Last Friday (see, I’m slowly catching up!), OFAC added the following persons:

and entities:

to its counter narcotics and/or Global Magnitsky human rights sanctions programs.

And the Treasury Department issued the following press release:

and issued handy visual charts of both sets of parties.

Links:

OFAC Notice

Treasury Press Release

Kingpin Act Chart

Global Magnitsky Act Chart

Last Friday, UK regulators implemented Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/791 by amending the following ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida counter terror listing:

ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND THE LEVANT – KHORASAN (ISIL-K)

a.k.a: (1) ISIL Khorasan (2) ISIL’s South Asia Branch (3) ISIS Wilayat Khorasan (4) Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (5) South Asian Chapter of ISIL Other Information: UN Ref QDe.161. (Listing to be treated as temporary for 30 days from the date of listing by the UNor until the EU adds the new listing to an existing sanctions regulation (whichever is sooner) in accordance with Policing and Crime Act 2017). [UN Listing (formerly temporary listing, in accordance with Policing and Crime Act 2017)]. Listed on: 15/05/2019 Last Updated: 15/05/2019 17/05/2019 Group ID: 13788.

Under the same regulation, they also removed:

SALEH AL-SAADI, Nessim Ben Mohamed Al-Cherif Ben Mohamed

DOB: (1) 30/11/1974. (2) 20/11/1974. POB: (1) Haidra Al-Qasreen (2)-(3) -, (1) Tunisia (2) Lebanon (3)Algeria a.k.a: (1) GEORGE, Dia, el Haak (2) GEORGE, Diael, Haak (3) GEORGE, El Dia, Haak (4) SAADI, Nassim Nationality: Tunisian Passport Details: M788331 (Tunisian). Issued on 28 Sept 2001. Expired on 27 Sept 2006 Address: (1) Via Cefalonia 11, Milan, Italy (Domicile, last known address).(2) Via Monte Grappa 15, Arluno, Milan, Italy.Other Information: UN Ref QI.S.148.03. Arrested on 9 Oct 2002. In detention in Italy until 27 Apr 2012. Sentenced in absentia to 20 years of imprisonment by the Tunis Military Court on 11 May 2005 for membership of a terrorist organisation. Father’s name is Mohamed Sharif. Mother’s name is Fatima. Also referred to as Abou Anis and Abu Anis. Listed on: 18/11/2003 Last Updated: 17/06/2011 17/05/2019 Group ID: 7871.

from the same program.

Links:

OFSI removal notice

OFSI amendment notice

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/791

On Tuesday, Swiss authorities amended the following individuals sanctioned under its Myanmar program:

SSID: 145-39366 Name: Aung Kyaw Zaw

Sex: M DOB: 20 Aug 1961 Identification document: Passport No. DM000826, Myanmar, Date of issue: 22 Nov 2011, Expiry date: 21 Nov 2021

Justification: Lieutenant General Aung Kyaw Zaw was the Commander of the Bureau of Special Operations No. 3 of the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) from AugustAug 2015 to the end of 2017. The Bureau of Special Operations No. 3 oversaw the Western Command and, in that context, Lieutenant General Aung Kyaw Zaw is responsible for the atrocities and serious human rights violations committed against the Rohingya population in Rakhine State by the Western Command during that period. These include unlawful killings, sexual violence and the systematic burning of Rohingya houses and buildings. Other information: Military identification number: BC 17444 Modifications: Listed on 17 Oct 2018, amended on 21 May 2019

SSID: 145-39379 Name: Maung Maung Soe

Sex: M DOB: Mar 1964

Justification: Major General Maung Maung Soe was the Commander of the Western Command of the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) from OctoberOct 2016 to 10 Nov. 2017 and oversaw the military operations in Rakhine State. In that context, he is responsible for the atrocities and serious human rights violations committed against Rohingya population in Rakhine State by the Western Command during that period. These include unlawful killings, sexual violence and systematic burning of Rohingya houses and buildings. Other information: National Identification Number: Tatmadaw Kyee 19571 Modifications: Listed on 17 Oct 2018, amended on 21 May 2019

SSID: 145-39388 Name: Than Oo

Sex: M DOB: 12 Oct 1973

Justification: Brigadier General Than Oo is the Commander of the 99th Light Infantry Division of the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw). In that context, he is responsible for the atrocities and serious human rights violations committed against the Rohingya population in Rakhine State in the second half of 2017 by the 99th Light Infantry Division. These include unlawful killings, sexual violence and the systematic burning of Rohingya houses and buildings. Other information: Military identification number: BC 25723 Modifications: Listed on 17 Oct 2018, amended on 21 May 2019

SSID: 145-39394 Name: Aung Aung

Sex: M

Justification: Brigadier General Aung Aung is the Commander of the 33rd Light Infantry Division of the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw). In that context, he is responsible for the atrocities and serious human rights violations committed against the Rohingya population in Rakhine State in the second half of 2017 by the 33rd Light Infantry Division. These include unlawful killings, sexual violence and the systematic burning of Rohingya houses and buildings. Other information: Military identification Number: BC 23750 Modifications: Listed on 17 Oct 2018, amended on 21 May 2019

SSID: 145-39399 Name: Khin Maung Soe

Sex: M DOB: 1972

Justification: Brigadier General Khin Maung Soe is the Commander of the Military Operation Command 15, also sometimes known as the 15th Light Infantry Division, of the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw), under which Infantry Battalion No. 564 falls. In that context, he is responsible for the atrocities and serious human rights violations committed against the Rohingya population in Rakhine State in the second half of 2017 by the Military Operation Command 15, in particular by Infantry Battalion No. 564. These include unlawful killings, sexual violence and the systematic burning of Rohingya houses and buildings. Modifications: Listed on 17 Oct 2018, amended on 21 May 2019

SSID: 145-39403 Name: Thura San Lwin

Sex: M DOB: 195717 Mar 1959

Justification: Brigadier General Thura San Lwin was the Commander of the Border Guard Police from OctoberOct 2016 until early OctoberOct 2017. In that context, he is responsible for the atrocities and serious human rights violations committed against Rohingya population in Rakhine State by the Border Guard Police during that period. These include unlawful killings and systematic burning of Rohingya houses and buildings. Modifications: Listed on 17 Oct 2018, amended on 21 May 2019

