aware of – guess Mr. Watchlist has some research to do), and it resulted in a ton of updates (just to add the wording about the review being done – at least in the listings I saw). And, on Monday, Australian officials incorporated those updates in their Consolidated List.

Link:

UN Web Notice

On Wednesday, Swiss regulators amended 48 individual designations under their Iran program. From a quick review of the changes, they are all in the narrative “Justification” section and do not include elements typically used in screening (e.g. name, date or place of birth) so, for simplicity’s sake (and to get this out sooner rather than later – it’s a 10-page PDF), I’ll just provide the link.

Links:

Data files of updates – PDF, XML

TESTING AND AUDITING

Audits assess the effectiveness of current processes and check for inconsistencies between these and day-to-day operations. A comprehensive and objective testing or audit function within an SCP ensures that an organization identifies program weaknesses and deficiencies, and it is the organization’s responsibility to enhance its program, including all program-related software, systems, and other technology, to remediate any identified compliance gaps. Such enhancements might include updating, improving, or recalibrating SCP elements to account for a changing risk assessment or sanctions environment. Testing and auditing can be conducted on a specific element of an SCP or at the enterprise-wide level.

General Aspects of an SCP: Testing and Auditing

A comprehensive, independent, and objective testing or audit function within an SCP ensures that entities are aware of where and how their programs are performing and should be updated, enhanced, or recalibrated to account for a changing risk assessment or sanctions environment, as appropriate. Testing or audit, whether conducted on a specific element of a compliance program or at the enterprise-wide level, are important tools to ensure the program is working as designed and identify weaknesses and deficiencies within a compliance program.

I. The organization commits to ensuring that the testing or audit function is accountable to senior management, is independent of the audited activities and functions, and has sufficient authority, skills, expertise, resources, and authority within the organization.

II. The organization commits to ensuring that it employs testing or audit procedures appropriate to the level and sophistication of its SCP and that this function, whether deployed internally or by an external party, reflects a comprehensive and objective assessment of the organization’s OFAC-related risk assessment and internal controls.

III. The organization ensures that, upon learning of a confirmed negative testing result or audit finding pertaining to its SCP, it will take immediate and effective action, to the extent possible, to identify and implement compensating controls until the root cause of the weakness can be determined and remediated.

Press Releases

Link:

HKMA Notice

Press Releases

Link:

HKMA Notice

TRAINING

An effective training program is an integral component of a successful SCP. The training program should be provided to all appropriate employees and personnel on a periodic basis (and at a minimum, annually) and generally should accomplish the following: (i) provide job-specific knowledge based on need; (ii) communicate the sanctions compliance responsibilities for each employee; and (iii) hold employees accountable for sanctions compliance training through assessments.

General Aspects of an SCP: Training

An adequate training program, tailored to an entity’s risk profile and all appropriate employees and stakeholders, is critical to the success of an SCP.

I. The organization commits to ensuring that its OFAC-related training program provides adequate information and instruction to employees and, as appropriate, stakeholders (for example, clients, suppliers, business partners, and counterparties) in order to support the organization’s OFAC compliance efforts. Such training should be further tailored to high-risk employees within the organization.

II. The organization commits to provide OFAC-related training with a scope that is appropriate for the products and services it offers; the customers, clients, and partner relationships it maintains; and the geographic regions in which it operates.

III. The organization commits to providing OFAC-related training with a frequency that is appropriate based on its OFAC risk assessment and risk profile.

IV. The organization commits to ensuring that, upon learning of a confirmed negative testing result or audit finding, or other deficiency pertaining to its SCP, it will take immediate and effective action to provide training to or other corrective action with respect to relevant personnel.

V. The organization’s training program includes easily accessible resources and materials that are available to all applicable personnel.

On Friday, OFAC added the following entities:

and cargo vessels:

to its Venezuela sanctions program.