SSID: 145-39408 Name: Thant Zin Oo

Sex: M

Justification: Thant Zin Oo is the Commander of the 8th Security Police Battalion. In that context, he is responsible for the atrocities and serious human rights violations committed against Rohingya population in Rakhine State in the second half of 2017 by the 8th Security Police Battalion. The serious human rights violations include unlawful killings and systematic burning of Rohingya houses and buildings. Those violations were conducted in conjunction with and in direct support of the 33rd Light Infantry Division of the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) led by Brigadier General Aung Aung. Thant Zin Oo is therefore associated with listed person, Brigadier General Aung Aung. Relation: Associated with Aung Aung (SSID 145-39394) Modifications: Listed on 17 Oct 2018, amended on 21 May 2019

SSID: 145-39980 Name: Ba Kyaw

Sex: M

Justification: Ba Kyaw is a Staff Sergeant in the 564th Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) of the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw). He committed atrocities and serious human rights violations, including murder, deportation and torture, against the Rohingya population in Rakhine State in the second half of 2017. In particular, he has been identified as one of the key perpetrators of the Maung Nu massacre on 27 Aug 2017. Modifications: Listed on 18 Jan 2019, amended on 21 May 2019

SSID: 145-39984 Name: Tun Naing

Sex: M

Justification: Tun Naing is the Commanding Officer of the Border Guard Police (BGP) base in Taung Bazar. In that capacity, he is responsible for the atrocities and serious human rights violations against the Rohingya population in Rakhine State committed by the BGP in Taung Bazar before, around and after 25 Aug 2017, including forced detention, ill-treatment and torture. Modifications: Listed on 18 Jan 2019, amended on 21 May 2019

SSID: 145-39988 Name: Khin Hlaing

Sex: M DOB: 2 May 1968

Justification: Brigadier General Khin HLaing is the former Commander of the 99th Light Infantry Division (LID) and the current Commander of the North-eastern Command of the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw). As the Commander of the 99th LID he oversaw military operations carried out in Shan State in 2016 and early 2017. In that context, he is responsible for the atrocities and serious human rights violations committed against ethnic minority villagers in Shan State in the second half of 2016 by the 99th LID. These include unlawful killings, forced detention and destruction of villages. Modifications: Listed on 18 Jan 2019, amended on 21 May 2019

SSID: 145-39993 Name: Aung Myo Thu

Sex: M

Justification: Major Aung Myo Thu is the Field Unit Commander of 33rd Light Infantry Division (LID) of the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw). As the Field Unit Commander of the 33rd LID he oversaw military operations carried out in Rakhine State in 2017. In that context, he is responsible for the atrocities and serious human rights violations committed against the Rohingya population in Rakhine State in the second half of 2017 by the 33rd LID. These include unlawful killings, sexual violence and forced detention. Modifications: Listed on 18 Jan 2019, amended on 21 May 2019

SSID: 145-39997 Name: Thant Zaw Win

Sex: M

Justification: Thant Zaw Win is a Major in the 564th Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) of the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw). In that capacity, he oversaw military operations carried out in Rakhine State and is responsible for the atrocities and serious human rights violations committed against the Rohingya population in Rakhine State by the 564th LIB, notably in and around Maung Nu village on 27 Aug 2017. These include unlawful killings, sexual violence and systematic burning of Rohingya houses and buildings. Modifications: Listed on 18 Jan 2019, amended on 21 May 2019

SSID: 145-40001 Name: Kyaw Chay

Sex: M

Justification: Kyaw Chay is a Corporal in the Border Guard Police (BGP). He was formerly based in Zay Di Pyin and was the Commanding Officer of the BGP base in Zay Di Pyin in the period around 25 Aug 2017 when a series of human rights violations were committed by the BGP under his command. In that context, he is responsible for the atrocities and serious human rights violations by the BGP against the Rohingya population in Rakhine State in that period. He also participated in serious human rights violations. These violations include the ill-treatment of detainees and torture. Modifications: Listed on 18 Jan 2019, amended on 21 May 2019

SSID: 145-40005 Name: Nyi Nyi Swe

Sex: M

Justification: Major General Nyi Nyi Swe is the former Commander of the Northern Command of the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw). In that capacity, he is responsible for the atrocities and serious human rights violations committed in Kachin State from May 2016 to Apr 2018 (until his appointment as Commander of the South-western Command) by the Northern Command, including ill-treatment of civilians. He is also responsible for obstructing the provision of humanitarian assistance to civilians in need in Kachin State in that period, in particular the blocking of food transports. Modifications: Listed on 18 Jan 2019, amended on 21 May 2019

The huge bulk of these changes are either replacing month names with abbreviations or adding the sex of the party.

Links:

Data files of updates – PDF, XML

On Wednesday, Canadian regulators removed:

QDi.202 Name: 1: MAZEN 2: SALAH 3: MOHAMMED 4: na
Name (original script): مازن صلاح محمد
Title: na Designation: na DOB: 18 May 1981 POB: Arbil, Iraq Good quality a.k.a.: a) Mazen Ali Hussein born 1 Jan. 1982 in Baghdad, Iraq b) Issa Salah Muhamad born 1 Jan. 1980 Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: IraqPassport no: German travel document (“Reiseausweis”) A 0144378 (revoked as at Sep. 2012) National identification no: na Address: 94051 Hauzenberg, Germany Listed on: 6 Dec. 2005 (amended on 21 Oct. 2008, 13 Dec. 2011, 15 Nov. 2012, 1 May 2019) Other information: Member of Ansar Al-Islam (QDe.098). Released from custody in Germany on 18 May 2012. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 30 Jul. 2009. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb. 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-UN-Notices-Individuals

The names of individuals and entities removed from the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al‑Qaida Sanctions List pursuant to a decision by the Committee may be found in the “Press Releases” section on the Committee’s website.  Other information about the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List may also be found on the Committee’s website at the following URL: www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/procedures-for-delisting.

The ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List is updated regularly on the basis of relevant information provided by Member States and international and regional organizations. An updated List is accessible on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee’s website at the following URL:  www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list.

The Consolidated United Nations Security Council List is also updated following all changes made to the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List. An updated version of the Consolidated List is accessible via the following URL: www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/un-sc-consolidated-list.

from their counter terror sanctions program, after their delisting by the United Nations ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee. Note that the OSFI page says 4 persons were removed, which is in error.

Links:

OSFI Notice

UN Notice

On Wednesday, UK regulators implemented Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/808 by removing the following entities from its Iraq sanctions program:

1. DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF BAGHDAD ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION

Address: PO Box 24042, Al-Jumhuriya Street, Building 66, Baghdad, Iraq.Other Information: Funds or financial assets or economic resources received on or after 23 May 2003 are not to be regarded as frozen nor required to be transferred to the successor arrangements to the DFI Listed on: 05/05/2004 Last Updated: 21/02/2013 22/05/0219 Group ID: 8071.

2. IDRISI CENTRE FOR ENGINEERING CONSULTANCY

a.k.a: ICEC Address: Museum Square, Karkh, PO Box 14077, Baghdad, Iraq.Other Information: Funds or financial assets or economic resources received on or after 23 May 2003 are not to be regarded as frozen nor required to be transferred to the successor arrangements to the DFI Listed on: 05/05/2004 Last Updated: 21/02/2013 22/05/0219 Group ID: 8106.

3. NATIONAL CENTRE FOR ENGINEERING AND ARCHITECTURAL CONSULTANCY Address: Rashid Street, PO Box 11387, Baghdad, Iraq.Other Information: Funds or financial assets or economic resources received on or after 23 May 2003 are not to be regarded as frozen nor required to be transferred to the successor arrangements to the DFI Listed on: 05/05/2004 Last Updated: 21/02/2013 22/05/0219 Group ID: 8138.

4. STATE ENTERPRISE FOR FERTILIZER INDUSTRIES

Address: PO Box 74, Basrah, Iraq.Other Information: Funds or financial assets or economic resources received on or after 23 May 2003 are not to be regarded as frozen nor required to be transferred to the successor arrangements to the DFI Listed on: 05/05/2004 Last Updated: 21/02/2013 22/05/0219 Group ID: 8179.

Links:

OFSI Notice

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/808

Yesterday, OFAC added the following persons:

and entities:

to its counter narcotics sanctions program, under its Kingpin Act authorities.

Link:

OFAC Notice

On Wednesday, UK regulators implemented Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/798 by removing the following 7 people:

1. AL-JASSIM Fahid

Title: Lt. General a.k.a: AL-JASSIM, Fahd Position: Chief of Staff Other Information: Military official involved in the violence in Homs Listed on: 02/12/2011 Last Updated: 31/05/2013 22/05/2019 Group ID: 12414

2. JARAD Ahmed Yousef

Title: Brigadier General a.k.a: (1) JARAD, Ahmad, Yousef (2) JARAD, Ahmad, Youssef (3) JARAD, Ahmed, Youssef (4) JARRAD, Ahmad, Yousef (5) JARRAD, Ahmad, Youssef (6) JARRAD, Ahmed, Yousef (7) JARRAD, Ahmed, Youssef Position: Commander of 132nd Brigade Listed on: 24/01/2012 Last Updated: 31/05/2013 22/05/2019 Group ID: 12464.

3. MAKHLOUF Mohsin

Title: Brigadier General Listed on: 24/01/2012 Last Updated: 31/05/2013 22/05/2019 Group ID: 12473.

4. HASSAN Suheil Salman

Title: Major General a.k.a: HASSAN, Suhail, Salman Position: Commander of 5th Division Listed on: 24/01/2012 Last Updated: 31/05/2013 22/05/2019 Group ID: 12476.

5. AL ZU’BI Omran Ahed

DOB: 27/09/1959. POB: Damascus a.k.a: (1) AL ZO’BI, Omran, Ahed (2) AL ZOU’BI, Omran , Ahed (3) AL ZOUBI, Omran, Ahed Other Information: Former Minister of Information Listed on: 16/10/2012 Last Updated: 07/06/2017 22/05/2019 Group ID: 12780.

6. AL SAYED Mohammed Turki

Position: Former Minister of Industry Listed on: 16/10/2012 Last Updated: 30/05/2014 22/05/2019 Group ID: 12786.

7. AL-DIN Isam Zahr

Title: Brigadier General DOB: –/–/1961. POB: Tarba, As-Suwayda province Syria a.k.a: (1) AL-DEEN, Issam , Zaher (2) AL-DIN, Isam, Zuhair (3) ASSADLLAH, Nafed (4) ZAHREDDINE, Issam (5) ZAHRUDDIN, Essam (6) ZAHRUDDIN, Issam (7) ZOHRUDDIN, Isam Other Information: Holds the rank of Brigadier General, a senior officer in the Republican Guard, in post after May 2011. Listed on: 18/07/2017 Last Updated: 27/09/2017 22/05/2019 Group ID: 13500.

and 2 entities:

1. DREX TECHNOLOGIES HOLDING S.A.

Address: 17 rue Beaumont, Luxembourg (previous address), L-1219. Other Information: Registered in Luxembourg under number B77616. Beneficial owner is Rami Makhlouf Listed on: 17/08/2012 Last Updated: 17/08/2012 22/05/2019 Group ID: 12736.

2. DK GROUP

a.k.a: (1) DK Group Sarl (2) DK Middle- East & Africa Regional Office Address: (1) Azarieh Building, Block 03, 5th Floor Azarieh Street, Solidere Downtown, PO Box 11-503, Beirut, Lebanon.(2) DK Middle-East & Africa Regional Office, Peres Lazaristes Center, No. 3, 5th Floor, Emir Bachir Street, Beirut Central District, Bachoura Sector, Beirut, Lebanon.Other Information: DK Group supplies new banknotes to the Central Bank of Syria. Listed on: 09/03/2015 Last Updated: 09/03/2015 22/05/2019 Group ID: 13240.

from its Syria sanctions program: and amending the following 29:

1. ZAYTUN Muhammad Dib

DOB: 20/05/1951. POB: Jubba, Damascus province, Syria a.k.a: (1) ZEITOUN, Mohammed, Dib (2) ZEITUN, Mohamed, Dib Passport Details: D000001300 (Diplomatic) Position: Head of General Security Directorate Listed on: 10/05/2011 Last Updated: 02/06/2015 22/05/2019 Group ID: 11907.

2. ABBAS Amjad

a.k.a: AL-ABBAS, Amjad Position: Head of Political Security in Banyas Other Information: Former Head of Political Security in Banyas Listed on: 10/05/2011 Last Updated: 04/07/2018 22/05/2019 Group ID: 11912.

3. HASSAN Jamil

Title: Major General DOB: –/–/1953 07/07/1953 POB: Quasayr, Homs province, Syria a.k.a: (1) AL-HASSAN, Jamil (2) HASSAN, Jameel Position: Head of Syrian Air Force Intelligence Other Information: Major-General in the Syrian Air Force. Listed on: 10/05/2011 Last Updated: 01/10/2016 22/05/2019 Group ID: 11906.