Additionally, the following non-proliferation listing:

BEURKLIAN, Anni (a.k.a. AJAKA, Anni); DOB 17 May 1969; nationality Lebanon; citizen United States (individual) [NPWMD] (Linked To: KATRANGI, Amir). -to- BEURKLIAN, Anni (a.k.a. AJAKA, Anni), Lebanon; Bsalim, Majzoub St. #701, Bldg. #254, 3rd floor, Beirut, Lebanon; DOB 17 May 1969; nationality Lebanon; citizen United States(individual) [NPWMD] (Linked To: KATRANGI, Amir).

and counter-terrorism listing:

BSQRD LIMITED, Mansion House Manchester Road, Altrincham Chesire WA14 4RW, United Kingdom; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations; D-U-N-S Number 22-369-0096; Company Number 11207847 (United Kingdom) [SDGT] (Linked To: BAZZI, Wael). -to- BSQRD LIMITED, Mansion House Manchester Road, Altrincham Cheshire WA14 4RW, United Kingdom; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations; D-U-N-S Number 22-369-0096; Company Number 11207847 (United Kingdom) [SDGT] (Linked To: BAZZI, Wael).

were updated.

And the US Treasury:

and State Departments:

issued press releases.

Links:

OFAC Notice

Press Releases: Treasury, State

Revisions have been made to the filing requirements for the OSFI-525 and OSFI-590 monthly anti-terrorism reporting effective March 2019. Please consult OSFI’s website for further details. All questions should be directed to OSFI’s Returns Administration at RA-RRS.Support@osfi-bsif.gc.ca.

Root Causes of OFAC Sanctions Compliance Program Breakdowns or Deficiencies Based on Assessment of Prior OFAC Administrative Actions

Since its publication of the Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, 31 C.F.R. part 501, App. A (the “Guidelines”), OFAC has finalized numerous public enforcement actions in which it identified deficiencies or weaknesses within the subject person’s SCP. These items, which are provided in a non-exhaustive list below, are provided to alert persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction, including entities that conduct business in or with the United States, U.S. persons, or U.S.-origin goods or services, about several specific root causes associated with apparent violations of the regulations it administers in order to assist them in designing, updating, and amending their respective SCP.

I. Lack of a Formal OFAC SCP

OFAC regulations do not require a formal SCP; however, OFAC encourages organizations subject to U.S. jurisdiction (including but not limited to those entities that conduct business in, with, or through the United States or involving U.S.-origin goods, services, or technology), and particularly those that engage in international trade or transactions or possess any clients or counter-parties located outside of the United States, to adopt a formal SCP. OFAC has finalized numerous civil monetary penalties since publicizing the Guidelines in which the subject person’s lack of an SCP was one of the root causes of the sanctions violations identified during the course of the investigation. In addition, OFAC frequently identified this element as an aggravating factor in its analysis of the General Factors associated with such administrative actions.

II. Misinterpreting, or Failing to Understand the Applicability of, OFAC’s Regulations

Numerous organizations have committed sanctions violations by misinterpreting OFAC’s regulations, particularly in instances in which the subject person determined the transaction, dealing, or activity at issue was either not prohibited or did not apply to their organization or operations. For example, several organizations have failed to appreciate or consider (or, in some instances, actively disregarded) the fact that OFAC sanctions applied to their organization based on their status as a U.S. person, a U.S.-owned or controlled subsidiary (in the Cuba and Iran programs), or dealings in or with U.S. persons, the U.S. financial system, or U.S.-origin goods and technology.

With respect to this specific root cause, OFAC’s administrative actions have typically identified additional aggravating factors, such as reckless conduct, the presence of numerous warning signs that the activity at issue was likely prohibited, awareness by the organization’s management of the conduct at issue, and the size and sophistication of the subject person.

III. Facilitating Transactions by Non-U.S. Persons (Including Through or By Overseas Subsidiaries or Affiliates)

Multiple organizations subject to U.S. jurisdiction—specifically those with foreign-based operations and subsidiaries located outside of the United States—have engaged in transactions or activity that violated OFAC’s regulations by referring business opportunities to, approving or signing off on transactions conducted by, or otherwise facilitating dealings between their organization’s non-U.S. locations and OFAC-sanctioned countries, regions, or persons. In many instances, the root cause of these violations stems from a misinterpretation or misunderstanding of OFAC’s regulations. Companies and corporations with integrated operations, particularly those involving or requiring participation by their U.S.-based headquarters, locations, or personnel, should ensure any activities they engage in (i.e., approvals, contracts, procurement, etc.) are compliant with OFAC’s regulations.