4. BILAL Mohammed

Title: Colonel Brigadier General a.k.a: BILAL, Lieutenant Colonel, Muhammad Position: Senior officer in the Air Force Intelligence Service of Syria Other Information: He is associated with the listed Scientific Studies Research Centre (SSRC). Listed on: 22/10/2014 Last Updated: 22/10/2014 22/05/2019 Group ID: 13162.

5. AL HASSAN Bassam

DOB: –/–/1953 a.k.a: AL HASAN, Bassam Position: Presidential Advisor for Strategic Affairs Listed on: 24/05/2011 Last Updated: 31/05/2013 22/05/2019 Group ID: 11935.

6. YOUNES Tawfiq

Title: Major General a.k.a: (1) YOUNES, Tawfik (2) YUNES, Tawfig (3) YUNES, Tawfik Position: Head of the Department for Internal Security of the General Intelligence Directorate Other Information: Former Head of the Department for Internal Security of the General Intelligence Directorate Listed on: 02/08/2011 Last Updated: 31/05/2013 22/05/2019 Group ID: 12025.

7. AL-ALI Lu’ai

Title: Colonel POB: Jablah, Latakia Province a.k.a: (1) AL-ALI, Loai (2) AL-ALI, Louay Position: Head of Syrian Military Intelligence, Dara’a Branch Listed on: 15/11/2011 Last Updated: 02/06/2015 22/05/2019 Group ID: 12210.

8. BARAKAT Ali

Title: Brigadier Major General Position: 103rd Brigade of the Republican Guard Division. Listed on: 02/12/2011 Last Updated: 31/05/2013 22/05/2019 Group ID: 12417.

9. MAKHLUF Talal

Title: Major General a.k.a: MAKHLOUF, Talal Position: Current commander general of the Republican Guards. Commander of the 2nd Corps. Other Information: Former commander of the 105th Brigade of the Republican Guards. Former commander general of the Republican Guards. Listed on: 02/12/2011 Last Updated: 04/07/2018 22/05/2019 Group ID: 12418.

10. KHADDOR Mohamed

Title: Brigadier Major General a.k.a: (1) KHADDOR, Mohammad (2) KHADDOR, Mohammed (3) KHADDOR, Muhammad (4) KHADDOUR, Mohamed (5) KHADDOUR, Mohammad (6) KHADDOUR, Mohammed (7) KHADDOUR, Muhammad (8) KHADDUR, Mohamed (9) KHADDUR, Mohammad (10) KHADDUR, Mohammed (11) KHADDUR, Muhammad (12) KHADOUR, Mohamed (13) KHADOUR, Mohammad (14) KHADOUR, Mohammed (15) KHADOUR, Muhammad (16) KHUDOUR, Mohamed (17) KHUDOUR, Mohammad (18) KHUDOUR, Mohammed (19) KHUDOUR, Muhammad Position: Commander of the 106th Brigade, Presidential Guard Listed on: 24/01/2012 Last Updated: 31/05/2013 22/05/2019 Group ID: 12475.

11. IBRAHIM Mohamed Heikmat

a.k.a: (1) IBRAHIM, Mohamed, Hekmat (2) IBRAHIM, Mohamed, Hikmat (3) IBRAHIM, Mohammad, Heikmat (4) IBRAHIM, Mohammad, Hekmat (5) IBRAHIM, Mohammad, Hikmat (6) IBRAHIM, Mohammed, Heikmat (7) IBRAHIM, Mohammed, Hekmat (8) IBRAHIM, Mohammed, Hikmat (9) IBRAHIM, Muhammad, Heikmat (10) IBRAHIM, Muhammad, Hekmat (11) IBRAHIM, Muhammad, Hikmat Position: Head of Operations Branch (Political Security Directorate) Other Information: Former Head of Operations Branch (Political Security Directorate) Listed on: 24/01/2012 Last Updated: 31/05/2013 22/05/2019 Group ID: 12480.

12. QADOUR Burhan

Title: Brigadier General a.k.a: (1) QADDOUR, Burhan (2) QADDUR, Burhan Position: Head of Branch 291 (Damascus) of the army’s intelligence service. Other Information: Former Head of Branch 291 (Damascus) of the army’s intelligence service. Listed on: 24/07/2012 Last Updated: 31/05/2013 22/05/2019 Group ID: 12706.

13. AL-ABDULLAH Suhail

Title: Colonel Brigadier General a.k.a: (1) AL-ABDALLAH, Suhail (2) AL-ABDALLAH, Suheil (3) AL-ABDULLAH, Suheil Position: Head of the Latakia Branch of the air force’s intelligence service. Listed on: 24/07/2012 Last Updated: 31/05/2013 22/05/2019 Group ID: 12714.

14. LUQA Hussam

Title: Brigadier Major General DOB: –/–/1964 POB: Damascus a.k.a: (1) LOUCA, Housam (2) LOUCA, Houssam (3) LOUCA, Husam (4) LOUCA, Hussam (5) LOUKA, Housam (6) LOUKA, Houssam (7) LOUKA, Husam (8) LOUKA, Hussam (9) LOUQA, Housam (10) LOUQA, Houssam (11) LOUQA, Husam (12) LOUQA, Hussam (13) LUKA, Housam (14) LUKA, Houssam (15) LUKA, Husam (16) LUKA, Hussam (17) LUQA, Housam (18) LUQA, Houssam (19) LUQA, Husam Position: Head of the Homs branch of the Political Security Directorate Other Information: Former Head of the Homs branch of the Political Security Directorate Listed on: 24/07/2012 Last Updated: 31/05/2013 22/05/2019 Group ID: 12718.

15. AL-JARROUCHEH Ahmed

DOB: –/–/1957. a.k.a: (1) AL-JAROUCHA, Ahmad (2) AL-JAROUCHA, Ahmed (3) AL- JAROUCHAH, Ahmad (4) ALJAROUCHAH, Ahmed (5) AL-JAROUCHEH, Ahmad (6) AL- JAROUCHEH, Ahmed (7) AL-JAROUSHA, Ahmad (8) ALJAROUSHA, Ahmed (9) AL- JAROUSHEH, Ahmad (10) AL-JAROUSHEH, Ahmed (11) AL-JARROUCHEH, Ahmad Position: Head of the foreign branch of General Intelligence (branch 279) Other Information: Responsible for General Intelligence arrangements in Syrian embassies Former Head of the foreign branch of General Intelligence (branch 279) Listed on: 24/07/2012 Last Updated: 31/05/2013 22/05/2019 Group ID: 12724.

16. AL WEZ Hazwan

Title: Dr. a.k.a: AL WAZZ, Hazwan Position: Minister of Education Other Information: Former Minister of Education Listed on: 16/10/2012 Last Updated: 31/05/2013 22/05/2019 Group ID: 12772.

17. AL-SABBAN Bishr

DOB: –/–/1966 POB: Damascus, Syria a.k.a: (1) AL-SABBAN, Bishr, Mazin (2) AL- SABBAN, Mohammed Bishr Other Information: Former Governor of Damascus, who was appointed by, and is associated with, Bashar al-Assad. Supports the regime and is responsible for the violent repression against the civilian population in Syria, including engaging in discriminatory practices against Sunni communities within the capital. Listed on: 28/10/2016 Last Updated: 05/03/2019 22/05/2019 Group ID: 13386.

18. ABDUL-QADER Ahmad Sheik

a.k.a: (1) ABDULQUADER, Ahmad, al-Sheik (2) QADIR, Ahmad, Sheikh, Abdul Other Information: Former Governor of Quneitra. Previously Governor of Latakia. Listed on: 28/10/2016 Last Updated: 28/10/2016 22/05/2019 Group ID: 13387.

19. KHALAF Ghassan Omar

Title: Dr Other Information: Former Governor of Hama and closely associated with members of a regime-affiliated militia in Hama known as the Hama Brigade. Listed on: 28/10/2016 Last Updated: 28/10/2016 22/05/2019 Group ID: 13388.

20. AL-SAYYED Khayr Al-Din

a.k.a: (1) AL-SAYYED, Khaireddin (2) AL-SAYYED, Khayr, al-Din, Abdul-Sattar (3) AL- SAYYED, Kheir, Eddin (4) AL-SAYYED, Kheredden (5) AL-SAYYED, Mohamed, Khair (6) ASAYED, Kheir, Eddib (7) AS-SAYYED, Khairuddin Other Information: Former Governor of Idlib. Associated with the regime’s Minister of Awqaf, Dr Mohammad Abdul-Satar al-Sayyed, who is his brother. Listed on: 28/10/2016 Last Updated: 28/10/2016 22/05/2019 Group ID: 13389.

21. AL-HASAN Nabil

DOB: –/–/1963. POB: Aleppo a.k.a: AL-HASSAN, Nabil Position: Minister of Water Resources Other Information: Former Minister of Water Resources Listed on: 14/11/2016 Last Updated: 15/11/2016 22/05/2019 Group ID: 13405.

22. AL-GHARBI Abdullah

DOB: –/–/1962. POB: Damascus a.k.a: AL-QIRBI, Abdullah Position: Minister of Internal Trade and Consumer Protection Other Information: Former Minister of Internal Trade and Consumer Protection Listed on: 14/11/2016 Last Updated: 15/11/2016 22/05/2019 Group ID: 13407.

23. DURGHAM Duraid

Position: Governor of the Central Bank of Syria Other Information: Former Governor of the Central Bank of Syria Listed on: 14/11/2016 Last Updated: 15/11/2016 22/05/2019 Group ID: 13413.

24. WANUS Ali

Title: Brigadier Major General DOB: 05/02/1964. a.k.a: WANNOUS, Ali Other Information: Holds the rank of Brigadier Major General, in post after May 2011. He is associated with the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre. Listed on: 18/07/2017 Last Updated: 18/07/2017 22/05/2019 Group ID: 13494.

25. YOUSEF Mohamed Mazen Ali

DOB: 17/05/1969. POB: Damascus Countryside, Syria Position: Minister of Industry Other Information: Former Minister of Industry. Appointed in January 2018. Listed on: 27/02/2018 Last Updated: 27/02/2018 22/05/2019 Group ID: 13613.

26. JAMALEDDINE Nazir Ahmad NAZER Jamal Eddin Mohammed

DOB: –/–/1962 02/01/1962 POB: Damascus, Syria a.k.a: (1) JAMALEDDINE, Nazir, Ahmad, Mohammed (2) NAZIR, Ahmad Nationality: Syrian Passport Details: N 011612445, issue no. 002-17-L022286 (place of issue: Syrian Arab Republic) National Identification no: 010-3028342 (Place of issue: Syrian Arab Republic) Position: Cofounder and majority shareholder of Apex Development and Projects LLC and founder of A’ayan Company for Projects and Equipment Other Information: Leading businessperson operating in Syria with significant investments in the construction industry, including a controlling 90 % stake in Apex Development and Projects LLC, which has entered into a USD 34,8 million joint venture for the construction of Marota City, a regime-backed luxury residential and commercial development. Through his participation in the Marota City development, Nazir Ahmad JamalEddine Jamal Eddin Mohammed Nazer benefits from and/or supports the Syrian regime. Listed on: 22/01/2019 Last Updated: 22/01/2019 22/05/2019 Group ID: 13753.

27. QADDOUR Hayan Mohammad Nazem KADDOUR Hayan

DOB: –/–/1970. (1) 14/07/1970 (2) 24/07/1970 POB: Damascus, Syria a.k.a: (1) NAZEM, Hayyan, Kaddour, bin, Mohammed (2) QADDOUR Hayan Mohammad Nazem Nationality: Syrian Nationality: (1) Syrian (2) Swiss Passport Details: X4662433 (place of issue: Switzerland); N 004599905 (place of issue: Syrian Arab Republic) Position: Primary Shareholder of Exceed Development and Investment Company Other Information: Leading businessperson operating in Syria, who holds a 67 % stake in Exceed Development and Investment, which has entered into a USD 17,7 million joint venture for the construction of Marota City, a regime- backed luxury residential and commercial development. Through his participation in the Marota City development, Hayan Mohammad Nazem Qaddour benefits from and/or supports the Syrian regime. Listed on: 22/01/2019 Last Updated: 22/01/2019 22/05/2019 Group ID: 13761.

28. AL-AZAB Imad Muwaffaq

DOB: –/–/1970. POB: Damascus Countryside Position: Minister of Information Listed on: 04/03/2019 Last Updated: 04/03/2019 22/05/2019 Group ID: 13773.

29. IBRAHIM Bassam Bashir

DOB: –/–/1960. POB: Hama Other Information: Minister of Higher Education. Appointed in November 2018. Listed on: 04/03/2019 Last Updated: 04/03/2019 22/05/2019 Group ID: 13774.