IV. Exporting or Re-exporting U.S.-origin Goods, Technology, or Services to OFAC- Sanctioned Persons or Countries

Non-U.S. persons have repeatedly purchased U.S.-origin goods with the specific intent of re- exporting, transferring, or selling the items to a person, country, or region subject to OFAC sanctions. In several instances, this activity occurred despite warning signs that U.S. economic sanctions laws prohibited the activity, including contractual language expressly prohibiting any such dealings. OFAC’s public enforcement actions in this area have generally been focused on companies or corporations that are large or sophisticated, engaged in a pattern or practice that lasted multiple years, ignored or failed to respond to numerous warning signs, utilized non- routine business practices, and—in several instances—concealed their activity in a willful or reckless manner.

V. Utilizing the U.S. Financial System, or Processing Payments to or through U.S. Financial Institutions, for Commercial Transactions Involving OFAC-Sanctioned Persons or Countries

Many non-U.S. persons have engaged in violations of OFAC’s regulations by processing financial transactions (almost all of which have been denominated in U.S. Dollars) to or through U.S. financial institutions that pertain to commercial activity involving an OFAC-sanctioned country, region, or person. Although no organizations subject to U.S. jurisdiction may be involved in the underlying transaction—such as the shipment of goods from a third-country to an OFAC-sanctioned country—the inclusion of a U.S. financial institution in any payments associated with these transactions often results in a prohibited activity (e.g., the exportation or re- exportation of services from the United States to a comprehensively sanctioned country, or dealing in blocked property in the United States). OFAC has generally focused its enforcement investigations on persons who have engaged in willful or reckless conduct, attempted to conceal their activity (e.g., by stripping or manipulating payment messages, or making false representations to their non-U.S. or U.S. financial institution), engaged in a pattern or practice of conduct for several months or years, ignored or failed to consider numerous warning signs that the conduct was prohibited, involved actual knowledge or involvement by the organization’s management, caused significant harm to U.S. sanctions program objectives, and were large or sophisticated organizations.

Press Releases

Link:

HKMA Notice

VI. Sanctions Screening Software or Filter Faults

Many organizations conduct screening of their customers, supply chain, intermediaries, counter- parties, commercial and financial documents, and transactions in order to identify OFAC- prohibited locations, parties, or dealings. At times, organizations have failed to update their sanctions screening software to incorporate updates to the SDN List or SSI List, failed to include pertinent identifiers such as SWIFT Business Identifier Codes for designated, blocked, or sanctioned financial institutions, or did not account for alternative spellings of prohibited countries or parties—particularly in instances in which the organization is domiciled or conducts business in geographies that frequently utilize such alternative spellings (i.e., Habana instead of Havana, Kuba instead of Cuba, Soudan instead of Sudan, etc.),

VII. Improper Due Diligence on Customers/Clients (e.g., Ownership, Business Dealings, etc.)

One of the fundamental components of an effective OFAC risk assessment and SCP is conducting due diligence on an organization’s customers, supply chain, intermediaries, and counter-parties. Various administrative actions taken by OFAC involved improper or incomplete due diligence by a company or corporation on its customers, such as their ownership, geographic location(s), counter-parties, and transactions, as well as their knowledge and awareness of OFAC sanctions.

VIII. De-Centralized Compliance Functions and Inconsistent Application of an SCP

While each organization should design, develop, and implement its risk-based SCP based on its own characteristics, several organizations subject to U.S. jurisdiction have committed apparent violations due to a de-centralized SCP, often with personnel and decision-makers scattered in various offices or business units. In particular, violations have resulted from this arrangement due to an improper interpretation and application of OFAC’s regulations, the lack of a formal escalation process to review high-risk or potential OFAC customers or transactions, an inefficient or incapable oversight and audit function, or miscommunications regarding the organization’s sanctions-related policies and procedures.

IX. Utilizing Non-Standard Payment or Commercial Practices

Organizations subject to U.S. jurisdiction are in the best position to determine whether a particular dealing, transaction, or activity is proposed or processed in a manner that is consistent with industry norms and practices. In many instances, organizations attempting to evade or circumvent OFAC sanctions or conceal their activity will implement non-traditional business methods in order to complete their transactions.