Links:

OFSI Notice

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/798

Press Releases

Link:

HKMA Notice

This one makes more sense – because it has much more detail than the Raphaels Bank one, to which is it related…

Unfortunately, the notice doesn’t cut and paste at all, so let me give you the highlights:

• Travelex (UK) Ltd was fined 10,000 GBP for processing that same 204 GBP payment for someone designated under the Egypt sanctions program
• They self-reported, but received no adjustment of the penalty for it
• “Travelex had direct, in-person, contact with a designated person (DP), in the UK, and dealt with funds belonging to that person despite having access to their passport, which clearly identified the individual by both name, date of birth and nationality”
• “Travelex were aware of financial sanctions risks and their obligations, and despite this they dealt with funds belonging to a DP. The regime under which the individual was designated is one where sanctions are applied because of the misappropriation of Egyptian State funds. Travelex’ s actions allowed the individual to utilize funds that should have been frozen. No matter the value of the transaction, the breach directly contravened the policy intention of the asset freeze.”

Eh… something tells me that, had this been OFAC, they would have gotten a Cautionary Letter, at worst. You would think the intent of this program is to prevent capital flight, not prevent someone sending their relative a few hundred pounds.

What do you think?

Link:

OFSI Imposition of Monetary Penalty

Press Releases

Link:

HKMA Notice

Literally… OFAC issued a Finding of Violation, which is statistically the least frequent result of an investigation, to State Street Bank and Trust. Basically, it made pension payments to a US person’s US bank account, while the person was resident in Iran. Just reminds you that there are many ways to establish jurisdiction…

State Street did self-disclose the violations (45 of them), and did make changes to correct the gap in its compliance program.

OFAC considered the following as aggravating factors:

 Processed transactions on behalf of an individual in Iran after being alerted to the Iran connection, and thus SSBT reasonably should have been put on notice that the conduct constituted a violation of U.S. law;

 Had actual knowledge that it was processing transactions on behalf of an individual who was resident in Iran, as SSBT stopped, escalated, reviewed, and approved every one of the 45 distribution payments, each of which contained an explicit reference to Iran;

 Caused harm to the sanctions program objectives and the integrity of the ITSR by performing a service on behalf of an individual in Iran;

 Is a large and commercially sophisticated financial institution;

 Had escalation and review procedures for sanctions-related alerts that nonetheless failed

to lead to correct decisions on 45 occasions; and

 Had compliance screening issues that continued for a year after the Federal Reserve Bank

of Boston notified the bank of a related issue pertaining to inadequate escalation procedures.

and mitigating factors:

 No SSBT managers or supervisors appear to have been aware of the conduct that led to the violations;

 SSBT’s screening filter did appropriately identify and alert staff to the nexus to a sanctioned jurisdiction;

 The payments at issue may not have actually been transferred to Iran, though they were made on behalf of a person in Iran;

 SSBT took remedial action in response to the violations and enhanced its escalation procedures as they pertain to sanctions-related alerts;

 There is a possibility that the funds transfers could have become licensed; and

 SSBT cooperated with OFAC by voluntarily self-disclosing the violations and entering

into a tolling agreement with extensions.

in its decision-making process.

Link:

OFAC Enforcement Information

In particular, these are for “direct general insurance”, “direct life insurance” and reinsurance businesses. It speaks to the three lines of defense, management commitment, policies and procedures, training, CDD and training, record keeping and SAR/STR reporting. It’s a light read – 12 page PDF. As time permits, I may republished it by section to keep the reading to a minimum.

Link:

MAS AML/CFT Guidelines document

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 These Guidelines apply to all insurers licensed under section 8 of the Insurance Act (Cap. 142) (“the Act”) and to all foreign insurers operating in Singapore under a foreign insurer scheme established under Part IIA of the Act1.

1.2 Direct life insurers writing life policies should refer to MAS Notice 314 on “Prevention of Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism – Direct Life Insurers” and the accompanying guidelines in relation to direct life insurance business. For all other insurers, including foreign insurers operating in Singapore under a foreign insurer scheme and direct life insurers writing accident and health policies, these Guidelines are intended to provide guidance on the prevention of money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism.

1.3 For the purposes of these Guidelines, the licensed insurers and foreign insurers operating in Singapore under a foreign insurer scheme as defined in paragraph 1.1 will be collectively known as “insurers”.

1.4 Singapore’s primary legislations to combat money laundering (“ML”) and terrorism financing (“TF”) are the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (Cap. 65A) (“CDSA”) and the Terrorism (Suppressing of Financing) Act (“TSOFA”) respectively. Insurers may refer to the Inter-Ministry Committee on Terrorist Designation’s website for more information2 in relation to the TSOFA, and the Commercial Affairs Department’s website3 for more information on the CDSA and the reporting of suspicious transactions.

1.5 ML is a process4 intended to mask the benefits derived from criminal conduct so that they appear to have originated from a legitimate source.

1.6 TF refers to the financing of terrorist acts, and of terrorists and terrorist organisations.

1.7 Proliferation financing (“PF”) refers to the act of providing funds or financial services which are used, in whole or in part, for the manufacture, acquisition, possession, development, export, trans-shipment, brokering, transport, transfer, stockpiling or use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery and related materiels (including both technologies and dual use goods used for non-legitimate purposes), in contravention of national laws or, where applicable, international obligations.

1.8 In addition, targeted financial sanctions (“TFS”) relate to specific sanctions imposed in relation to both asset freezing and prohibitions to prevent funds or other assets from being made available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of designated persons and entities5. TFS include the following components:

(a) Sanctions relating to TF (i.e. the lists indicated under the First Schedule of the TSOFA and any other lists or information provided by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (“the Authority”) or other relevant authorities in Singapore regarding sanctions relating to TF);

(b) Sanctions relating to PF that make reference to resolutions effected by the United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”)6; and

(c) Sanctions relating to resolutions effected by the UNSC on undesirable persons7.

In these Guidelines, regulations issued by the Authority in relation to paragraphs 1.8(b) and 1.8(c) will be collectively known as the “MAS TFS Regulations”.

1.9 For the purposes of these Guidelines, the risks of TF, PF and non-compliance with TFS will be collectively known as “TF risks”. Similarly, where the term “countering the financing of terrorism” (“CFT”) is used in relation to controls, this would refer to control processes to counter both TF and PF, and to ensure compliance with TFS.