X. Individual Liability

In several instances, individual employees—particularly in supervisory, managerial, or executive-level positions—have played integral roles in causing or facilitating violations of the regulations administered by OFAC. Specifically, OFAC has identified scenarios involving U.S.- owned or controlled entities operating outside of the United States, in which supervisory, managerial or executive employees of the entities conducted or facilitated dealings or transactions with OFAC-sanctioned persons, regions, or countries, notwithstanding the fact that the U.S. entity had a fulsome sanctions compliance program in place. In some of these cases, the employees of the foreign entities also made efforts to obfuscate and conceal their activities from others within the corporate organization, including compliance personnel, as well as from regulators or law enforcement. In such circumstances, OFAC will consider using its enforcement authorities not only against the violating entities, but against the individuals as well.

Circular to Licensed Corporations and Associated Entities

Anti-Money Laundering / Counter-Financing of Terrorism

Updated AML/CFT Self-Assessment Checklist

The Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”) today posted an updated AML/CFT Self-Assessment Checklist which has incorporated revisions to reflect the latest Guideline on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (For Licensed Corporations)^{Note 1}. A copy of the updated checklist can be downloaded from the SFC’s website at(https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/files/IS/AML/AML_Self_Assessment_Checklist_EN.docx).

The AML/CFT Self-Assessment Checklist has been prepared to provide a structured framework for licensed corporations (“LCs”) and associated entities (“AEs”) to assess compliance with the key AML/CFT requirements. LCs and AEs are advised to use the self-assessment checklist as part of their regular review to monitor their AML/CFT compliance.

The senior management of LCs and AEs should ensure that any compliance deficiencies identified during the regular reviews are rectified in a timely manner. In the course of our regular inspections, we may require LCs and AEs to provide documentary evidence of the performance of such review and its results.

Should you have any queries regarding the contents of this circular, please contact Ms Kiki Wong at 2231 1569 who will assist to refer your queries to the relevant officer.

Intermediaries Supervision Department
Intermediaries Division
Securities and Futures Commission

End

SFO/IS/017/2019

Links:

HK SFC Notice

HK SFC Circular

Here’s the headline piece:

Enforcement Action

Central Bank of Ireland and Bank of Montreal Ireland plc.

Bank of Montreal Ireland plc. reprimanded and fined €1,246,189 by the Central Bank of Ireland for breach of banking licence condition

On 26 April 2019, the Central Bank of Ireland (the “Central Bank”) reprimanded and imposed a fine on Bank of Montreal Ireland plc. (the “Firm”) for breaching a condition of its banking licence by failing to submit three operational risk returns to the Central Bank, and failing to establish and maintain effective processes and internal controls to ensure compliance with this regulatory reporting condition. The Firm has admitted the breaches in full. This is the Firm’s second reprimand and fine for deficiencies in regulatory reporting.

The Central Bank’s investigation found that the breaches were caused by:

 the Firm’s failure to establish and maintain effective processes and controls to ensure the

submission of operational risk returns;

 an over-reliance on Bank of Montreal group policies; and

 the use of an informal process to comply with its obligation to submit operational risk returns.

The Central Bank determined that the appropriate fine was €1,780,269 which was reduced by 30% to €1,246,189 in accordance with the settlement discount scheme provided for in the Central Bank’s Administrative Sanctions Procedure (“ASP”).

Seána Cunningham, the Central Bank’s Director of Enforcement and Anti Money Laundering, said:

“All firms operating in Ireland must do so in line with their regulatory licence, and all conditions attaching to it. Compliance with licence conditions is not optional, and breaches are treated seriously by the Central Bank as demonstrated in this enforcement action against the Firm.

The licence breach in this case centres on the Firm’s failure to submit three operational risk returns. As the risks facing the financial sector continue to grow and become more complex, it is essential that the Central Bank has a clear line of sight to any potential risks, including operational risks, within regulated firms to ensure effective supervision and to assess the resilience and integrity of all firms and the financial sector as a whole. All firms must ensure the highest standards in identifying, properly managing and monitoring, and reporting on its operational risks in line with the Central Bank’s requirements.

As a result of this investigation, the Central Bank reminds international firms, whether already established or seeking to establish a presence in Ireland, that they must put in place adequate policies, processes and controls necessary to comply with all licence conditions and regulatory obligations specific to their licence conditions to operate in Ireland.”