1.10 The expressions used in these Guidelines have the same meaning as those found in the Act, except where expressly defined in these Guidelines or where the context otherwise requires.

1.11 The degree of observance with these Guidelines by an insurer may have an impact on the Authority’s overall risk assessment of the insurer, including the quality of its board and senior management oversight, governance, internal controls and risk management processes.

Press Releases

Link:

HKMA Notice

This is OFAC’s 27th “Annual Report to the Congress on Assets in the United States Relating to Terrorist Countries and Organizations Engaged in International Terrorism” – a mouthful, I know.

Some highlights:

• $46.181 million in blocked terrorist organization assets, up from $43.606 million in 2017
• Biggest increases in this group – Hizballah blocked assets increased from $9.814 million to $11.601 million, Hamas went from $1.143 million to $1.364 million, the IRGC-Quds Force increased from $14.491 million to $14.989 million, ISIL went from $251,613 to $657,689, Lashkar-e Tayyiba increased from $218,639 to $397,774, and the Taliban increased from $10,728 to $206,805.
• State Sponsors of Terrorism have $216.83 million in blocked funds, up from $201.53 million in 2017
• Of that increase, the overwhelming bulk is due to North Korea (almost $11 million), with Iran ($2.9 million) and Syria ($1.4 million) making up the rest
• State Sponsors of terrorism own a bit of real estate: Syria owns 4 properties, Iran 11, and Bank Melli indirectly has an ownership interest in a NY building

Link:

Calendar Year 2018 Terrorist Assets Report

On Tuesday, UK regulators implemented Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/855 by amending the following 9 individual listings:

1. NADERI Mohammad

Title: Brigadier-General Position: Head of Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) Head of Iran’s Aviation Industries Organisation (IAIO). Other Information: EU listing. Not UN. Former Head of Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) Listed on: 24/06/2008 Last Updated: 24/06/2008 29/05/2019 Group ID: 10643.

2. BORBORUDI Sayed Shamsuddin

a.k.a. BORBOROUDI, Seyed, Samseddin DOB: 21/09/1969 Position: Deputy Head of Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran Other Information: EU listing. Not UN. Listed on: 02/12/2011 Last Updated: 02/12/2011 29/05/2019 Group ID: 12230.

3. DANESHJOO Kamran

a.k.a: DANESHJOU, Kamran Position: Minister of Science, Research and Technology Other Information: EU listing. Not UN. Former Minister of Science, Research and Technology Listed on: 02/12/2011 Last Updated: 02/12/2011 29/05/2019 Group ID: 12232.

4. FATAH Parviz

DOB: –/–/1961. Position: Khatam al Anbiya’s no 2 Other Information: EU listing. Not UN. Member of the IRGC. Former Minister of Energy. Listed on: 27/07/2010 Last Updated: 27/10/2010 29/05/2019 Group ID: 11233.

5. FARAHI Seyyed Mahdi

Title: IRGC Brigadier-General Position: Managing Director of the Defence Industries Organisation (DIO) Other Information: EU listing. Not UN. Former head of Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) and former managing director of the UN- designated Defence Industries Organisation (DIO). Member of the IRGC and a Deputy in Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Listed on: 24/06/2008 Last Updated: 24/06/2008 29/05/2019 Group ID: 10635.

6. HOSEYNITASH Ali

Title: IRGC Brigadier-General Position: Head of the General Department of the Supreme National Security Council Other Information: EU listing. Not UN. Involved in formulating policy on the nuclear issue Member of the IRGC. Member of the Supreme National Security Council and involved in formulating policy on nuclear issues. Listed on: 24/06/2008 Last Updated: 24/06/2008 29/05/2019 Group ID: 10637.

7. SHAMSHIRI Ali

Title: IRGC Brigadier-General Position: MODAFL Deputy for Counter-Intelligence Other Information: EU listing. Not UN. Responsible for security of MODAFL personnel and Installations Member of the IRGC. Has held senior roles in MODAFL. Listed on: 24/06/2008 Last Updated: 24/06/2008 29/05/2019 Group ID: 10646.

8. VAHIDI Ahmad

Title: IRGC Brigadier-General Position: Minister of the MODAFL and former Deputy Head of MODAFL Other Information: EU listing. Not UN. Former Minister of the MODAFL. Listed on: 24/06/2008 Last Updated: 18/11/2009 29/05/2019 Group ID: 10647.

9. SHAMS Abolghassem Mozaffari

Other Information: EU listing. Not UN. Former Head of Khatam Al-Anbia Construction Headquarters. Listed on: 02/12/2011 Last Updated: 02/12/2011 29/05/2019 Group ID: 12275.

and 2 entity listings:

1. ORGANISATION OF DEFENSIVE INNOVATION AND RESEARCH (SPND)

Other Information: EU listing. Not UN. Run by UN designated Mohsen Fakhrizadeh and is part of the Ministry of Defence For Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). SPND’s head of security is Davoud Babaei The Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) directly supports Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. The IAEA has identified SPND with their concerns over possible military dimensions (PMD) to Iran’s nuclear programme. SPND is run by UN-designated Mohsen Fakhrizadeh- Mahabadi and is part of the Ministry of Defence For Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) designated by the EU. Listed on: 24/12/2012 Last Updated: 24/12/2012 29/05/2019 Group ID: 12821.

2. BEHNAM SAHRIYARI TRADING COMPANY

Address: Ziba Building, 10th Floor, Northern Sohrevardi Street, Tehran, Iran.Other Information: EU listing. Not UN. Sent two containers of various types of firearms from Iran to Syria in May 2007. Involved in the shipment of arms on behalf of the IRGC. Listed on: 24/01/2012 Last Updated: 24/01/2012 29/05/2019 Group ID: 12499.

under the Iran (nuclear proliferation) sanctions program.

Links:

OFSI Notice

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/855

On Wednesday, UK regulators implemented Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/850 by removing the following person:

MOHAMMED, Mazen Salah

DOB: (1) 01/01/1982. (2) 01/01/1980. (3) 18/05/1981. POB: (1) Baghdad (2) Arbil, (1) (2) Iraq a.k.a: (1) ALI HUSSEIN, Mazen (2) MUHAMAD, Issa, Salah Nationality: Iraqi Passport Details: German travel document (Reiseausweis) A 0144378 (revoked as at Sep 2012) Address: Hauzenberg, Germany, 94051.Other Information: UN Ref QI.A.202.05. Member of Ansar Al-Islam. Released from custody in Germany on 18 May 2012 Listed on: 07/12/2005 Last Updated: 06/12/2012 29/05/2019 Group ID: 8784.

from the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida counter terrorism sanctions program.