Link:

Enforcement Action

On May 16th, Australian regulators added:

QDe.161 Name: ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND THE LEVANT – KHORASAN

(ISIL- K)

A.k.a.: a) ISIL KHORASAN b) ISLAMIC STATE’S KHORASAN PROVINCE c) ISIS

WILAYAT KHORASAN d) ISIL’S SOUTH ASIA BRANCH e) SOUTH ASIAN

CHAPTER OF ISIL F.k.a.: na Address: na Listed on: 14 May 2019 Other

information: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan (ISIL – K) was formed on

January 10, 2015 by a former Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (QDe.132) commander

and was established by former Taliban faction commanders who swore an oath of

allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq

(QDe.115)). ISIL – K has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in both

Afghanistan and Pakistan. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link:

https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/xxxx

to their counter terrorism sanctions program after its addition by the United Nations ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee.

They also removed:

QDi.148 Name: 1: NESSIM 2: BEN MOHAMED 3: AL-CHERIF BEN MOHAMED 4:

SALEH AL-SAADI

Title: na Designation: na DOB: 30 Nov. 1974 POB: Haidra Al-Qasreen, Tunisia Good

quality a.k.a.: a) Nassim Saadi b) Dia el Haak George born 20 Nov. 1974 in

Lebanon c) Diael Haak George born 30 Nov. 1974 in Lebanon d) El Dia Haak George

born 30 Nov. 1974 in Algeria Low quality a.k.a.: a) Abou Anis b) Abu

Anis Nationality: Tunisia Passport no: Tunisia number M788331, issued on 28 Sep.

2001 (expired 27 Sep. 2006) National identification no: na Address: a) Via Monte

Grappa 15, Arluno (Milan), Italy b) Via Cefalonia 11, Milan, Italy (Domicile, last known

address) Listed on: 12 Nov. 2003 ( amended on 20 Dec. 2005, 31 Jul. 2006, 21 Dec.

2007, 3 Jun. 2009, 16 May 2011 ) Other information: Arrested on 9 Oct. 2002. In

detention in Italy until 27 Apr. 2012. Sentenced in absentia to 20 years of imprisonment

by the Tunis Military Court on 11 May 2005 for membership of a terrorist organization.

Father’s name is Mohamed Sharif. Mother’s name is Fatima. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN

Security Council Special Notice web link:

https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1419840 click here

from the same program

Link:

UN Notice 1, UN Notice 2

On May 16, Australian regulators removed:

IQe.021 Name: DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF BAGHDAD

ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION

A.k.a.: na F.k.a.: na Address: P.O. Box 24042, Al-Jumhuriya Street, Building

66, Baghdad, Baghdad, Iraq Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information:

IQe.050 Name: IDRISI CENTRE FOR ENGINEERING CONSULTANCY

(ICEC)

A.k.a.: na F.k.a.: na Address: Museum Square, Karkh, P.O. Box 14077,

Baghdad, Iraq Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information:

IQe.082 Name: NATIONAL CENTRE FOR ENGINEERING AND

ARCHITECTURAL CONSULTANCY

A.k.a.: na F.k.a.: na Address: Rashid Street, P.O. Box 11387, Baghdad, Iraq

Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information:

IQe.127 Name: STATE ENTERPRISE FOR FERTILIZER INDUSTRIES

A.k.a.: na F.k.a.: na Address: P.O. Box 74, Basrah, Basrah, Iraq Listed on:

26 Apr. 2004 Other information:

from their Iraq sanctions program after their delisting by the United Nations Sanctions Committee.

Link:

UN Notice

Syria: EU renews sanctions against the regime by one year
	On 17 May 2019, the Council extended EU restrictive measures against the Syrian regime until 1 June 2020. In line with the EU strategy on Syria, the EU decided to maintain its restrictive measures against the Syrian regime and its supporters as the repression of civilian population continues. The Council also removed 5 deceased persons from the list, as well as one entity which ceased to exist and one entity for which there were no longer grounds to keep it under restrictive measures. The list now includes 270 persons and 70 entities targeted by a travel ban and an asset freeze for being responsible for the violent repression against the civilian population in Syria, benefiting from or supporting the regime, and/or being associated with such persons or entities. More broadly, sanctions currently in place against Syria include an oil embargo, restrictions on certain investments, a freeze of the assets of the Syrian central bank held in the EU, export restrictions on equipment and technology that might be used for internal repression as well as on equipment and technology for the monitoring or interception of internet or telephone communications.

Link:

EU Notice