Link:

OFSI Notice

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/850

Circular to Licensed Corporations and Associated Entities

Anti-Money Laundering / Counter-Financing of Terrorism

Early Alert on United Nations Sanctions

The sanctions committee of the United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) which administers the sanctions regime for ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida added one entity to and removed one individual from its sanctions list ^{Note 1, 2} on 14 May 2019 (New York time).  Please refer to the relevant press releases issued by the UNSC in Attachment 1.

Licensed corporations (“LCs”) and associated entities (“AEs”) should update their screening databases with the above changes made by the UNSC sanctions committee for sanctions screening of customers and payments.  LCs and AEs are reminded to refer to our circular on United Nations Sanctions issued on 7 February 2018 ^{Note 3} which sets out our expectations on actions that LCs and AEs should take regarding sanctions imposed by the UNSC.

Should you have any queries regarding the contents of this circular, please contact Ms Kiki Wong at 2231 1569 who will assist to refer your queries to the relevant officer.

Intermediaries Supervision Department
Intermediaries Division
Securities and Futures Commission

Enclosure

End

SFO/IS/025/2019

Links:

HK SFC Circular

UN Press Releases (Attachment 1)

Commerce and Economic Development Bureau List (Attachment 2)

2 MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORISM FINANCING

2.1 Insurers should be cognisant of their exposure to ML/TF risks. Payments originating from insurers are viewed as commonplace, with the money assumed to be clean. If money launderers are able to successfully place funds into an insurance policy, they would have made significant steps in layering and integrating such funds into the financial system.

2.2 Funds for TF may be derived from criminal activities such as robbery, drug-trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, fraud or hacking of online accounts. In such cases, there may also be an element of money laundering involved to disguise the source of such funds.

2.3 Terrorist acts and organisations may also be financed from legitimate sources such as donations from charities, legitimate business operations and self-funding by individuals. In addition, considering the fact that TF does not always need to involve large sums of money, TF can be hard to detect and insurers should remain vigilant.

2.4 In the case of direct insurance business, ML/TF activity could occur within the context of, and as the motive behind, insurance fraud. For example, exaggerated or false claims could be made to recover part of invested illegitimate funds. Other examples could include the refund of premiums, by an insurer’s cheque, for overpaid or cancelled policies.

2.5 In the case of reinsurance business, ML/TF activity could occur through the establishment of fictitious fronting arrangements and captives, or by the misuse of normal reinsurance transactions. Examples include dealing with bogus insurers or receiving tainted premiums from insurers which have weak anti-money laundering (“AML”) controls that allow illicit funds or funds from unclear or dubious sources to pass through.

3 THE THREE LINES OF DEFENCE

3.1 Insurers are reminded that the ultimate responsibility and accountability for ensuring compliance with AML and CFT (“AML/CFT”)-related laws and regulations rest with their board of directors and senior management8.

3.2 An insurer’s board of directors and senior management are responsible for ensuring strong governance and sound risk management and controls in relation to AML/CFT within the insurer. While certain responsibilities can be delegated to senior employees responsible for AML/CFT, the final accountability rests with an insurer’s board of directors and senior management. The insurer should ensure a strong compliance culture throughout the organisation, where the board of directors and senior management set the right tone from the top. The board of directors and senior management should also set a clear risk appetite and establish a compliance culture whereby financial crime is not tolerated.

3.3 Business units (e.g. front office, customer-facing functions) constitute the first line of defence in identifying, assessing and mitigating the ML/TF risks faced by an insurer. As part of the first line of defence, business units require robust controls to detect illicit activities and should be allocated sufficient resources to perform this function effectively. The insurer’s policies, procedures and controls on AML/CFT should be clearly documented in writing, and communicated to all relevant officers, employees and agents in the various business units. The insurer should also ensure that its officers, employees and agents are adequately trained to be aware of their AML/CFT-related obligations, so that the insurer is in compliance with prevailing AML/CFT laws and regulations.

3.4 The second line of defence includes an insurer’s compliance function9, and other support functions such as operations, human resource or technology that work together with the compliance function to identify ML/TF risks. The compliance function is typically responsible for the screening of new and existing business relations and their ongoing monitoring. The compliance function should alert the board of directors or senior management if it has reason to believe that the insurer’s officers, employees or agents are failing or have failed to adequately address ML/TF risks and concerns or have breached applicable AML/CFT laws and regulations. While the other support functions also play a role in mitigating ML/TF risks that an insurer faces, the compliance function will usually be the main contact point in relation to all AML/CFT-related issues for domestic and foreign authorities, including supervisory authorities, law enforcement authorities and financial intelligence units.

3.5 The third line of defence is an insurer’s internal audit function, which plays a key role in independently evaluating the insurer’s AML/CFT risk management framework and controls. This independent assessment is achieved through internal audits (or an equivalent function’s periodic evaluations) of the insurer’s compliance with AML/CFT laws and regulations, as well as policies, procedures and controls. An insurer should establish policies for periodic AML/CFT internal audits, covering areas such as –

(a) adequacy of the insurer’s AML/CFT policies, procedures and controls in identifying ML/TF risks, addressing the identified risks and complying with laws, regulations and notices;

(b) effectiveness of the insurer’s officers, employees and agents in implementing the insurer’s policies, procedures and controls;

(c) effectiveness of the compliance oversight and quality control including parameters and criteria for transaction alerts; and

(d) adequacy and effectiveness of the insurer’s AML/CFT training of relevant officers, employees and agents.

The results of these assessments should be reported to either the Audit or Risk Committee of the insurer, or a similar body of oversight, on a regular basis. Significant AML/CFT issues should be escalated to the Board. Any deficiencies identified should be promptly addressed to mitigate risks, including legal and reputational risks, to the insurer.

3.6 The board of directors and senior management should understand the ML/TF risks that the insurer is exposed to and how the insurer’s AML/CFT control framework operates to mitigate those risks. The AML/CFT controls put in place by an insurer should commensurate with the scale, complexity and inherent risk of the insurer, and may be broadly categorised into the following 4 categories, which will be elaborated on within these Guidelines:

4

(a) Management Oversight, Policies and Training;

(b) Customer Due Diligence and Screening Procedures;

(c) Record Keeping and Documentation; and

(d) Assessment and Reporting of Suspicious Transactions.